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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1927, the federal government has imposed a wide
variety of content and structural' regulations on the broadcast
media that would be unconstitutional were they applied to the
print media.2 Although the Court invokes strict scrutiny to
assess the constitutionality of print media regulations, it
employs only intermediate scrutiny to judge the constitutional-
ity of broadcast media regulations.' The Court predicates less-
ened First Amendment protection for the broadcast media on a
number of highly suspect rationales.
The broadcast media is said to be more technologically
and economically scarce than the print media such that without
government regulation of who may speak and what may be
said, the broadcast media would come to be owned by a select
few who would air their views to the exclusion of all others.4
1. See Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC
Ownership Regulations, 38 CATm. U. L. REV. 401 (1989).
2. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(upholding FCC requirement that broadcasters air contrasting views on
controversial issues of public importance) with Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down a similar state statute that
mandated a print media right of editorial reply) and League of Women Voters
v. FCC, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984) ("[T]he absolute freedom to advocate one's
own positions without also presenting opposing viewpoints - a freedom
enjoyed, for example, by newspaper publishers and soapbox orators - is
denied to broadcasters.").
3. Compare Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 and Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214
(1966) with League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380 (restrictions on broadcast
press content are upheld if they are "narrowly tailored to further a substantial
governmental interest") and Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388 ("Where there are
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment
right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write
or publish.").
4. This view is a mainstay of Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.
See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1990); Red
Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 ("Because of the scarcity of [electromagnetic]
frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in
favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium.");
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377 ("Congress may... seek to assure that
the public receives through this medium a balanced presentation of
information on issues of public importance that otherwise might not be
addressed if control of the medium were left entirely in the hands of those
who own and operate broadcasting stations."); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226
(1943) ("unlike other modes of expression radio inherently is not available to
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The broadcast media is said to have a "pervasive presence in
the lives of all Americans" and to thereby pose a threat to an
unsuspecting public that is not presented by the print media.5
The broadcast media is said to be technologically different
from the print media, and this physical difference in the mode
of communication is said to justify a legal difference in the con-
stitutional protection afforded the message.6 Finally, the gov-
ernment is said to have an "important" interest in ensuring
maximum ownership and viewpoint diversity in the broadcast
media, even in the absence of any alleged antitrust violations, 7
although the government is precluded from having any such
role in the print media, except upon proof of antitrust
violations.8
This article demonstrates that the motivations that led to
the current licensing regime and the rationales that support it
are antithetical to the First Amendment's core values. Broad-
cast press licensing is the by-product of a monopoly rent/con-
tent control quidpro quo between the broadcast industry and the
government. This trade is part of a recurrent historical pattern
begun in 1530, when Henry VIII licensed the print press. It
has recurred thereafter as each new technology for mass com-
munication comes to the fore.9
The rationales for content regulation are shown to be
derived from false historical and factual premises and to posit
double standards. This article advocates application of the
print model standard to all modes of mass communication.
The failure to apply the print model standard universally has
caused our First Amendment to become increasingly
anachronistic.
all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of
expression, it is subject to government regulation.").
5. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (Regulations of
"indecent" programming are said to be justified because "prior warnings
cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program
content.").
6. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386 ("[D]ifferences in the characteristics of
news media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them.").
7. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3010 ("Safeguarding the public's
right to receive a diversity of views and information over the airwaves is
therefore an integral component of the FCC's mission."); FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); NBC, 319 U.S. 190.
8. Compare Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254-58 with NBC, 319 U.S. at 223-24.
9. For further elaboration on this theme, see JONATHAN W. EMORD,
FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991) [hereinafter
EMORD].
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At a time when the public overwhelmingly prefers the elec-
tronic media as their source of news, information, and opin-
ion, t1 it is essential that this media be able to check
government maladministration, probe into controversy, offer
opinionated solutions to problems, and challenge orthodoxies
as fully and effectively as the print media. If existing content
regulations are not constitutionally checked and eliminated,
the idea marketplace of tomorrow will likely become epito-
mized not by strident editorialization, potent criticism of gov-
ernment officials and laws, and truth-seeking but by bland
programming fare, views calculated not to offend, and truth-
seeking limited to the non-political realm.
It is not enough to lay a precedential foundation for the
protection of the print media when those media are the least
populous press forms. The courts must do more if they are to
ensure the free flow of political and commercial ideas and
information upon which our society so greatly depends. They
must apply the First Amendment to the "press" whatever form
it takes. There must be freedom for the message regardless of
the medium.
Only when granted full First Amendment and property
rights protection will the electronic press come to enjoy the
same degree of independence from government that the print
media has known-an independence essential if the modern
media are to be free from government oppression and
intimidation. t
This article concludes by advocating a property rights
alternative to replace electronic media regulation. It shows
that such a system existed before the advent of comprehensive
10. Today, the electronic media are the media of choice for the vast
majority of Americans. See THE BROADCASTING YEARBOOK A-3 (1991)
(according to The Roper Organization, 65% of Americans consider
broadcast television to be their primary source of news and 49% consider it
the most believable news source).
11. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 5-9 (arguing that government
suppression of speech, rather than private limitations on speech
opportunities, poses the greatest threat to freedom of speech and press).
Private limitations on speech are merely acts of editorial discretion, the
quintessence of a free press. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or
unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this
crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
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broadcasting regulation and that such a system can be imple-
mented again today.
II. BROADCAST LICENSING IS AN HISTORICAL ANOMALY
There are two competing theories on the origins of broad-
cast regulation, a market failure thesis and an industry capture
thesis.' 2 The traditional view explains broadcast regulation as
unavoidable. In short, the laissez-faire model was tried and
failed, necessitating government regulation. The revisionist
view explains broadcast regulation as the by-product of more
sinister motives, a bargain between broadcast industry leaders
and government officials in which the former abandoned their
claims to property rights in the spectrum and relinquished a
degree of editorial discretion to the state in exchange for statu-
tory limits on the number of broadcast licenses (thereby ensur-
ing themselves above market rates of return). According to the
revisionist view; a workable system of private rights in the spec-
trum was known to exist before comprehensive regulation of
radio but was consciously rejected in favor of government con-
trol. This revisionist view best explains the history preceding
Congress's adoption of the Radio Act of 1927.
A. The Traditional View: The Market Failure Thesis
In National Broadcasting Co. v. U.S.," 3 Justice Felix Frank-
furter articulated the history of broadcast press licensing that
has been followed by most commentators and the federal
courts ever since. According to Frankfurter, between 1921 and
1925 the nascent broadcast industry developed at a phenome-
nal rate, yet did so in a helter skelter manner.' 4 By 1926, fol-
12. Compare, CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & JOHN M. KrtrROSS, STAY
TUNED: A CONCISE HISTORY OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 88 (1978)
[hereinafter STERLING & KiTrROSs] and William H. Melody, Radio Spectrum
Allocation: Role of the Market, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980) and Dallas W.
Smythe, Facing Facts about the Broadcasting Business, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 96
(1952) (all presenting the market failure thesis) with Matthew L. Spitzer, The
Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990 (1989)
[hereinafter Spitzer] and Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation
of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990) [hereinafter Hazlett] and
EMORD, supra note 9, at 146-57 (all presenting the industry capture thesis).
13. 319 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1943).
14. On November 2, 1920, Westinghouse Electric Company first used
radio for commercial broadcasting (via station KDKA, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania). By March 1, 1922, sixty broadcast stations were operating
nationwide. Just eight months later, 564 stations were operating. One year
later, in March of 1923, there were 588. In October of 1924, the number
decreased to 530. See LAWRENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE FEDERAL RADIO
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lowing two court set-backs that stripped Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover of the limited regulatory powers
he then wielded, the signals of several hundred stations began
to collide replacing intelligible reception with unintelligible
cacophony.15 Broadcasters, seeking interference-free opera-
tion, roamed the frequency band, altering their power at will.' 6
This collapse of orderly market processes made federal inter-
vention imperative. 7
Advocates of the traditional view believe the private radio
marketplace incapable of sorting out property rights because,
unlike other commodities, the spectrum is an unknown entity,
intangible and invisible. They argue that "etheric bedlam"'"
can not be stopped without regulatory restraints. According to
COMMISSION: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 4-7 (1932)
[hereinafter SCHMECKEBIER]. In 1925, the number of stations had increased
to approximately 600, and from July 1926 to February 1927, the number of
stations increased by about 200 more. See NBC, 319 U.S. 190, 211-12; see also
Hazlett, supra note 12, at 139-41.
15. From September of 1921 (when the first broadcasting license was
issued by the Secretary of Commerce under the Radio Communications Act
of Aug. 13, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912)) until March of
1923, Hoover licensed the use of only two wave lengths for broadcasting, 360
and 400 meters (i.e., 833 kc and 750 kc). See LAWRENCE W. LIcHTY &
MALACHI C. TOPPING, AMERICAN BROADCASTING 536 (1975) [hereinafter
LICHTY & TOPPING]. At the second national radio conference in March of
1923, Hoover agreed with the broadcast industry to enlarge the number of
available frequencies to those within the range of 222 meters (i.e., 1350 kc) to
545 meters (i.e., 550 kc). See CLARENCE CLEVELAND DILL, RADIO LAW:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 70-71 (1938) [hereinafter DILL].
16. Several colorful accounts of radio interference can be found in the
conventional history but none more colorful than the following: "[C]haos
rode the air waves, pandemonium filled every loud-speaker and the twentieth
century Tower of Babel was made in the image of the antenna towers of some
thousand broadcasters who, like the Kilkenny cats, were about to eat each
other up." FRANCIS S. CHASE, SOUND AND FURY 21 (1942).
17. See NBC, 319 U.S. at 212-13; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969).
18. In a letter dated March 30, 1910 from the Department of the Navy
to the Senate Committee on Commerce, the Navy used the term "etheric
bedlam" to describe interference to its ship to ship and ship to shore
communications caused by private radio operators before the advent of
commercial broadcasting: "Calls of distress from vessels in peril on the sea
go unheeded or are drowned out in the etheric bedlam produced by
numerous stations all trying to communicate at once .... It is not putting the
case too strongly to state that the situation is intolerable, and is growing
worse." S. REP. No. 659, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1910).
Justice Frankfurter described a similar situation befalling the broadcast
industry in 1926 and 1927: "These new stations used any frequencies they
desired, regardless of the interference thereby caused to others. Existing
stations changed to other frequencies and increased their power and hours of
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the traditional view, by 1926 Congress had but three alterna-
tives: spectral anarchy (i.e., the status quo), outright govern-
ment ownership of the means of broadcast communication, or
public ownership of the airwaves and private operation on
them pursuant to a utility-based system of regulation.' 9
From 1922 to 1925, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoo-
ver held four national radio conferences at which he informally
regulated radio with the consent of the broadcast industry.
Broadcasters agreed to operate within certain parameters and
thereby avoided interference problems. 20 Hoover developed,
with the industry's blessing, cognizable rights to the use of the
spectrum. He did so by refusing to license more than one
operator to broadcast on a single frequency at a set power at a
single time. He protected existing licensees in accordance with
a first in time, first in right preference principle. The Secretary
also restricted the number of available broadcast frequencies,
transmitter locations, and wavelength assignments, and he
withheld action on a number of license applications to protect
existing operators from potential interference. 2'
According to the traditional view, this system worked rea-
sonably well until the Secretary was forced by the courts to
operation at will. The result was confusion and chaos. With everybody on
the air, nobody could be heard." NBC, 319 U.S. at 212.
The traditional view ascribes this situation to a supposed inability on the
part of broadcasters to function without destructive interference during a
period of self-regulation. See STERLING & KIrrRoss, supra note 12, at 88
("The cacophony on the air after mid-1926 was ample proof that
broadcasters could not cooperate sufficiently to function without outside
regulatory force."); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375 ("Before 1927, the allocation of
frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, and the result was chaos.");
Nicholas Johnson, Towers of Babel: The Chaos in Radio Spectrum Utilization and
Allocation, 34 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 505 (1969).
19. According to the traditional view, a property rights system was
never seriously considered by Congress or anyone else for that matter. See
Hazlett, supra note 12, at 141-43 (listing the works of numerous economic
and legal commentators who record either that regulators were not aware of
a property rights alternative or that such an alternative was considered but
found unworkable).
20. See DILL, supra note 15, at 65-72; see also SCHMECKEBIER, supra note
14, at 4-12; LICHTY & TOPPING, supra note 15, at 534-44; PHILIP T. ROSEN,
THE MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, 1920-1934, at 49 (1980) [hereinafter ROSEN] ("Hoover had
stated that the voluntary system of government-industry cooperation had
been working well .. ").
21. See Hazlett, supra note 12, at 139-41, 145 ("It is clear that such
chaos as potentially could exist was explicitly remedied by federal
establishment of property rights, followed by market trading to assign such
rights to their highest valued employments.").
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abandon all attempts at regulation. Following court decisions
holding that he lacked authority to deny an application for a
radio license 22 and lacked authority to require licensees to
operate on any single frequency, 23 a so-called "breakdown in
the law" occurred.
Secretary Hoover did not appeal Zenith. Instead, he sought
an opinion from the Acting Attorney General, WilliamJ. Dono-
van, about the extent of his authority under the Radio Act of
1912. Donovan confirmed that the Act did not delegate to
Hoover authority to regulate the operating parameters of
licensed broadcast stations, except to prohibit them from using
the wave lengths between 600 and 1600 meters (which were
reserved for government use by the Act).24
Following his receipt of the Acting Attorney General's
opinion, the Secretary began granting radio licenses to all who
had applied for them.25 He granted some 210 applications
between July 1, 1926 and February 1, 1927, bringing the
number of licenses issued to about 716.26 This led to the inter-
ference that drowned out intelligible reception in many parts of
the country.2 7
According to the traditional view, the market was to blame
for the audible clatter on the airwaves that followed the Secre-
tary's loss of regulatory power.28 In short, without regulation
chaos reigned.
22. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio, 286 F. 1003, dismissed, 266 U.S. 636
(1923).
23. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill.
1926).
24. See 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 126 (1926).
25. See 68 CONG. REC. 3031 (1927) (the statements of Clarence C. Dill).
26. See LicHTv & TOPPING, supra note 15, at 554; SYDNEY W. HEAD,
BROADCASTING IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF TELEVISION AND RADIO 129 (1956)
[hereinafter HEAD]; Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2
J.L. & ECON. 1, 5 (1959) [hereinafter Coase].
27. In December of 1926, President Calvin Coolidge remarked:
Due to the decisions of the courts, the authority of the department
[of Commerce] under the law of 1912 has broken down; many more
stations have been operating than can be accommodated within the
limited number of wave-lengths available; further stations are in
[the] course of construction; many stations have departed from the
scheme of allocation set down by the department; and the whole
service of this most important public function has drifted into such
chaos as seems likely, if not remedied, to destroy its great value.
Quoted in FRANK J, KAHN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 33-34
(1973) [hereinafter KAHN].
28. See, e.g., STUDY, COMMISSION ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in REGULATION OF BROADCASTING:
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Recently, the traditional view has been critically examined
and found wanting. In particular, Thomas W. Hazlett has
refocused attention on the period from 1920 to 1927 and has
found government regulation not an inevitable but a rational
choice not among three, but among four alternatives: the then
existing system of zero-priced entry and no protection for
rights to use of the spectrum, a system of outright government
ownership and control of the means of communication, a sys-
tem of government regulation through licensure of the broad-
cast press, and a system of governmentally protected property
rights in the spectrum.
29
B. The Revisionist View: The Industry Capture Thesis
For some time, those who have closely examined broadcast
regulation in the United States have found government advo-
cates of broadcast regulation motivated to a considerable
degree by a desire to gain control over the structure and con-
tent of that medium. Radio was the first medium of instantane-
ous mass communication and was viewed with alarm by
incumbent politicians who thought regulation necessary to pre-
vent radio from falling into the "uncontrolled hands" of indus-
try leaders. They feared private editorial discretion because it
could deny them access to the media, force them to suffer criti-
cism for their political agendas without an opportunity to rebut
attacks, or even cause them to lose re-election. 0 Of course, it
would have been possible for members of Congress to limit
government's role in regulating the broadcast media to polic-
ing for interference, but this would not have provided the
degree of editorial control that Congress desired. Conse-
quently, Congress defined no such limited role for itself or for
its regulatory agencies, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC)
and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the
FRC's successor.
HALF A CENTURY OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BROADCASTING AND THE
NEED FOR FURTHER LEGISLATIVE ACTION 6-7 (1958).
29. See Hazlett, supra note 12, at 142 (explaining that no serious effort
was undertaken by the government to create a federal system of protected
property rights in the spectrum during the debates preceding passage of the
Radio Act of 1927); see also Spitzer, supra note 12, at 1043-48; EMORD, supra
note 9, at 137-65.
30. In this context, the term "uncontrolled hands" was first used by
Secretary Hoover, who warned at the First National Radio Conference in
1922 that there was a "necessity to so establish [a] public right over the ether
roads that there may be no national regret that we have parted with a great
national asset into uncontrolled hands." Quoted in LICHTY & TOPPING, supra
note 15, at 534.
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Before Congress enacted laws for the comprehensive regu-
lation of radio, various government departments vied for con-
trol over the medium. Beginning in the early 1920s, the
Department of the Navy, the United States Post Office, and the
Department of Commerce beseeched Congress to permit their
respective departments to gain control over the medium."'
The most successful political operator among the department
heads was Hoover.3 2 Early in the inter-departmental struggle,
Hoover forged alliances with industry leaders and members of
Congress that other department officials were either unable or
unwilling to forge. He did this through championing the posi-
tion of the broadcast industry in its struggle for more spectrum
space against the amateur radio operators, 33 by advocating reg-
ulations that favored broadcast industry leaders over new mar-
ket entrants but that also gave Congress the degree of control
over radio content it desired, 34 and by assuming extralegal
31. The most detailed account of the political struggle among these
federal departments is contained in ROSEN, supra note 20, at 29-33. See also
LiCHTV & TOPPING, supra note 15, at 536 (quoting Edward F. Sarno, Jr.):
Fifteen official delegates attended the [First National Radio]
Conference; 10 representing governmental interests and five non-
governmental interests, particularly in the fields of science and
engineering.... Large commercial concerns such as AT&T, General
Electric, Westinghouse and RCA wanted the Commerce Department
to control broadcasting and were decidedly against control by either
the Navy or the Army. Navy representatives still claimed a vested
interest in radio, due to their control of the medium during World
War I, and the War and Agriculture departments also were anxious
to expand their operations. Besides this, the Post Office department
felt that since radio was a form of communication, it fell within its
area of control much as did the mails, although Congress had
rejected this contention a few years earlier.
See also EMORD, supra note 9, at 140-42.
32. See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 33 ("What appeared to be a
groundswell of opinion urging the Commerce Department to intervene had
in reality, of course, been carefully orchestrated by Secretary Hoover.
Against a background of interdepartmental strife and the 'take-off' of
commercial broadcasting, the Commerce Department stepped forward to
assume control.").
33. See id. at 36.
34. See id. at 72 ("Secretary Hoover supported the policies im-
plemented by the large corporations because he recognized that these
innovations would benefit both the industry and the public."); see also Hazlett,
supra note 12, at 152 n.60 (explaining that Hoover "advanced both the
incumbent broadcasters' agenda and a regulators' agenda-interests that
most often intersected in Hoover's policy recommendations. He therefore
played a large role in advancing [both] group[s]' interests .... ); id. at 152-
54; Spitzer, supra note 12, at 1047:
Herbert Hoover wanted federal controls over private radio
broadcasting: "state-corporate alliances were the hallmark of
1992]
104 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
powers to resolve interference disputes among broadcasters
until comprehensive regulation was attained.35
1. The Monopoly Rent/Content Control Quid Pro Quo
Considerable evidence exists that the Radio Act of 1927
was the by-product of a monopoly rent/content control quid
pro quo between the broadcast industry and the government.36
Through this exchange, broadcast industry leaders were
assured that competition would be artificially limited by licen-
sure so that they could reap above-market rates of return. 7
Politicians were assured mandatory rights of access to the
broadcast press to overcome "private censorship," i.e., the
exercise of a broadcaster's editorial discretion in a manner con-
trary to official preferences. 8
At the four Commerce Department sponsored national
radio conferences, Secretary Hoover proposed resolutions for
interference disputes, thereby gaining the allegiance of broad-
cast industry leaders.3 9 Hoover convinced industry leaders to
Hooverism." Elected federal officials wanted a degree of control
over the content of broadcasting. As Senator Clarence C. Dill,
author of the Federal Radio Act of 1927, wrote, " 'Of one thing I am
absolutely certain. Uncle Sam should not only police this 'new beat';
he should see to it that no one uses it who does not promise to be
good and well-behaved.'" And Representative W. H. White, Jr.,
author of a radio bill in the House, stated that federalization of the
"ether" was needed to prevent private rights from evolving and to
ensure that only those who would "render service to the public"
would be allowed to broadcast.
35. Hoover became widely admired by broadcasters because of the
extralegal measures he took to resolve interference complaints and to create
voluntary guidelines to guard against interference. ROSEN, supra note 20, at
38-39.
36. See Spitzer, supra note 12, at 1047-48; Hazlett, supra note 12, at 152-
71; EMORD, supra note 9, at 146-57.
37. See Hazlett, supra note 12, at 154-55; Spitzer, supra note 12, at 1047;
EMORD, supra note 9, at 149.
38. EMORD, supra note 9, at 146-57.
39. See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 61:
Secretary Hoover used the renewed chaos and disorder caused by
the lack of legislation [for comprehensive radio regulation] to
strengthen an alliance between businessmen and his department in
the hope of promoting his own endeavors. But the relationship did
not disintegrate into a government dictatorship. On the contrary,
Hoover's attempts to implement the extralegal arrangement, by
which he aimed to secure protracted control, required a secure
identification between his agency and the business community. In
the process of establishing this felicitous proximity, Hoover became
increasingly dependent upon the industry, thereby relinquishing
part of his own command of the situation.
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adhere to restraints on the use of their facilities and to support
his legislative agenda for radio regulation. In return for their
support, Hoover promised that the new law would place
restrictions on the number of available licenses.4"
In each of the radio conferences, the government's repre-
sentatives repeatedly described radio as imbued with a "pub-
lic" character.4 They insisted that broadcasting had to be
controlled by the government for the "public good."42 For
40. EMORD, supra note 9, at 146-57.
41. In each of the four national radio conferences, Secretary Hoover
emphasized that the "public interest" had to govern broadcasting and
indicated that service in the public interest meant service in fulfillment of
government policy objectives. At the first national radio conference, Hoover
emphasized that the "ether" was a "public" medium. See EMORD, supra note
9, at 152. By 1925, Hoover had developed an elaborate "public interest"
theory. At the Fourth National Radio Conference, he stated:
The ether is a public medium, and its use must be for public benefit.
The use of a radio channel is justified only if there is public benefit.
The dominant element for consideration in the radio field is, and
always will be, the great body of the listening public, millions in
number, countrywide in distribution. There is no proper line of
conflict between the broadcaster and the listener, nor would I
attempt to array the one against the other. Their interests are
mutual, for without the one the other could not exist.
Id. At that same conference, Hoover also articulated the view, later rendered
the law by the Supreme Court in Red Lion, that the interests of the listeners,
and not those of individual speakers, were paramount in the field of
broadcasting.
We hear a great deal about the freedom of the air; but there are two
parties to freedom of the air, and to freedom of speech, for that mat-
ter. There [are] the speechmaker and the listener. Certainly in
radio I believe in freedom for the listener. He has much less option
upon what he can reject, for the other fellow is occupying his receiv-
ing set. The listener's only option is to abandon his right to use his
receiver. Freedom cannot mean a license to every person or corpo-
ration who wishes to broadcast his name or his wares, and thus
monopolize the listener's set.
Quoted in EMORD, supra note 9, at 153.
42. Repeatedly in their public statements, federal government officials
and elected representatives demanded that government be given some
control over what was broadcast. Hoover believed it the government's duty
"to see that... [radio] is devoted to real service and to develop the material
that is transmitted into that which is really worthwhile." Quoted in EMORD,
supra note 9, at 152. In 1921, during the First National Radio Conference,
Hoover asked a Mr. Sherley, counsel for the Association of Manufacturers of
Electronic Supplies, the following question: "Suppose we get into the period
where there is [an] insufficient number of wave lengths and you find a given
town where the program is not as high grade as another town; would you
advocate the Government taking any supervision over the programs? Had
you given any thought to that?" Congressman Wallace H. White also
examined Sherley on this point.
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their part, industry leaders expressed few opinions on the pub-
lic weal but repeatedly argued that the quality of broadcasting
was inversely related to the number of licenses issued. They
argued that the number of licenses had to be severely restricted
in order to ensure the maintenance of the highest quality radio
programming nationwide.43 In the end, the two sides agreed
MR. WHITE: There are classes of service. Broadcasting is a class of
service. Can you subdivide that class, for instance, can you say that
crop reports shall have priority over baseball reports?
MR. SHERLEY: Yes.
MR. WHITE: If you admit that, where are you going to draw the
line? How are you going to establish broadcasting if you don't go
pretty close to censorship?
MR. SHERLEY: You might give priority to sermons as against
sporting news without giving any class the right to pass upon the
character of service of either class.
MR. WHITE: That goes back to the question, would we give
priority to a sermon over a prize fight?
Quoted in id. at 148-49.
The advocates of regulation insisted that radio, "a public medium,"
should not be used for private benefit. Rather, they argued that it should
only be used for that ever amorphous "public good." See Hazlett, supra note
12, at 152 (quoting Hoover: "We can surely agree that no one can raise a cry
of deprivation of free speech if he is compelled to prove that there is some-
thing more than naked commercial selfishness in his purpose.").
43. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 149-51. L. R. Krumm, representing the
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company submitted that only the
established industry leaders could present quality programming to the public
and that the number of licenses had to be restricted in order to attain that
objective.
MR. L. R. KRUMM: There is a limitation to the number of
broadcasting stations that can operate successfully and if you are
going to get the desired results there must be some regulation and
possibly limitation of the number of these stations. We can stand
pat on our stations-operating them to the best of our ability-we
hope to continue them and possibly extend them, but we want to
know what the future holds for us in that regard.
Quoted in id. at 150.
Krumm did not think the industry's leaders should be limited in their
expansion, just new entrants. Krumm stated:
I do not want to pledge myself, but I see no reason why they [AT&T]
cannot operate their stations without interfering with ours. We are
not troubled by that Company as badly as a whole lot of stations-as
we are by stations that do not represent any time, thought, or
money.
Id.
Krumm thought the whole country would best be served by about a
dozen of the "high quality" stations. In response to a question from Secre-
tary Hoover about what number of stations would be necessary to give the
nation "a complete service," Krumm responded that he believed "twelve
good stations, certainly a maximum of fifteen, would supply most of the
needs of this country."
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to legislation that would accomplish both parties' objectives:
giving government control over broadcast industry structure
and content and reducing the number of licensed stations
operating across the country.44
By seeking to regulate radio under a virtually limitless
"public interest" standard, Hoover was, in effect, asking for
redistribution of speech and press power from the private
realm of editorial discretion to the public realm of censorship.
Private preferences would no longer dictate radio content.
Now the government would determine whether the content
broadcast served the "public interest." Licensees would have
to account for their "stewardship" of the airwaves at license
renewal time.
Id.
Even representatives of the smaller licensees favored barriers to new
entry. H. F. Breckel of the Precision Equipment Company of Cincinnati,
Ohio, advocated a one city/one station limitation:
With reference to the number of broadcasting stations which should
be permitted to operate, we believe that they should be limited to a
number sufficient to provide adequate entertainment and safeguard
the interests of the general public who have invested in receiving
equipment and further, [we] . . . feel that it would be inadvisable to
allocate more than one broadcasting station to a city.
Id.
44. At the fourth and final National Radio Conference, the conference
committee announced its intention to restrict the number of broadcast
licenses by encouraging certain broadcasters to leave the broadcasting
business. The committee report reads:
The committee considered the question, Is it essential to limit the
number of broadcasting stations in order to prevent further
congestion? The committee was unanimous in their views that the
number of broadcasting stations should be limited, as there was
ample evidence already at hand to show that serious congestion was
taking place due to the large number of stations not having sufficient
frequency separation or repeating frequencies to prevent
interference. The committee felt that this was so much in evidence
that little time need be spent on the question. They concluded that
discussion by adopting the following resolution:
Resolved, That it is the sense of this conference that the bands of
frequencies now assigned to broadcasting [are] overcrowded,
causing serious interference. Therefore, the committee
recommends, in the interest of public service, that no new
stations be licensed until through discontinuance the number of
stations is reduced and until it shall be in the interest of public
service to add new stations.
Id at 151 (emphasis added).
Hoover did not wait for Congress to act before implementing the licens-
ing restrictions. On November 13, 1925, one day after the conference ended,
Hoover declared that the Commerce Department would not accept any new
license applications. See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 80.
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2. From Whence Came the "Breakdown in the Law:" The
Market or Hoover?
Between 1921 and 1927, over fifty bills were introduced in
Congress to regulate radio comprehensively.4 5 None of these
bills became law. Prior to 1927, not enough support existed in
Congress, in the broadcast industry, or among members of the
public to secure passage of the new legislation that Hoover and
the broadcast industry leaders wanted. From 1921 to 1926, in
the absence of comprehensive regulation, radio broadcasting
flourished due to industry self-regulation.46
Hence, for those like Hoover and Congressman Wallace
H. White, who earnestly wanted regulation and had tried
unsuccessfully for years to get it, it must have been apparent by
1926 that only a radical change in the environment could stir
Congress from its lethargy and bring about the desired legisla-
tive consensus. According to the revisionist view, Hoover's
failure to appeal the Zenith decision and his departure from
informal regulation of radio were actions calculated to provoke
Congress, the broadcast industry, and the public into favoring
regulation.4 7
Hoover hoped the reactions engendered would cause Con-
gress to enact the bill he favored most, that authored by Con-
gressman White.4" The White bill would give the Department
45. Twenty bills were introduced in the 67th Congress between 1921
and 1923; thirteen bills were introduced in the 68th Congress between 1923
and 1925; and eighteen bills wereintroduced in the 69th Congress between
1925 and 1927. See LicHw & ToPPING, supra note 15, at 545.
46. See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 49 ("Hoover had stated that the
voluntary system of government-industry cooperation had been working well,
the lawmakers assumed there was little need for immediate action."); see also
id. at 61 ("Hoover's policies had been so effective that Americans seemed to
many to be preoccupied with nothing but crystal sets and programs.").
47. See Spitzer, supra note 12, at 1046:
Hoover... failed to appeal the Zenith decision because he wanted
chaos to reign. He had been asking Congress for legislation
granting the Commerce Department greater power over
broadcasting for several years, but was always rebuffed because the
system seemed to be working so well. Hoover issued licenses to all
applicants so as to cause unhappiness in the industry and Congress
... making his proposals more attractive.
Hoover promoted publicity of Acting Attorney General Donovan's opinion
that Hoover lacked regulatory powers. The generation of this publicity
seems aimed at preparing the public for the Secretary's abandonment of all
attempts at regulation and at producing a pro-regulatory response from the
public and broadcasters that would assist Hoover in his effort to secure com-
prehensive radio regulation. See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 101.
48. See H.R. 9971, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1926). From 1921 to 1927,
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of Commerce (and thus Hoover) primary control over radio,
relying on a commission only as an appellate body with limited
jurisdiction. A competing bill, opposed by Hoover, was intro-
duced by Senator Clarence C. Dill. That bill would have vested
control over radio in a commission independent of the Secre-
tary of Commerce.4 9
The Zenith decision was handed down while Congress was
debating the White and Dill bills.50 Hoover's abandonment of
any efforts at regulation thus came at a critical juncture, and
did elicit a prompt reaction from the broadcast industry and
the public. In the midst of the interference wars caused in part
by Hoover's refusal to intervene,5 Congress reached a consen-
sus in favor of regulation. Congress also reached a compro-
mise between the White and Dill bills. The Radio Act of 1927
was enacted on February 23 of that year.52
3. Congress's Fears of Radio Power Over Politics
In the congressional debates preceding the adoption of the
Radio Act of 1927, two central themes arose: one is that radio,
Hoover and Congressman White lobbied to secure passage of their favored
radio legislation. Rosen records that White "relied heavily" on the
Commerce Department for assistance in drafting the legislation. The White
bill was first introduced in June of 1921 in the House (House Resolution
11964) and in the Senate by Senator Frank Kellogg (Senate Resolution
3691). It was reintroduced thereafter in both houses, but did not gain
significant congressional support in both the House and Senate until 1927.
See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 48-49, 73-75, 80, 81-82.
49. See S. 4057, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1926); see also Licimv & TOPPING,
supra note 15, at 546-47. Eugene McDonald, President of Zenith, wanted the
secretary of commerce removed from what he termed a position of "supreme
czar" over radio. He implored that any law to control radio vest authority in a
commission independent of Hoover, whom he regarded as a rapacious
bureaucrat. See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 94. Hoover fought for the White bill
"to assure implementation of his own legislative plan." Id. Senator Dill
relied heavily on McDonald's ideas in drafting a bill that would cut Hoover
out of the picture by awarding control of radio to an independent
commission. See id. at 95; see also DILL, supra note 15, at 76.
50. See Coase, supra note 26, at 5 (explaining that the Zenith decision
"added very considerably to the pressure for new legislation"); ROSEN, supra
note 20, at 96-103 (describing in detail the competition among the divergent
political factions supporting the Hoover-backed White bill and the
McDonald-backed Dill bill); see also LiCHTY & TOPPING, supra note 15, at 546.
51. Senator Dill recalled: "As soon as it became definitely known that
the Secretary of Commerce had no regulatory power over radio broadcasting
under the Act of 1912, several radio station owners changed wave lengths.
Some others used increased power and operated at whatever hours they
desired." DILL, supra note 15, at 78.
52. See LiCrTY & TOPPING, supra note 15, at 546-47.
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in its nascent, unregulated state, was either a monopoly or was
fast becoming one;5" the other is that radio, if left unregulated,
would place great persuasive power in the hands of a select few
who might oppose the election wishes or policy preferences of
members of Congress.54 Some members of Congress con-
53. On January 15, 1923, the House Committee on the Merchant
Marine and Fisheries adopted a report that identified "certain companies and
interests" as seeking to establish "a monopoly in wireless communication
through control of the manufacture and sale of radio instruments, through
contractual arrangements giving exclusive privileges in the transmission and
exchange of messages or through other means." The Committee called for
an investigation of these matters by the Federal Trade Commission.
The FTC conducted its investigation, filed a complaint against General
Electric Company, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Western
Electric Company, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company,
International Radio Telegraph Company, and Radio Corporation of America,
alleging that the companies had engaged in "unfair methods of competition"
and had tried to create "monopolies in the 'manufacture, purchase, and sale,
in interstate commerce, of radio devices and apparatus, and other electrical
devices and apparatus, and in domestic and transoceanic radio
communication and broadcasting.'" Following initial discovery, the FTC
chose not to prosecute and dismissed its complaint on December 19, 1929.
See William A. Lovett, The Antitrust Provisions of the Radio Act, 2J. RAmO L. 5-6
(1932); see also ERIK BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL 60 (1966).
54. A few examples of the reactions in Congress will suffice to prove
the point. These are quoted in EMORD, supra note 9, at 169-71. Senator
Robert B. Howell opined:
[T]o perpetuate in the hands of a comparatively few interests the
opportunity of reaching the public by radio and allowing them alone
to determine what the public shall and shall not hear is a
tremendously dangerous course for Congress to pursue. Only
recently a public official called my attention to the fact that he was
invited to utilize a radio station of one of the great broadcasting
companies; that when he appeared to speak they insisted on
censoring his remarks and blue-penciled certain portions criticizing
"Pittsburgh plus." They said, "You cannot talk about that." Are we
to consent to the building up of a great publicity vehicle and allow it
to be controlled by a few men, and empower those few men to
determine what the public shall hear?...
If any public question is to be discussed over the radio, if the
affirmative is to be offered, the negative should be allowed upon
request also, or neither the affirmative nor the negative should be
presented.
Howell also submitted that "the larger portion of the radio audience is the
youth of the country. Give me control of the character of the matter that goes
out over our broadcasting stations and I will mold the views of the next gen-
eration." Id.
Congressman Ewin L. Davis and Thomas Lindsay Blanton concurred
with these sentiments. Blanton explained that unless radio was brought
under governmental control, "one candidate might be able to pay $1,000 for
one night's service over the radio, and another candidate might not be able to
put up anything, and the radio could shut that man out and let the other in."
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demned what they termed a private monopoly and "private
censorship," preferring a public monopoly and public
censorship.55
Despite the many complaints of monopoly control and pri-
vate censorship that appear in the Congressional Record from
the Sixty-Ninth Congress, little actual basis existed to support
either charge. The radio industry had been extremely competi-
tive from the start and the content of what was broadcast varied
widely.56 Despite the weak factual basis for the monopoly
charges, those who favored comprehensive regulation found
the arguments politically potent. These arguments helped
engender public support for control of radio by government
rather than the private sector.57
He demanded to know: "What are you going to do about this question? The
night before election some fellow who might be favored by the Radio Corpo-
ration could get up in a Congressman's district and, with favored access to
the radio, ruin any man running for Congress."
Congressman William R. Johnson also feared the power of a free press
and demanded that it be tamed. He warned:
If the strong arm of the law does not prevent monopoly ownership
and make discrimination by such stations illegal, American thought
and American politics will be largely at the mercy of those who oper-
ate these stations. For publicity is the most powerful weapon that
can be wielded in a Republic, and when such a weapon is placed in
the hands of one, or a single selfish group is permitted to either
tacitly or otherwise acquire ownership and dominate those who dare
to differ with them, it will be impossible to compete with them in
reaching the ears of the American people.
55. Congressman White thought "individual and corporate
censorship" to be far worse than "government censorship." Likewise,
Congressman Davis said that he was "even more opposed to private
censorship" than government censorship. Quoted in EMORD, supra note 9, at
168, 173 n.9.'
56. See RoSEN, supra note 20, at 62-63 (explaining that "the industry
was characterized not by monopoly but by its opposite"); see also EMORD, supra
note 9, at 171 n.l (quoting testimony given in 1926 by Department of
Commerce Solicitor Stephen B. Davis, Jr. to the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce in which he informed the committee of the diffuse
nature of media ownership-stores that sold radio supplies operated 124
broadcast stations, schools and colleges operated 94, churches operated 43,
newspapers and magazines operated 35, manufacturers of various kinds
operated 15, insurance companies and similar businesses operated 15, hotels
operated 12, societies of various kinds operated 11; and miscellaneous other
entities operated 22.).
57. According to Rosen, Hoover "felt that the charge of monopoly was
bogus" but recognized the "vast political ramifications" of the charge and
"therefore voiced loud opposition to any restraint of trade." RoSEN, supra
note 20, at 73.
19921
112 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
4. Congress's Rejection of the Property Rights Alternative
Under the traditional view, Congress was left with no
choice but to regulate radio to end interference. However,
from 1921 to 1926, the industry successfully relied on self-reg-
ulation. Even during the period of widespread interference fol-
lowing Hoover's abandonment of regulation and of efforts at
encouraging industry self-regulation, property rights theories
surfaced in the courts as solutions to the interference problem.
In the fall of 1926, following the Zenith decision, but before
Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927, a Cook County, Illi-
nois court decided Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting.5" The
Chicago Tribune Company's station, WGN, brought suit to
enjoin an interloper from operating on a wavelength adjacent
to WGN's. The presiding judge, Chancellor Francis S. Wilson,
resorted to common law property rights principles in deciding
the case. He found that WGN's investment and development
of a broadcast station established a priority in time that created
a superiority in right. Therefore, the presiding judge issued
the requested injunction and ended the interference. Other
stations in a position similar to WGN were quick to file prop-
erty rights claims in other courts arguing that their priority in
time created a superiority in right."9
The popularity of the Tribune decision among broadcasters
prompted Congress to act. 60 In July of 1926, Congress passed
ajoint resolution designed to prevent broadcast licensees from
obtaining any vested rights in the spectrum. 6' The resolution
58. The court did not publish its decision, but Congress did. See 126
CONG. REC. S215-19 (December 10, 1926).
59. Dill recalled that "[o]ne after another [broadcaster] began to claim
he had a vested right in the particular wave length which he was using, that he
owned it, that it was his, exclusively, and that nobody could interfere with his
right to use it." DILL, supra note 15, at 78.
During the Radio Act debates, the ABA's "Air Law Committee" released
its "Interim Report on Radio Legislation" in the December 1926 ABA Journal.
In that report, it expressed the view that the Tribune case was "sound law and
that the existing stations have acquired rights certainly as against other
private parties." 12 A.B.A.J. 848 (Dec. 1926).
Indeed, the concept of property rights in the spectrum became so
familiar in the law that attorney, later Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
argued in an appeal (from a Federal Radio Commission decision denying
station WGY, Schenectady, New York, a license renewal) that the
Commission could not deny the station a renewal for to do so would violate
the station's property rights-an argument quickly rejected by the court. See
DILL, supra note 15, at 79; see also Hazlett, supra note 12, at 151.
60. See DILL, supra note 15, at 80; see also Spitzer, supra note 12, at 1046.
61. See DILL, supra note 15, at 81.
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was signed into law on December 8, 1926.62 Although the
common law property rights approach used in Tribune offered
an equitable way to resolve interference disputes, it vested ple-
nary authority over broadcasting in private hands.63 Many
members of Congress could not tolerate this. Therefore, Con-
gress disallowed private rights, paving the way for public
control.'
5. Government Fulfills Its Promise to Broadcasters
With the passage of the Radio Act of 1927 and the creation
of the FRC, the time had come for government to fulfill its
promise to the broadcast industry by reducing the number of
licenses available and thereby decreasing the amount of com-
petition facing the broadcast industry's leaders. What had
started as a decidedly political affair between Hoover and
industry leaders continued in that vein.65 Indeed, the FRC
quickly became known as an agency susceptible to influence
peddling and Congressional interference with its quasi-judicial
functions.66
62. Senate Joint Resolution 125 reads as follows:
That until otherwise provided by law, no original license for the
operation of any radio broadcasting station and no renewal of a
license of an existing broadcasting station, shall be granted for
longer periods than ninety days and no original license for the
operation of any other class of radio station and no renewal of the
license for an existing station of any other class than a broadcasting
station, shall be granted for longei periods than two years; and that
no original radio license or the renewal of an existing license shall
be granted after the date of the passage of this resolution unless the
applicant therefor shall execute in writing a waiver of any right or of
any claim to any right, as against the United States, to any wave
length or to the use of the ether in radio transmission because of
previous license to use the same or because of the use thereof.
Act of Dec. 8, 1926, ch. 1, 44 Stat. 917 (1926), quoted in KAHN, supra note 27,
at 35 (emphasis in original); see also Coase, supra note 26, at 5; Spitzer, supra
note 12, at 1046; Hazlett, supra note 12, at 160.
63. Spitzer observes: "Key congressmen well understood that state
property rights would give broadcasters a foundation that could not be
controlled by the federal government." Spitzer, supra note 12, at 1046.
64. Hazlett remarks: "Should those common-law principles apportion
the spectrum to private users, the 'breakdown of the law' would be remedied,
but the federal government's ability to control or even influence broadcasting
would vanish." Hazlett, supra note 12, at 161.
65. See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 131-44 (wherein Rosen documents
Federal Radio Commission members' actions to promote the interests of
broadcast industry leaders at the expense of smaller broadcast operators
through its allocation, programming, and channel assignment policies).
66. See SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 14, at 54-55 ("[P]robably no quasi-
judicial body was ever subject to so much congressional pressure as the
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Between 1927 and 1934, the FRC endeavored to reduce
the number of broadcasters. The commissioners believed their
duty to Congress lay in achieving that objective.67 Rosen
writes of the methods used by the FRC to lessen the number of
licensees. Believing the Radio Act to prevent them from revok-
ing licenses at will, the FRC relied on changes in the law to
effect the same result. Through manipulation of the Davis
Amendment,68 that required geographic equality in the alloca-
tion of service, the FRC reallocated frequencies in such a way
as to create particularly disadvantageous assignments for small
commercial and noncommercial operators.69 By discriminating
against these operators, the FRC was able to drive them out of
broadcasting, making continued operation futile in light of
reception difficulties. This approach reduced the number of
stations7" without offending the leading broadcast interests.
Federal Radio Commission. Much of this, moreover, came at a time when a
majority of the Commission had not been confirmed."); see also HAZLETr,
supra note 12, at 168-69:
Broadcast licensing became, hence, an inordinately political affair.
FRC General Counsel Louis G. Caldwell noted the "political
pressure constantly exercised . . . in all manner of cases," and the
1927 Act's creator, Senator Dill, pointedly rejected a later
suggestion that congressional members treat the commission like a
court of law and refrain from attempting to influence
assignments.... [P]ure influence peddling in the procurement of
licenses could yield both legal and extralegal benefits for incumbent
Congressmen.
67. See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 134.
68. See Pub. L. No. 195, 70th Cong., approved March 28, 1928, 45 Stat.
373, c. 263, § 5.
69. ROSEN, supra note 20, at 140. Rosen describes the process by which
industry leaders were spared while smaller broadcasters were driven out of
the business.
[T]he allocation plan represented Machiavellian manipulation. The
commissioners maintained their belief that high-powered
transmitters used the spectrum most efficiently. Furthermore, by
improving reception they hoped to enlarge the audience further.
They expected that the clear channel stations would limit the market
for expensive receivers. Obviously programs transmitted on high
power could be picked up on the inexpensive sets more easily afford
by most listeners. Using the strategy of packing small operators
closely together, while limiting their range and operations, the FRC
aimed to eliminate roughly two hundred of them. It hoped to
reclaim these wavelengths "rendering minimal public service" after
their holders failed within a year or two.
Id. at 136.
70. See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 134-36. Rosen writes:
While it was polling its constituency for suggestions, the FRC began
to pressure small operators to surrender their licenses voluntarily.
Immediately after passage of the 1928 radio control bill, the bureau
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Between 1927 and 1932, the number of licensees went from
700 to 604, and the number of those with authority to operate
at night dwindled to from 565 to 397. Between 1921 and 1936,
202 stations were licensed for educational use. Of these, fully
164 gave up their licenses. 71 The FRC thus made good on
Commerce Department and congressional assurances that,
through licensing, the number of broadcasters would be
reduced, and it did so in a way that was not readily susceptible
to court challenge.
III. BROADCAST CONTENT REGULATION: A DETAILED HISTORY
Section III of this article provides a detailed chronological
history of the rise and decline of broadcast content regulation
between 1927 and the present. It is a primer for those unfamil-
iar with the scope and longevity of FRC and FCC content regu-
lations. Those already aware of this history should turn to
Section IV for a refutation of the rationales used to support
these regulations.
A. The Rise of Broadcast Content Regulation
72
The FRC did not waste time in puting Hoover's theory of
"public interest" regulation into practice. The Radio Act gave
closed thirteen portable stations with the argument that the Davis
Amendment authorized fixed facilities only. On 25 May 1928, the
FRC promulgated General Order Number 32, which required 164
small broadcasters to justify their continued operation. While
comparatively few owners suffered under this edict, it nonetheless
warned of more changes to come.
Id. at 135.
71. Seeid. at 140-41;see also HEAD, supra note 26, at 132 ("From 1927 to
1932 the total number of broadcast authorizations was reduced.., from 681
to 604. However, the number of stations authorized to operate at night
(when sky wave interference becomes a factor) was reduced from 565 to
397.").
72. The number and variety of FCC regulations that affect broadcast
media content are so great that an article designed to present a general
overview of the subject must be somewhat selective in order to avoid a brief
assessment of subjects that seem to require extensive treatment.
Accordingly, this history does not examine the financial interest/syndication
rules, although these rules appear to violate the speech and press freedoms
of networks by preventing them from relying on in-house entertainment
programming productions to fill their prime-time schedules and by denying
them an unencumbered right to disseminate their programming through
domestic syndication. See also Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial
Interest Rules, 6 F.C.C.R. 3094, 3213 (1991) (Commissioner James H.
Quello, dissenting). The Seventh Circuit now has these rules under review;
the network petitioners argue, inter alia, that the rules violate their First
1992]
116 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
the FRC broad discretion in evaluating the nature of licensee
service.7" Under Section 18 of the Act, broadcasting stations
were required to afford equal opportunities for the use of a sta-
tion by candidates for public office.74 As in the case of granting
new broadcast licenses, the Commission could only grant a
license modification or renewal if it found that the "public
interest, convenience, or necessity" would be served by doing
so.75 The Act also required Commission approval in advance
Amendment rights. See Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 91-2350
(7th Cir. filed June 14, 1991).
This history also excludes FCC indecency and obscenity regulations, the
agency's prime time access rule, and its content regulations of the cable
media. These subjects require more detailed analysis than is appropriate for
a single article and are therefore left for another day.
73. Section 4(b) of the Act permitted the Commission "as public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires" to "[p]rescribe the nature of the
service to be rendered by each class of licensed stations and each station
within any class." Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169 § 46, 44 Stat. 1164 (1927),
reprinted in Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 20:4. Section 10 of the Act specifically
required applicants for license authority to identify "the purposes for which
the station is to be used." Id. at § 10, 44 Stat. at 1166.
74. Section 18 of the Radio Act reads:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall
afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office
in the use of such broadcasting station, and the licensing authority
shall make rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect;
provided, that such licensee shall have no power of censorship over
the material broadcast under the provisions of this paragraph. No
obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow use of its
station by any such candidate.
Id. at 1170.
75. See id. at 1167.
The "public interest" standard proved to be an extremely facile one,
capable of condoning a wide array of censorial regulations. By merely stating
that it was acting on behalf of the interest of an inherently undefinable
"listening public," the Commission could impose (and did impose) all
manner of regulatory restraints on what could be broadcast. See, e.g., Edward
C. Caldwell, Censorship of Radio Programs, 1 J. RADIO L. 441, 467 (1931)
(quoting the SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION
160).
In his report to Secretary of Commerce Hoover for the year 1924, the
Commissioner of Navigation for the Department frankly admitted, "the
broadcast listener is an unknown quantity .... An accurate expression of its
views is unobtainable." Selection from Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Navigation to the Secretary of Commerce for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1924, in 1
DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 22 U. Kittross ed.,
1977). In fact, the "public interest" is whatever the agency wants it to be,
provided it can articulate a rational basis for its conception. See, e.g., Pinellas
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
1007 (1956), wherein Judge E. Barrett Prettyman wrote:
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of any voluntary or involuntary transfer of control over the
licensee or assignment of license, again under the same all-
encompassing public interest standard?.
6
In two places, the Act denied licensees any property right
in the spectrum. 77 Broadcasting licenses were expressly lim-
ited to three year terms, thus ensuring that licensees would
remain mindful of the fact that they were authorized to broad-
cast only at the pleasure of the FRC. 7' The Act did prohibit"censorship" but immediately followed that prohibition with a
denial of a right to broadcast anything "obscene, indecent, or
profane."
79
[T]he Commission's view of what is best in the public interest may
change from time to time. Commissions themselves change,
underlying philosophies differ, and experience often dictates
changes. Two diametrically opposite schools of thought in respect
to the public welfare may both be rational; e.g., both free trade and
protective tariff are rational positions.
230 F.2d at 206.
Surveying the history of broadcast regulation, Ronald Coase found the
"public interest" standard to "lack any definite meaning." See Coase, supra
note 26, at 8. More recently, in a 1991 speech before the Washington Jour-
nalism Center, Bill Monroe, Executive Producer and Moderator of NBC's
"Meet the Press" and Editor of the Washington Journalism Review, described the
"public interest" standard as "the second-to-the last refuge of a scoundrel."
In contrast, the Court has reasoned, with admitted difficulty, that the stan-
dard is "as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of
delegated authority permit." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 138 (1940).
76. See Section 12 of the Radio Act of 1927, supra note 73, at 1167.
77. Section 5(H) of the Radio Act of 1927 reads in pertinent part:
No station license shall be granted by the commission or the
Secretary of Commerce until the applicant therefor shall have signed
a waiver of any claim to the use of any particular frequency or wave
length or of the ether as against the regulatory power of the United
States because of the previous use of the same, whether by license or
otherwise.
Radio Act of 1927, supra note 73, at 1165.
Section 11 (A) of the Act required the station license to contain the fol-
lowing condition:
The station license shall not vest in the licensee any right to operate
the station nor any right in the use of the frequencies or wave length
designated in the license beyond the term thereof nor in any other
manner than authorized therein.
Id. at 1165.
78. Id. at 1166.
79. Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927 reads:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the
licensing authority the power of censorship over the radio
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
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The anti-censorship provision was, to a large extent, a
dead letter, for it did not prevent the FRC from imposing its
editorial strictures on broadcasters. Both the constitutional law
of the time and the vast majority of members of Congress did
not recognize broadcasting as the equivalent of newspaper or
book publishing. Rather, to them it was more like a carnival
spectacle than "the press."80 As of 1927, the broader implica-
tions of censorship had not been addressed by the Supreme
Court. The First Amendment continued to be interpreted con-
sistent with the Eighteenth Century Blackstonian conception of
free speech and press;"' as a consequence, the anti-censorship
provision of the Act was of little use. From 1798 until 1930,
the state and federal courts adhered to the view that although
prior restraints were prohibited, punishments for material once
published were permissible. The Supreme Court did not begin
to alter this reading of the amendment until 1930 in Stromberg v.
California,a2 when at last the marketplace of ideas and search for
truth rationales for denying government authority over speech
and press gained suasion with a majority of the Court."
Therefore, as long as the FRC refrained from proscribing
content with prior restraints, it could attain the same result law-
fully through the imposition of after the fact regulation. In par-
ticular, it relied upon the threat of non-renewal as a means to
licensing authority which shall interfere with the right of free speech
by means of radio communications. No person within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication.
Id. at 1172-73.
80. See, e.g., Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S.
230, 244 (1915) (wherein the Court found motion pictures not to constitute
the "publication of ideas" or to be a "part of the press of the country.").
81. According to Blackstone,
The liberty of the press . . .consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in the freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to
destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of
his own temerity.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 151-52.
82. 283 U.S. 359 (1930).
83. For three outstanding studies on the Court's remarkable lack of a
developed First Amendment theory during this period, see David Rabban,
The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 513 (1981). See also
Michael Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917,
55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263 (1986); Howard Hunter, Problems in Search of
Principles: The First Amendment in the Supreme Court from 1791-1930, 35 EMORY
L.J. 59 (1986).
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cajole licensees into broadcasting content "in the public inter-
est." 4 Of course, after the fact regulation could silence speech
just as effectively as prior restraint.8 5 Indeed, the FRC commis-
sioners did not hesitate to use post-publication censorship to
effect changes in content, as the following quote from FRC
Commissioner Orestes H. Caldwell makes clear:
[E]ach station occupying a desirable channel should be
kept on its toes to produce and present the best pro-
grams possible and, if any station slips from that high
standard, another station which is putting on programs
of a better standard should have the right to contest the
first station's position and after hearing the full testi-
mony, to replace it.
The public interest standard was defined by reference to
Hoover's conception of public service. Hoover viewed radio as
a utility, whose product, programming, had to be monitored by
government with a paternalistic regard for the "best interests"
of the listening public.8 6 As Hoover put it in 1924:
Radio has passed from the field of an adventure to that of
a public utility. Nor among the utilities is there one
whose activities may yet come more closely to the life of
each ... of our citizens, nor which holds out greater pos-
sibilities of future influence, nor which is of more poten-
tial public concern. Here is an agency that has reached
deep into the family life. We can protect the'home by
preventing the entry of printed matter destructive to its
ideals, but we must double-guard the radio.8 7
84. See ERIC BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB 28-36 (1968).
85. The necessity for denying the state power to ban speech (whether
that power is exercised through prior restraint or after the fact regulation)
was recognized early in our constitutional history. As James Madison put it,
"to be effectual" the First Amendment "must be an exemption, not only from
the previous inspection of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of
laws." See Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, quoted in IV THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONsTrruTION 570 (J. Elliot ed., 1888).
86. Congress, too, regarded radio as a regulatable utility. Speaking in
support of the Radio Act, Senator Dill equated the public interest standard
with that used in public utility law: "In this proposed law .... we have laid
down a basic principle-namely, the principle of public interest, convenience,
and necessity-which is the general legal phrase used regarding all public
utilities engaged in interstate commerce." 68 Cong. Rec. S3027 (1927).
87. See Proceedings of the Third National Radio Conference, at 2-3.
The Federal Radio Commission later employed precisely this utility notion,
in a very attenuated analogy, to justify program content regulations. The
FRC wrote:
[T]he emphasis should be on the receiving of service and the
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Hoover's "public interest" theory elevated the largely
unknowable "interests of the listener" (i.e., the government's
conception of acceptable programming fare) above the inter-
ests of the broadcaster (i.e., the broadcaster's editorial
choices). 8 Hoover believed broadcasting necessarily imbued
with a "public" character because it makes use of a "national"
resource, the airwaves. Moreover, he understood that every-
one who wished to broadcast could not do so given the fact that
the spectrum, like any resource of value, was not universally
available;89 hence, someone would have to select who would be
permitted to broadcast. For Hoover, those someones were
government officials.9" Hoover, Congress, and the courts
relied on the spectrum scarcity rationale as the legal justifica-
tion for government selection.
Under this rationale, government (said to be protecting
the public) could exert influence not only over broadcast indus-
try structure, 9 ' but also over broadcast content. Hence, when
Hoover said that the listeners' interests were paramount, he
was in fact saying that the government's view of what the listeners
should hear was paramount. In short, the content of what was
standard of public interest, convenience or necessity should be
construed accordingly. This point of view does not take
broadcasting stations out of the category of public utilities or relieve
them of corresponding obligations; it simply assimilates them to a
different group of public utilities, i.e., those engaged in purveying
commodities to the general public, such, for example, as heat, water,
light, and power companies, whose duties are to consumers, just as
the duties of broadcasting stations are to listeners. The commodity
may be intangible but so is electric light; the broadcast program has
become a vital part of daily life.... The Government does not try to
tell a public utility such as an electric-light company that it must
obtain its materials such as coal or wire, from all comers on equal
terms; it is not interested so long as the service rendered in the form
of light is good. Similarly, the commission believes that the
Government is interested mainly in seeing to it that the program
service of broadcasting stations is good, i.e., in accordance with the
standard of public interest, convenience, or necessity.
See Statement Made by the Commission on August 23, 1928, Relative to Pub-
lic Interest, Convenience, or Necessity, 2 FRC Annual Report 166 (1928),
reprinted in KAHN, supra note 27, at 127.
88. See Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference at 7.
89. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
90. Hoover was fond of government-industry partnerships. See Hazlett,
supra note 12, at 158-59.
91. See Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC
Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 401 (1988).
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broadcast would have to be in accordance with what the gov-
ernment found fitting and proper.
92
Under this theory, which has come to be known as the
"public trusteeship" model of broadcast regulation, good
broadcasters kowtow to the editorial desires of the Commis-
sion, thereby protecting their licenses from attack. Govern-
ment uses administrative cajolery, affirmative programming
requirements, and the threat of non-renewal to push and pull
broadcasters into orthodox broadcasting.
The market failure thesis is an important part of the justifi-
cation for government content regulation, for the trusteeship
model rests on the assumption that broadcasters, if left to their
own devices, will not always program in a way that will satisfy
the true needs and interests of listeners. Rather, the assump-
tion is that government must intervene to remedy "market fail-
ures" by imploring that certain matters be broadcast that the
public should hear but is not receiving. This latter, highly pater-
nalistic aspect of broadcast regulation continues to epitomize
government intervention into the idea marketplace. Govern-
ment intervenes to alter broadcast content for the "good" of
the listening public, whether the public actually desires a
change in programming or not.a3
1. The FRC's Development of Policies to Second Guess the
Editorial Judgments of Broadcasters
The FRC was quick to assert its power over radio pro-
grams. The agency held that radio programs were not entitled
to full First Amendment protection from federal regulation,
basing this decision on the spectrum scarcity rationale. In
August of 1928, the agency warned licensees:
The Commission is unable to see that the guaranty of
freedom of speech has anything to do with entertainment
programs as such. Since there are only a limited number
of channels and since an excessive number of stations
desire to broadcast over these channels, the Commission
believes it is entitled to consider the program service ren-
dered by the various applicants, to compare them, and to
92. See Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference at 7.
93. A prime example of such regulation is the Children's Television Act
of 1990, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 303b, 394, and the regulations adopted to
implement the act. See Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television
Programming and Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies,
Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for
Commercial Television Stations, 6 F.C.C.R. 2111 (1991).
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favor those which render the best service. If one station
is broadcasting phonograph records in a large city where
original programs are available and another station is
broadcasting original programs, for which it is making a
great financial outlay, the commission believes the sec-
ond station should be favored and that the question of
freedom of speech is not involved.94
Also in August of 1928, the FRC released a statement
defining what kinds of programming it considered contrary to
the public interest.95 Meant to guide broadcasters in their
exercise of editorial discretion, this statement identified pro-
gramming areas into which broadcasters could dare enter only
at their peril.
The FRC had a low opinion of stations that broadcast pho-
nograph records, preferring the more costly live performances
sponsored by the major radio concerns. The FRC determined
that "[a] station which devotes the main portion of its hours of
operation to broadcasting ... phonograph records is not giving
the public anything which it can not readily have without such a
station."96 In addition, the Commission did not like program
length commercials and the quoting of price information in
commercials. It found advertising tolerable only when ancil-
lary to a program it deemed suitable.9 7
The FRC also preoccupied itself with fulfilling its obliga-
tion to Congress that House and Senate members be afforded
access to the airwaves during election season. Indeed, Section
18 of the Radio Act of 1927 required the FRC to take this
action. The agency adopted an expanded view of licensee
responsibilities under Section 18. The second prong of what
later became known as the "Fairness Doctrine" was first articu-
lated in the FRC's 1928 statement, which read in pertinent
part:
94. FRC Second Annual Report 160, quoted in Edward C. Caldwell,
Censorship of Radio Programs, 1 J. RADIO L. 441, 467 (1931).
95. See FRC Second Annual Report, reprinted in KAHN, supra note 27, at
127.
96. KAHN, supra note 27, at 130-31.
97. The Commission stated:
Where the station is used for the broadcasting of a considerable
am6unt of what is called "direct advertising," including the quoting
of merchandise prices, the advertising is usually offensive to the
listening public. Advertising should be only incidental to some real
service rendered to the public, and not the main object of a
program.
Id. at 131.
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It would not be fair, indeed it would not be good service
to the public to allow a one-sided presentation of the
political issues of a campaign. In so far as a program con-
sists of discussion of public questions, [the] public inter-
est requires ample play for the free and fair competition
of opposing views, and the commission believes that
principle applies not only to addresses by political candi-
dates but to all discussions of issues of importance to the
public.
98
The FRC also explained that programming of general util-
ity to those in a broadcaster's community of license was to be
preferred over programming of concern only to a small seg-
ment of the audience (this is an early articulation of the concept
of localism that, although modified somewhat over time, is still
very much in vogue at the FCC). In addition, what later would
become known as "balanced" programming fare was consid-
ered a public interest imperative. The FRC admonished
licensees:
[I]n the opinion of the commission ... the tastes, needs
and desires of all substantial groups among the listening
public should be met, in some fair proportion, by a well-
rounded program, in which entertainment, consisting of
both classical and lighter grades, religion, education and
instruction, important public events, discussions of pub-
lic questions, weather, market reports, and news, and
matters of interest to all members of the family find a
place.
99
As if licensees had any doubt about the dangers they faced
if they did not'follow the FRC's advice on programming, the
FRC expressed in writing that all of the programming factors
referenced in its statement would be taken into account in a
98. Id. at 136. The Commission added to this the warning that stations
dominated by partisan editorialization to the exclusion of others of certain
"doctrines, creeds, and beliefs" could be in danger of losing their licenses
because "a well-founded complaint will receive the careful consideration of
the Commission in its future action with reference to the station... Id. at
136-37.
It is significant in light of Congress's obsession with protecting the right
of incumbents to get their views across that "fairness" is first described in the
statement as balanced campaign programming. This early version of the
Fairness Doctrine lacked the affirmative requirement that a broadcaster
present controversial material. It only required that if a broadcaster did
present one side of a controversial issue of public importance, it would have
to present the other side or sides. See generally Steven J. Simmons, Fairness
Doctrine: The Early History, 29 FED. COMM. B.J. 207 (1976).
99. STERLING & KIrrRoss, supra note 12, at 136.
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review of a licensee's "past performances" at renewal time.' 00
A determination would then be made about whether the licen-
see's overall programming service had been in "the public
interest."l''
This ad hoc approach to enforcement, largely limited to
times when the agency passed upon license modification or
renewal applications, attained the desired chilling effect by
causing licensees to engage in self-censorship rather than risk
the broadcast of programming that might be viewed as inimical
to the public interest. 0 2 Licensees began to realize that to stay
in the business of broadcasting they would have to second
guess the editorial judgments of their professional employees.
They would have to remain cognizant of any federal or state
law that might cause an area of programming to be perceived
by the FRC as contrary to the "public interest." Of course,
they also had to keep abreast of all Commission policy
announcements and adjust their programming accordingly.'0"
100. Id. at 138-39. In this regard, as early as 1927 renewal application
forms included the following questions:
(11) Attach printed program for the last week.
(12) [Explain why] the operation of the station [is] in the public
convenience, interest and necessity [List the]
(a) Average amount of time weekly devoted to the following
services (1) entertainment (2) religious (3) commercial (4)
educational (5) agricultural (6) fraternal
(b) Is direct advertising conducted in the interest of the
applicant or others?
Quoted in FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES
(1946), reprinted in KAHN, supra note 27, at 168.
101. The FRC defined a licensee as a public "fiduciary," in a position of
trust to serve the general weal. The agency relied upon high brow notions of
"trusteeship" and "stewardship" to encourage licensees to follow the
government's conception of good programming service. It also relied heavily
on the inducement of monopoly rent protection the license afforded and the
threat of nonrenewal to persuade broadcasters to follow the course preferred
by the government. See generally Comment, Radio Program Controls: A Network
of Inadequacy, 57 YALE L.J. 275, 286-89 (1947).
102. See Andrew G. Haley, The Law on Radio Programs, 5 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 157, 168 (1937) ("As it is, the licensee must take his chance, and after the
objectionable material is broadcast, the Commission may step in, hold a
hearing, determine that the action of the station was not in the public interest
and possibly delete the station.").
103. See id. at 168-69:
The licensee . . . may seek enlightenment from other sources
concerning the bona fides of advertising. He may obtain
information from the Post Office Department, the Food and Drug
Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, local state and city
agencies, such as the state board of medical examiners, the securities
and insurance regulatory bodies, etc., and a multitude of private
INVALIDITY OF FCC CONTENT REGULATIONS
Between 1927 and 1932, the FRC issued "General
Orders" that established rules for the governance of broadcast-
ing. From 1932 forward, the FRC's rules were formally codi-
fied.' O4 In 1928, the FRC released General Order No. 31 which
implemented Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927 (the require-
ment that stations provide equal opportunities to candidates
for public office to air their views)1 05 and General Order Nos.
52 and 78 (replacing previous orders 16 and 49) that discour-
aged licensees from using phonograph records in lieu of live
performances by requiring that logs be kept documenting
when such records were aired and that an announcement be
made before the broadcast of any such record that clearly iden-
tified it as a recording. The Commission offered the following
announcements as examples of statements in compliance with
its policy: "This is a talking machine recording," "This is a
phonograph record," or "This is a graphophone record."'
10 6
2. The FRC's Punishments for Expositors of Unorthodox
Views
In Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FRC,'°7 Chicago Federation of
Labor v. FRC, °8 and WO. Ansley, Jr. v. FRC,'°9 the D.C. Circuit
Court upheld a number of FRC decisions that denied applica-
tions in whole or part on the basis of adverse content
determinations.
In Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., station WCBD failed to
receive FRC approval for a facilities modification based in part
on the FRC's dissatisfaction with the station's religious format.
agencies, such as better business bureaus. He may refer to the
decisions of the Commission on the subject of program content. If
due care were always exercised by the licensees it is doubtful
whether any questionable program need ever be unwittingly
broadcast.
104. See STERLING & KirrRoss, supra note 12, at 131.
105. That Order reads:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall
afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office
in the use of such broadcasting station, and the licensing authority
shall make rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect:
PROVIDED, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship
over the material broadcast under the provisions of this paragraph.
No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use
of its station by any such candidate.
106. See FRC General Order Nos. 52 and 78.
107. 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
108. 41 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
109. 46 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
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WCBD's broadcasts were said to concern "the religious exer-
cise in the Zion Temple and [to] include the sermons of the
leader of the sect."' t t° The court affirmed the Commission's
decision, accepting the agency's argument that the religious
programming presented by WCDB was of less public interest
merit than the more varied programming of WCDB's
competitors. "'
Likewise in Chicago Federation of Labor, the FRC denied the
facilities improvement application of the Federation's station
WCFL. It did so based on a finding that the station had broad-
cast advertisements concerning fraudulent securities and pat-
ent medicine. In upholding this decision, the court noted that
"[t]he past record of station WCFL has not been above criti-
cism,' 1 again revealing a bias against the station's repertory.
In W.O. Ansley, Jr., the court affirmed the FRC's denial of
an application for a new AM station. In passing, the court
noted that evidence in the case revealed that another station in
the market broadcast "much objectionable matter," 1 3 confirm-
ing by example that a focus on content was not improper.
Each of these decisions made it clear to the commissioners
that the court would not oppose the FRC if it chose to punish
licensees for broadcasting programming that the FRC deemed
inappropriate. It was not until 1931 that the court buttressed
its largely tacit approval of FRC content review with a more
direct and developed statement of reasons why such review was
constitutionally permissible.
In KFKB Broadcasting Association v. FRC,114 the court upheld
the FRC's denial of the Brinkley-Jones Hospital Association's
application for license renewal. Following an assessment of the
licensee's programming performance, the FRC held that a
license renewal would disserve the public interest.
Station KFKB functioned as the mouthpiece for Dr. J. R.
Brinkley's hospital and pharmacy. Brinkley broadcast a contro-
versial program entitled the "Medical Question Box." During
the program, Brinkley read aloud letters sent to him from lis-
teners who suffered from various ailments, diagnosed the ill-
110. Great Lakes, 37 F.2d at 994.
111. Id. at 995 (The court explained: "This conclusion is based upon
the comparatively limited public service rendered by the station, and the fact
that its present assignment is not unreasonable."). For an additional decision
where the FRC denied licenses to parties that espoused particular religious
views, see Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. FRC, 105 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
112. 41 F.2d at 423.
113. 46 F.2d at 600.
114. 47 F.2d at 670.
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nesses described, and then prescribed treatments from his
collection of "tonics."" 15
The court's affirmance of the FRC's decision against
renewing KFKB's license was a ringing endorsement of the
agency's right to exercise plenary power over station program-
ming. It also affirmed the agency's spectrum scarcity rationale
for regulation.
It is apparent . . . that the business [of broadcasting] is
impressed with a public interest and that, because the
number of available broadcasting frequencies is limited,
the Commission is necessarily called upon to consider
the character and quality of the service to be rendered.
In considering an application for a renewal of license, an
important consideration is the past conduct 6f the appli-
cant, for "by their fruits, ye shall know them." Matt.
7:20.16
The court rejected the argument that post-publication punish-
ment for speech amounted to a violation of Section 29 of the
Radio Act of 1927 (the provision that disallowed cerisorship),
upholding the FRC's position that the section only prohibited
prior restraints:
Appellant contends that the attitude of the commission
amounts to a censorship of the station contrary to the
provisions of section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927 ...
This contention is without merit. There has been no
attempt on the part of the commission to subject any part
of appellant's broadcasting matter to scrutiny prior to its
release. In considering the question of whether the pub-
lic interest, convenience, or necessity will be served by a
renewal of appellant's license, the commission has merely
115. The court quoted from two of the broadcasts:
Here's one from Tillie. She says she had an operation, had some
trouble 10 years ago. I think the operation was unnecessary, and it
isn't very good sense to have an ovary removed with the expectation
of motherhood resulting therefrom. My advice to you is to use
Women's Tonic No. 50, 67, and 61. This combination will do for
you what you desire if any combination will, after three months.
persistent use.
Sunflower state, from Dresden Kans. Probably he has gall stones.
No, I don't mean that, I mean kidney stones. My advice to you is to
put him on Prescription No. 80 and 50 for men, also 64. I think that
he will be a whole lot better. Also drink a lot of water.
KFKB Broadcasting Ass 'n, 47 F.2d at 671.
116. Id. at 672.
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exercised its undoubted right to take note of appellant's
past conduct, which is not censorship."
7
The FRC's aversion to certain content led it on additional
occasions to deny license renewal applications. The applica-
tion of Norman Baker for renewal of station KTNT was denied
because Baker had broadcast personal attacks on "individuals,
companies, and associations, especially certain medical associa-
tions and doctors."' ' 8 These attacks offended the sensibilities
of the commissioners. Rather than limit the scope of their deci-
sion to a simple statement that the programming failed to serve
the public interest, the commissioners took the occasion to
extend their power over programming. They did so, in the
advent of favorable court decisions, by announcing their disap-
proval of the moral tone of what was broadcast, hoping to pro-
mote "a standard of refinement fitting our day and
generation." They wrote:
This Commission holds no brief for the Medical Associa-
tions and other parties whom Mr. Baker does not like.
Their alleged sins may be at times of public importance,
to be called to the attention of the public over the air in
the right way. But this record discloses that Mr. Baker
does not do so in any high-minded way. It shows that he
continually and erratically over the air rides a personal
hobby, his cancer cure ideas and his likes and dislikes of
certain persons and things. Surely his infliction of all this
on the listeners is not the proper use of a broadcasting
license. Many of his utterances are not uplifting or
entertaining.
Though we may not censor, it is our duty to see that
broadcasting licenses do not afford mere personal
organs, and also to see that a standard of refinement fit-
ting our day and generation is maintained.19
By 1931, the FRC had become a great sanitizer of broad-
cast subjects through its license revocation power. It had suc-
ceeded in declaring certain categories of content off limits for
broadcasters. It had effectively informed licensees that the ulti-
mate editor for their stations did not work in station news
rooms but in the FRC's Washington, D.C. offices. With the
D.C. Circuit's imprimatur of support coming in the form of
KFKB, the FRC now viewed itself as free to expand its content
regulatory regime into new areas. It issued statements identify-
117. Id.
118. See Caldwell, supra note 75, at 473.
119. See id.
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ing what kind of programming did not comport with the public
interest, expecting such statements to induce self-censorship
by licensees. The Commission issued one such statement in
May of 1931:
Upon frequent occasions there has [sic] been brought to
the attention of the commission complaints against radio
stations broadcasting fortune telling, lotteries, games of
chance, gift enterprises, or similar schemes offering
prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance.
On that subject the commission has this to say: There
exists doubt that such broadcasts are in the public inter-
est. Complaints from a substantial number of listeners
against any broadcasting station presenting such pro-
grams will result in the station's application for renewal
of license being set for a hearing.... 120
In Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC,' 21 the court again
affirmed the FRC's use of its renewal authority to punish a
licensee who broadcast the unorthodox. The FRC denied the
license renewal of station KGEF, whose owner, Dr. Bob Shuler,
a self-proclaimed "scrapper for God," aired vitriolic attacks on
Catholics, Jews, and government officials. Shuler challenged
the FRC's decision on First Amendment grounds but, predict-
ably, lost.
In affirming the agency's decision, the court also defended
the FRC's role as sanitizer of broadcast content.
If it be considered that one in possession of a permit to
broadcast in interstate commerce may, without let or hin-
drance from any source, use those facilities, reaching out,
as they do, from one corner of the country to the other,
to obstruct the administration of justice, offend the reli-
gious susceptibilities of thousands, inspire political dis-
trust and civic discord, or offend youth and innocence by
the free use of words suggestive of sexual immorality,
and be answerable for slander only at the instance of the
one offended, then this great science, instead of a boon,
will become a scourge, and the nation a theater for the
display of individual passions and the collision of per-
sonal interests .... Appellant ... may not, as we think,
demand, of right, the continued use of an instrumentality
of commerce for such purposes.
122
120. Id. at 472.
121. 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
122. Id. at 852.
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In its first few years, the FRC had established its authority
to control broadcast content through after the fact regulation.
Indeed, it had received support for its exercise of broad con-
tent regulatory powers, not only from the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, but also from the Supreme
Court in FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. 2 ' Made confi-
dent by the courts' legal backing, the Federal Communications
Commission, the FRC's successor, commenced an even more
ambitious, aggressive, and intrusive campaign to effect changes
in broadcast media content.
3. The FCC's Expansion of FRC Content Controls
In 1934, Congress enacted the Communications Act,
increasing the membership of the FRC, bringing telephone and
telegraph communications within the jurisdictional compass of
the agency, and changing the agency's name to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). Although the statutory
authority of the FCC over broadcasting did not differ funda-
mentally from that of the FRC, 2 4 the FCC was far more power-
ful than its predecessor, having gained full congressional
support for its permanent existence and a grant of authority
over all means of interstate communication. With this new
power, the FCC undertook as its first mission the expansion of
content controls.1
25
a. Mandated and Verboten Categories of Expression
On a case by case basis, the FCC held certain categories of
expression inimical to the public interest and therefore banned
from the airwaves: (1) biased racial or religious commentary;
(2) fortune-telling; (3) statements lauding or referring in a pos-
itive way to hard liquor; (4) obscenity; (5) excessive violence;
(6) children's programs containing too much suspense; (7)
123. 289 U.S. 266, 279, 285 (1933) (accepting the FRC's spectrum
scarcity rationale and holding that the "public interest" standard
encompasses regulation of programming).
124. See STERLING & Krrross, supra note 12, at 188-89. Compare 47
U.S.C. §§ 81-119 (1927) with 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1934). As the FCC
stated in reflecting on the agency's birth, "[b]y the time Congress had under
consideration replacing the Radio Act of 1927 with a new regulatory statute,
there no longer existed any doubt that the Commission did possess the
power to take overall program service into account." FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE
RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946), reprinted in KAHN, supra note
27, at 169.
125. See STERLING & KITrross, supra note 12, at 189 ("The first FCC
regulatory project was a concern of the old FRC-changing substandard
program and advertising policies in broadcasting.").
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excessive record playing; (8) direct solicitations; (9) program
length commercials or unusually high amounts of commercial
advertising; (10) advertising interruptions during concerts or
other artistic programs; (11) false or misleading advertising;
and (12) biased editorialization on controversial subjects.1
26
The cases of Scroggin & Company Bank, 127 Bremer Broadcast-
ing Company,' 28 and Ben S. McGlashan 129 present somewhat typi-
cal instances of content review by the FCC in its early years. In
each case, the FCC held hearings following public complaints
about station programming. The hearings served as fora for
the agency to inspect in detail all programming decisions made
by the licensees during their previous license terms and to
cross-examine the licensees' principals about their program-
ming choices. The hearings were (and still are) an expensive
proposition for licensees.130
In Scroggin & Company Bank, the applicant's license -was
renewed, but only after the agency forced it to undergo a hear-
ing and admonished it to avoid the broadcast of astrology, for-
tune-telling, and misleading advertisements.' 3' Scroggin &
Company Bank's station, KFEQ broadcast what the Commis-
sion termed "matter obviously designed primarily to exploit
the public."' 3 2  In two programs, one by a Dr. Richards,
"astrologer and psychologist," and another by a Dr. Price,
"spiritual psychologist," listeners were given advice on such
matters as "business, domestic affairs, health, finance and
126. See id. (referencing an FCC Memo'released in 1939 that identified
each of these kinds of programs as well as defamation as contrary to the
public interest); see also ROBERT JOHN LANDRY, WHO, WHAT, WHY is RADIO? 52
(1942), making reference to a statement by FCC Chairman Anning S. Prall
that these kinds of programs were not in the public interest.
127. 1 F.C.C. 194 (1935).
128. 2 F.C.C. 79 (1935).
129. 2 F.C.C. 145 (1935).
130. See Timothy B. Dyk, Full First Amendment Freedom for Broadcasters: The
Industry as Eliza on the Ice and Congress as the Friendly Overseer, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
299, 308 n.51 (1988) ("Even if a broadcaster were certain of ultimate success,
it would often be reluctant to take actions that would increase the risk of
challenge because the defense of a comparative proceeding may run into
millions of dollars .. ").
131. What has become known as the "raised eyebrow" approach is the
typical manner by which the FCC cajoles licensees into behaving in the
manner it desires. It usually holds its license revocation power in reserve to
punish reactivists. See Comment, Radio Program Controls: A Network of
Inadequacy, 57 YALE L.J. 275 (1947) ("Far more frequently than it revokes
licenses or denies renewal, the Commission merely warns. Thus, between
1934 and 1942, two licenses were revoked and 13 applications for renewal
denied. ..").
132. 1 F.C.C. 194; 195 (1935).
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investments, love, marriage .... delicate family matters, [and]
vocational guidance. ,, ." The commissioners greatly disap-
proved of these broadcasts, particularly because they included
some material "bordering on indelicacy and scandalous-
ness." ' 4 The FCC also condemned the airing of what it
thought to be a fraudulent commercial.1" 5
Nevertheless, on the basis of the licensee;s entire program-
ming record and because the station's other programs
appeared "to be generally satisfactory and interesting to resi-
dents within the range of the station," the FCC found the pub-
lic interest best served by issuance of a license renewal.' 36
In Bremer Broadcasting Company, station WAAT broadcast a
"health discussion" program and horse race results in code.
These broadcasts were condemned by the FCC following a
thorough hearing on station programming.
The medical discussion program was accompanied by
advertisements from a Dr. Coll. The program gave medical
advice on such maladies as hernias, varicose veins, ulcers, and
hemorrhoids.'3 7  In the advertisements, listeners were
encouraged to seek consultation and a painless cure from the
doctor. The FCC found the advertisements false and mislead-
ing and noted that the treatments, far from being painless,
actually caused the death of two individuals.' The FCC found
the station "guilty of improper conduct through its dissemina-
tion to a credulous public of certain medical programs far
removed from those reasonably calculated to be in the public
interest."
3 9
The horse racing program employed a code system intelli-
gible only to those who had subscribed to a "scratch sheet"
containing definitions of the terms.' 40 The FCC found that this
program also disserved the public interest, but noted that the
station had discontinued both programs and had agreed not to
run them in the future.
14 1
133. Id. at 195-96.
134. Id. at 196.
135. Id. at 196-97.
136. Id. at 197-98. For additional FCC rulings from the period that
condemn the broadcast of astrology, see T. Yount, d/b/a Universal
Advertising Agency, 2 F.C.C. 200 (1935). See also Nellie H. & W. C. Morris, 2
F.C.C. 269 (1935); Farmers and Bankers Life Ins. Co., 2 F.C.C. 455 (1935);
Adelaide Lillian Carrell, 7 F.C.C. 219 (1939).
137. 2 F.C.C. 79, 81 (1936).
138. Id. at 82.
139. Id. at 81.
140. Id. at 83.
141. Id.
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Upon a review of the station's entire programming record,
the FCC determined that "for the most part" the station
"served its listening area in a creditable manner, giving time to
educational, civic, charitable, and governmental agencies" and
did provide "interesting entertainment programs." '42 The
agency warned that if it found a basis in the record for conclud-
ing that the licensee would continue the objectionable pro-
grams, it would have refused to renew the applicant's
license.1
43
In Ben S. McGlashan, the FCC evaluated five applicants for
renewal of license: Ben S. McGlashan, licensee of KGFJ;
Warner Brothers Broadcasting Company, licensee of KFWB;
Beverly Hills Broadcasting Corporation, licensee of KMPC;
Radio Broadcasters, Inc., licensee of KRKD; and Cannon Sys-
tem, Ltd., licensee of KIEV. It also evaluated three applicants
seeking FCC consent to facilities improvements. 144 Each of the
licensee's stations had broadcast commercials created by the
Alhambra Electronic Institute (later called the California Elec-
tronic Institute), the alter ego of an entrepreneur named Fred
Bezuzi and a chiropractor named Stephen T. Mayes.
These commercials described an incredible new invention,
the "electronometer," said to be capable of diagnosing all
manner of ailments.145 Based on the expert testimony of an
142. Id.
143. Id. at 83-84. For additional cases involving FCC condemnation of
programming during the early years, see Standard Cahill Co., 1 F.C.C. 227
(1935); Joliet Broadcasting Company, 4 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1225 (1948);
Capitol Broadcasting Co., 4 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 21 (1948); Port Frere
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 5 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1137 (1949); Annapolis
Broadcasting Corp., 7 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1053 (1952); Community
Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 13 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 179 (1955).
144. 2 F.C.C. 145, 148 (1935).
145. The advertisement aired by station announcers read in pertinent
part as follows:
You have heard about this new marvel instrument called the
electronometer installed at the Alhambra Electronic Institute at
1811 West Main Street in Alhambra. It is an instrument that is
causing a sensation before us in Southern California, for this reason,
it shows you visually the underlying and basic cause of your ailment.
Many of you have spent many dollars trying to regain your health
and today you are at a loss to know what is causing your ailment.
You say to yourself, "If I knew what was causing my sickness, I
certainly would regain health." All right you would, and here is your
opportunity, that is for ten people, we are authorized to make
appointments for ten people at this time for this examination. Now
this examination usually costs $10.00, but for these ten people it is
going to be given to them for just $1.00 and that is the total cost
without any obligation.
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engineer and physicist, the FCC found no basis to credit the
claims made in Alhambra advertisements and concluded that
the broadcast of them was "inimical to public welfare and
"1146therefore not in the public interest ....
Upon evidence that each licensee had discontinued the
objectionable advertisements, had pledged not to air them
again, and had otherwise commendable service records, the
FCC granted the various applications.' 47
From the early FCC cases, the Commission perfected three
regulatory techniques used repeatedly, from that time forward,
to coax and cajole broadcasters into airing programming pre-
ferred by the commissioners: (1) it barred certain kinds of
applicants from receiving licenses; (2) it labeled certain kinds of
programs inimical to the public interest; and (3) it mandated
that broadcasters air certain classes of programs deemed bene-
ficial for the public. 4 '
In a triumphant reflection on the success of the early years
of content control, FCC Chairman Anning S. Prall announced
in a CBS radio interview on January 13, 1936:
And what else has happened in the program line during
the last twelve months? High powered advertising
announcements have been toned down; commercial con-
tinuities are in better form; the two major chains have
adopted entirely new policies and have outlawed pro-
grams advertising internal medicines or bordering upon
the improper. Their action has been quickly followed by
practically all the responsible independent stations.
Today the number of quack medicines, fortune-telling,
lottery and other schemes broadcast with the end in view
Id. at 149-50.
The parties described the electronometer as:
an instrument designed to pick up vibrations emanating from the
human body, the various organs, tissues, and nerves. It picks up
these impulses and builds them up or amplifies them to where they
will register on a very delicate set of dials, tubes, condensers, and
amplifiers. These registrations are manifested by means of dials
similar to those upon a radio machine and are measurements made
in units, . . . embracing micromilimeter [sic] measurement; wave
lengths are used which have been proven by tests to define the dif-
ferent organs, tissues, and conditions that can exist within the
human body.
Id. at 150-51.
146. Id. at 151-52.
147. Id. at 157.
148. See Comment, Radio Program Controls: A Network of Inadequacy, 57
YALE L.J. 275, 280 (1947).
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of fooling or defrauding a gullible public is at a mini-
mum. The FCC will not stop until all of them are off the
air. 1
49
From 1934 to 1940, with the courts' blessing, the FCC
became more assertive in its enforcement of content regula-
tions. Its role as moral policeman of content quality became an
indispensable and defining one for the agency. 150 In effect, the
FCC had become the broadcasters' collective conscience. It
caused them to avoid the iconoclastic and the heterodox. Con-
formity was the watch word of the day. The broadcasters' goal
was to pass by FCC regulators without notice or public com-
149. Quoted in Andrew G. Haley, The Law on Radio Programs, 5 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 157, 167 n.40 (1937). In its Third Annual Report, the FCC
explained that the
majority of the investigations conducted with regard to complaints
received concerning the program service of broadcast stations have
resulted in informal adjustments. Other complaints involving
possible violations of the act and rules and regulations of the
Commission, including the broadcast of lotteries, medical programs,
and fortune-telling programs . . . have been investigated, and
appropriate actions have followed either by way of adjustment or by
the designation of applications for renewal of licenses for hearing.
FCC Third Annual Report 40 (1937).
150. See Comment, Old Standards in New Context: A Comparative Analysis of
FCC Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 78, 83 (1950):
The Commission was beginning to use "public interest" in the
layman's sense. Licenses were issued or denied not merely upon a
comparison of the technical and financial abilities of the various
applicants, but upon a determination of whether the services of this
particular broadcaster would benefit the American people. The
Commission had travelled far from its original role of airwaves
traffic policeman. Control over radio had become more than
regulation based on technological necessity; it had become
regulation of conduct, and the basis was but emerging.
Recurrently in their public statements, the FCC commissioners insisted
that content regulation was a crucial power that they intended to wield. In
1937, before the National Conference on Educational Broadcasting, FCC
commissioner George Henry Payne (a former Bull Mooser for Theodore
Roosevelt) stated:
Program standards must be established corresponding to technical
standards. The broadcaster should be required at regular intervals
to account for his stewardship, and if he has not met the standards
set, the frequency he enjoys should be thrown into the public
domain and made available to those who can and will meet the pro-
gram standards, for program standards are more important than
technical standards.
Quoted in EMORD, supra note 9, at 186; see also Statement of FCC Chairman
Eugene 0. Sykes, quoted in Joel Rosenbloom, Authority of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN BROADCASTING 151-52
(John E. Coons ed., 1961).
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plaint and thereby safely attain license renewal. Bland, dispir-
ited, antiseptic programming afforded that safe harbor of
anonymity needed to assure a prompt renewal.
b. The FCC's Prohibition on Editorialization
In January, 1941, the FCC decided the Mayflower Broadcast-
ing Corporation case. 5' That case represents the culmination of
the agency's movement toward ever greater control over the
editorial discretion of broadcast journalists. In assessing the
license renewal application of The Yankee Network, Inc., licen-
see of WAAB, Boston, Massachusetts, the FCC considered the
propriety of station editorialization. WAAB broadcast editori-
als endorsing candidates for public office and taking sides on
controversial issues. The Commission concluded that editori-
alization by broadcasters was contrary to the public interest. It
based this decision on the spectrum scarcity rationale. Wrote
the commissioners:
The material in the record has been carefully considered
and compels the conclusion that this licensee during the
period in question, has revealed a serious misconception
of its duties and functions under the law. Under the
American system of broadcasting it is clear that responsi-
bility for the conduct of a broadcast station must rest ini-
tially with the broadcasters. It is equally clear that with
the limitations in frequencies inherent in the nature of
radio, the public interest can never be served by a dedica-
tion of any broadcast facility to the support of his own
partisan ends. Radio can serve as an instrument of
democracy only when devoted to the communication of
information and the exchange of ideas fairly and objec-
tively presented. A truly free radio cannot be used to
advocate the causes of the licensee. It cannot be used to
support the candidacies of his friends. It cannot be
devoted to the support of principles he happens to
regard most favorably. In brief, the broadcaster cannot
be an advocate.
152
In response to an FCC inquiry concerning the station's
editorialization, the licensee had voluntarily discontinued all of
its editorial programs and pledged to refrain in the future from
voicing an opinion. This was enough for the agency, and it
renewed The Yankee Network, Inc.'s license, but cautioned,
"[s]hould any future occasion arise to examine into the conduct
151. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
152. Id. at 339-40.
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of this licensee, . . . the Commission will consider the facts
developed in this record in its review of the activities as a
whole."
153
The Mayflower decision provoked widespread criticism but,
in light of Supreme Court decisions confirming the propriety of
the agency's content regulations, did not cause the agency to
change its position until 1947 when it scheduled FCC hearings
on the subject.
154
c. The Supreme Court Upholds FCC Content Controls
In 1940, the Supreme Court decided two cases following
the reasoning set forth in FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage
Co., one condoning the FCC's power to broadly regulate under
the public interest standard 55 and the other expressly endors-
ing it.' 56 It was not until 1943, however, that the Court
declared unequivocally that the FCC's power to assay the "pub-
lic interest" included not only the power to determine who
could be in the broadcast business but also what could be
broadcast. In NBC v. United States, the Court upheld the FCC's
"chain broadcasting rules" that restricted the contract rights of
the major radio networks purportedly to prevent the develop-
ment of network monopolies, to promote community respon-
sive programming, and to preclude licensees from abdicating
control over programming to the networks. 57 The Court
rejected a First Amendment challenge to the rules, reasoning
that spectrum scarcity justified lessened constitutional protec-
tion for the broadcast media15 8 and confirming that the FCC
had power not only to determine who could enter the field of
broadcasting but also to regulate the composite message com-
municated to the public. Wrote Justice Frankfurter:
[W]e are asked to regard the Commission as a kind of
traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent sta-
tions from interfering with each other. But the Act does
not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the
traffic. It puts upon the Commission the burden of deter-
mining the composition of that traffic. The facilities of
153. Id. at 341.
154. See Comment, Radio Program Controls: A Network of Inadequacy, 57
YALE L.J. 275, 288 (1947).
155. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 n.2
(1940).
156. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 693, 697 (1940).
157. See Report on Chain Broadcasting, No. 5060, slip op. (F.C.C. May
1941) at 63-66.
158. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
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radio are not large enough to accommodate all who wish
to use them. Methods must be developed for choosing
among the many who apply. And since Congress itself
could not do this, it committed the task to the
Commission.'
59
NBC inspired the Commission, leading to an expansion of
its content control over broadcasting. Until NBC, the agency
had always alleged that it did not engage in censorship because
it never dictated what a licensee could say. Rather, it only
determined, after the fact, whether what a licensee did say was
in the public interest. In the advent of NBC, the FCC estab-
lished affirmative programming obligations that licensees
would have to satisfy if they wished to assure themselves license
renewal. 1
d. The FCC's Affirmative Programming Requirements
On occasion, the FCC did more than just review the pro-
gramming pledges of licensees in assaying the public interest.
For example, in Canon System, Ltd. ,61 the Commission reported
its conclusions following an inspection of a station's program-
ming on three randomly selected dates. The Commission had
awarded Canon System, Ltd. a construction permit following
that applicant's successful challenge of the license renewal of
station KGIX, Las Vegas, Nevada. In its application, Canon
pledged to donate free time to local civic groups to broadcast
programs, to devote a substantial percent of its time to educa-
tional matters, agricultural features, and news, and to broad-
cast Spanish language programming. The FCC dispatched
inspectors on December 15, 21, and 27, 1938 to record the sta-
tions broadcasts in an effort to ascertain whether the licensee
kept its promises. The agency found that the licensee did not.
Nevertheless, the FCC decided not to deny the licensee's
renewal application in light of the licensee's post hoc efforts to
fulfill its original programming promises.
162
In 1945, the FCC decided United Broadcasting Co. 163 In that
comparative renewal case the Commission had before it an
agreement whereby a labor union and a renewal applicant set-
tled their differences upon the licensee's pledge to permit all
159. Id. at 215-16.
160. See Comment, Radio Program Controls: A Network of Inadequacy, 57
YALE LJ. 275, 289 (1947).
161. 8 F.C.C. 207 (1940).
162. Id. at 209-10.
163. 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
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sides to air views on controversial issues on the station. In
approving the settlement, the FCC announced a new policy.
Henceforth, it would be the affirmative duty of licensees to
broadcast programming "sensitive to the problems of concern
in the community and ... make sufficient time available, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, for full discussion thereof, without
any type of censorship which would undertake to impose the
views of the licensee upon the material to be broadcast.""
In April of that same year, the Chairman of the FCC
announced a new "get tough" renewal review policy, informing
broadcasters that the agency was about to intensify its "prom-
ise" versus "performance" appraisals at renewal time. Hence-
forth, a licensee's programming pledges made in license and
license renewal applications would have to be effectuated dur-
ing the license term to assure automatic renewal.' 6 5 The FCC
instituted this new policy in April of 1945.166
164. Id. at 517. With its 1928 Statement mandating balanced views in
controversial programs, and the United Broadcasting requirement that matters
of public concern be broadcast, the Commission had in place the two
pronged requirement of the modern Fairness Doctrine. In Robert Harold
Scott, 11 F.C.C. 372 (1946), the FCC framed its fairness requirement in
language almost identical to that adopted for the Fairness Doctrine proper.
The Commission defined the licensee's fairness duty to consist of making
"time available for the presentation of opposing views on current
controversial issues of public importance." Id. at 376.
165. Chairman Porter stated:
[A]n applicant seeks a construction permit for a new station and in
his application makes the usual representations as to the type of
service he proposes. These representations include specific pledges
that time will be made available for civic, educational, agricultural
and other public service programs. The station is constructed and
begins operations. Subsequently the licensee asks for a three-year
renewal and the record clearly shows that he has not fulfilled the
promises made to the Commission when he received the original
grant. The Commission in the past has, for a variety of reasons,
including limitations of staff, automatically renewed these licenses
even in cases where there is a vast disparity between promises and
performance.
We have under consideration.., a procedure whereby promises will
be compared with performance. I think the industry is entitled to
know our concern in this matter and should be informed that there
is pending before the Commission staff proposals which are
designed to strengthen renewal procedures and give the
Commission a more definite picture of the station's overall
operation when licenses come up for renewal.
Quoted in FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES
(1946), reprinted in KAHN, supra note 27, at 151-52.
166. KAHN, supra note 27, at 152.
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Then on March 7, 1946, the FCC released the most com-
prehensive series of programming guidelines it had ever
assembled in one place, the so-called "Blue Book," so named
because of the book's cover color.
167
The FCC construed NBC to mandate the establishment of
affirmative programming requirements for licensees, interpret-
ing that case as placing the licensee "under an affirmative duty,
in its public interest determinations, to give full consideration
to program service."'68
The FCC would henceforth renew a license only after it
compared the percentage of commercial programs of various
types the licensee broadcast with the percentage pledged to be
broadcast in the station's license or license renewal application.
Discrepancies between the two, resulting from a failure to fulfill
programming promises, could warrant a formal Commission
inquiry.' 69 The purpose of this programming scrutiny was not
only to increase the threat of non-renewal but also to ensure
that licensees appreciated that their super-editor, the FCC,
would be monitoring their performance not only at renewal
times, but also throughout their license terms.
Under the "Blue Book" regime, which lasted from 1946 to
1961, the Commission pressured broadcasters into providing
programming in each of a half dozen categories, service in
every category being deemed essential to the maintenance of
the "balanced programming fare" needed for renewal.' 7 ° As
Ben C. Fisher explained, "[s]o long as stations maintained a
167. Id. at 172.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 197, 227-28. Wrote the Commission:
[T]he Commission proposes to continue substantially unchanged its
present basic licensing procedures-namely, the requiring of a
written application setting forth the proposed program service of
the station, the consideration of that application on the merits, and
subsequently the comparison of promise and performance when an
application is received for a renewal of the station license.
Id. at 227-28.
170. The Commission informed broadcasters that it would give
particular consideration to four program service factors relevant to
the public interest. There are: (1) the carrying of sustaining
programs, including network sustaining programs, with particular
reference to the retention by licensees of a proper discretion and
responsibility for maintaining a well-balanced program structure; (2)
the carrying of local live programs; (3) the carrying of programs
devoted to the discussion of public issues, and (4) the elimination of
advertising excesses.
Id. at 226.
The FCC classified a program part as "commercial" if it had one or more
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fair balance between the various categories, their renewals
were automatic."'' License applications were altered to per-
mit heightened programming scrutiny.'
7 2
In 1944, the Supreme Court determined that the First
Amendment did not bar government from applying the anti-
trust laws to the press.' 7 3 The Court enunciated a new princi-
ple for regulating the media. Far from barring government
from regulating media structure and content, the First Amend-
ment was held to compel government intervention to assure
viewpoint diversity. The Court wrote:
It would be strange indeed . .. if the grave concern for
freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the
First Amendment should be read as a command that the
government was without power to protect that free-
dom.... That Amendment rests on the assumption that
the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wel-
fare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free
society. Surely a command that the government itself
shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford
non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose
commercial announcements within a 141/2 minute interval. All other pro-
gram parts were classified as "sustaining." See HEAD, supra note 26, at 202.
171. See Ben C. Fisher, Program Control and the Federal Communications
Commission: A Limited Role, 14 VILL. L. REV. 602, 607 (1969).
172. Application forms required that the licensee specify its proposed
or actual programs in the following categories:
1. Entertainment (programs intended primarily as entertainment,
such as music, drama, variety, comedy, quiz, breakfast,
children's)
2. Religious (sermons, religious news, music and drama, etc.)
3. Agricultural (farm or market reports and other information
addressed directly to the agricultural population)
4. Educational (programs prepared by or on behalf of educational
organizations, exclusive of discussion programs)
5. News (including commentaries)
6. Discussion (including forum, panel, and round-table programs)
7. Talks (conversation programs not previously classified; includes
sports)
8. Miscellaneous.
HEAD, supra note 26, at 336.
Licensees were also required to identify what percentages of these pro-
grams fell into the following categories:
Network Recorded Wire Live
Commercial 7 0 7 0
Sustaining 0 0 0 0
Id.
173. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944).
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restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed
freedom .... 1
74
In 1949, the FCC seized upon NBC and Associated Press to
buttress its case for the Fairness Doctrine and government con-
trol over broadcast programming content in general. It took
the occasion to emphasize that, in the field of broadcasting, the
"rights of the listener" were paramount to those of the speaker
(taking its cue from Hoover) and to reiterate that the FCC, not
individual broadcasters, would determine what kind of pro-
gram service the listeners deserved. In its Report on Editorializ-
ing by Broadcast Licensees, the FCC reversed the ban on licensee
editorialization that it had maintained for the eight years fol-
lowing Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation. It subsumed licensee
editorials within the Fairness Doctrine requirements then oper-
ative, thereby requiring licensees to broadcast views in opposi-
tion to their own if they chose to broadcast any opinion at
all. 175
e. The FCC's Quantitative Programming Requirements
Between 1950 and 1960, few Fairness Doctrine complaints
were filed with the FCC.176 Moreover, although the FCC
required that certain categories of programming be broadcast
by licensees, it did not quantify precisely how much program-
ming within any particular category it expected licensees to
present. Instead, in the first instance, the FCC made it the
licensee's obligation to "determine what percentage of the lim-
ited broadcast day should appropriately be devoted to news
and discussion or consideration of public issues, rather than to
the other legitimate services of broadcast."'
' 77
This general affirmative programming obligation began to
become more specific in 1960 when the FCC issued a Report and
Statement of Policy Regarding Programming.' 7' The FCC reiterated
its understanding of the limited scope of press freedom in the
field of broadcasting, explaining that the agency was not fore-
closed from regulating programming by either the First
Amendment or the anti-censorship provision of the Communi-
174. Id.
175. See Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.
1246 (1949).
176. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 467 (1979), modified,
84 F.C.C.2d 968, aff'd, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), remanded, 707 F.2d 1413
(D.C. Cir. 1983), modified, 96 F.C.C.2d 930 (1984), vacated, 779 F.2d 702 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), modified, 104 F.C.C.2d 505 (1986).
177. Report on Editorializing, 13 F.C.C. at 1247.
178. See En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960).
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cations Act of 1934.'7 It then imposed on licensees an obliga-
tion "to make a positive, diligent and continuing effort, in good
faith, to determine the tastes, needs and desires of the public in
[their communities] and to provide programming to meet
those [tastes,] needs and interests."' 180  "Localism" had
become the agency's paramount service objective.
The FCC defined the provision of programming in the fol-
lowing fourteen categories as "usually necessary to meet the
public interest, needs and desires of the community ... ." thus
indirectly forcing renewal conscious licensees to provide a fair
mix of such programming:
(1) Opportunity for Local Self-Expression, (2) The
Development and Use of Local Talent, (3) Programs for
Children, (4) Religious Programs, (5) Educational Pro-
grams, (6) Public Affairs Programs, (7) Editorialization by
Licensees, (8) Political Broadcasts, (9) Agricultural Pro-
grams, (10) News Programs, (11) Weather and Market
Reports, (12) Sports Programs, (13) Service to Minority
Groups, (14) Entertainment Programming.' 8'
Significantly, FCC application forms were revised to make
applicants specify the precise steps they had taken to apprise
themselves of community "tastes, needs, and desires" and to
elaborate on how programming would be tailored to satisfy
those tastes, needs, and desires.' 8 2 The FCC announced that it
would establish formal procedures to govern the manner by
which applicants would identify community interests. These
formal procedures came to be known as "ascertainment."' 83
179. Id. at 2307. The commissioners stated:
In view of the fact that a broadcaster is required to program his
station in the public interest, convenience and necessity, it follows
despite the limitations of the First Amendment and Section 326 of
the Act, that his freedom to program is not absolute. The
Commission does not conceive that it is barred by the Constitution
or by statute from exercising any responsibility with respect to
programming.
Id. at 2309.
180. Id. at 2314. Before 1960, the FCC had required licensees to
undertake efforts to discover community needs, but did not impose a formal
procedure on them to discover these needs. See, e.g., P.B. Huff, 11 F.C.C.
1211, 1218 (1947); Alexandria Broadcasting Corp., 13 F.C.C. 601, 614
(1949); Pilgrim Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C. 1308, 1348 (1950); Mid-Island
Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 617, 640 (1951); Wayne M. Nelson, 44 F.C.C. 1132,
1136 (1957).
181. Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. at 2314.
182. Id. at 2316.
183. Id. Wrote the commissioners:
What we propose is documented program submissions prepared as
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The Commission's new ascertainment requirements were
quickly put to the test. In Suburban Broadcasters,'84 the FCC
denied an application for new facilities on grounds that the
the result of assiduous planning and consultation covering two main
areas: first, a canvass of the listening public who will receive the
signal and who constitute a definite public interest figure; second,
consultation with leaders in community life-public officials,
educators, religious [leaders], the entertainment media, agriculture,
business, labor-professional and eleemosynary organizations, and
others who bespeak the interests which make up the community.
Id. FCC forms were not revised to incorporate the changes until 1965
(for radio) and 1966 (for television). See AM and FM Program Form, 1
F.C.C.2d 439 (1965); Television Program Form, 5 F.C.C.2d 175 (1966). Nev-
ertheless, the ascertainment requirements were imposed from 1960 forward.
The forms created a four-step ascertainment procedure. Applicants
were expected to fully brief the FCC on:
(a) the steps taken to become informed of the interests and needs of
the area to be served;
(b) the suggestions received as to how the station could help meet
those interests and needs;
(c) the applicant's evaluation of the suggestions; and
(d) the programming proposed to meet evaluated interests and
needs.
Id. at 178.
The FCC's renewed focus on programming became a point of considera-
ble public notice when in a 1961 address to the National Association of
Broadcasters, FCC Chairman Newton N. Minow expressed disdain for the
programming fare then on television and warned that unless drastic changes
were made there would be repercussions for licensees at renewal time. His
speech reads in pertinent part:
When television is bad, nothing is worse. I invite you to sit down in
front of your television set when your station goes on the air and
stay there without a book, magazine, newspaper, profit and loss
sheet or rating book to distract you-and keep your eyes glued to
that set until the station signs off. I can assure you that you will
observe a vast wasteland. You will see a procession of game shows,
violence, audience participation shows, formula comedies about
totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder, mayhem, violence,
sadism, murder, western bad men, western good men, private eyes,
gangsters, more violence, and cartoons. And endlessly, commer-
cials-many screaming, cajoling, and offending. And most of all,
boredom. Sure, you will see a few things you will enjoy. But they
will be very, very few. And if you think I exaggerate; try it....
Gentlemen, your trust accounting with your beneficiaries is overdue.
Never have so few owed so much to so many. ...
I understand that many people feel that in the past licenses were
often renewed pro forma. I say to you now: renewal will not be pro
forma in the future. There is nothing permanent or sacred about a
broadcast license.
Quoted in ERIK BARNOUW, THE IMAGE EMPIRE 197 (1970).
184. 30 F.C.C. 1021 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
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applicant had not conducted formal ascertainment. 85 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the FCC's decision
on statutory and constitutional grounds, relying heavily on
NBC.
18 6
With the arrival of FCC forms specifying steps for formal
ascertainment in 1965 (for AM and FM) and in 1966 (for televi-
sion), the FCC held that programming surveys were no longer
optional methods for ascertaining community needs; they had
become mandatory.' 8 7 Applicants had difficulty complying
with the FCC's ambiguous and evolving ascertainment require-
ments.' 8 8 Responding to the great number of complaints from
broadcasters about these ambiguities, the FCC adopted a pri-
mer to guide them.189 The primer contained thirty-six routine
questions and answers, going into considerable detail about
how applicants were to obtain and analyze demographic infor-
mation, conduct consultations with community residents and
leaders, list community problems and needs, evaluate these
problems and needs, and adopt programming responsive to
185. The FCC held:
[A]n applicant has the responsibility of ascertaining his community's
needs and of programming to meet those needs .... The instant
program proposals were drawn up on the basis of the principals'
apparent belief-unsubstantiated by inquiry, insofar as the record
shows-that Elizabeth's [i.e., Elizabeth, New Jersey's] needs
duplicated those of Alameda, California and Berwyn, Ill ...... [T]he
evidence admits no other conclusion than that the [applicant's]
program proposals were not "designed" to serve the needs of
Elizabeth. . . . [T]he applicant has made no showing as to
Elizabeth's programming needs .... In essence, we are asked to
grant an application prepared by individuals totally without
knowledge of the area they seek to serve. We feel that the public
deserves something more in the way of preparation for the
responsibilities sought by [the] applicant than was demonstrated on
this record.
Id. at 1022-23.
186. See Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191, 193-94 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 821 (1962). The court thought it "clear that the Commission's
action in the instant case reflects no greater interference with a broadcaster's
alleged right to choose its programs free from Commission control than the
interference involved in National Broadcasting Co." and thus affirmed the
FCC's decision. Id. at 194
187. See Andy Valley Broadcasting Sys., 12 F.C.C.2d 3, 6 (1968).
188. See, e.g., City of Camden, 18 F.C.C.2d 412 (1969) (denying an
assignment application, including among its reasons the fact that the
applicant appeared not to have surveyed a representative cross-section of the
community in light of available demographic information).
189. See Ascertainment of Community Problems, 27 F.C.C.2d 650
(1971).
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these problems and needs.' 90 An applicant's failure to abide by
the procedures set forth in the primer resulted in application
denial.19'
The ascertainment procedures forced licensees to orient
their programming more toward local matters and made it nec-
essary for licensees to keep local community leaders satisfied
with their performance. It also burdened them with new costs
and extensive record-keeping requirements. The FCC let
licensees know that the agency would judge their editorial
choices to be sure that matter broadcast did satisfy ascertain-
ment requirements.
In its 1971 primer, the FCC wrote: "[W]here the amount
of broadcast matter proposed to meet community problems
appears patently insufficient to meet significantly [sic] the com-
munity's problems disclosed by the applicant's consultations,
he will be asked for an explanation by letter of inquiry from the
Commission." '192 The agency's 1976 renewal primer also
warned that
[w]here the licensee ... has chosen a brief and unusually
superficial manner of presentation, such as news and
public service announcements, to the exclusion of all
others, a question could be raised as to the reasonable-
ness of the licensee's action. The licensee would then be
required to clearly demonstrate that its single type of
presentations would be the most effective method for its
station to respond to the community's ascertained
problems.'
9 3
190. Id. at 651-79. A Renewal Primer was also adopted. See
Ascertainment of Community Problems by Renewal Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d
418 (1975), recon. granted in part, 61 F.C.C.2d 1 (1976). The Renewal Primer
made ascertainment a continuing obligation of licensees. It established a
community leader "checklist," required a specific number of consultations to
be conducted based on city of license size, made it necessary for licensees to
place certain demographic information about their communities in their
public inspection files, obliged licensees to place lists of up to ten community
problems and needs in their public inspection files along with a list of
programs responsive to the listed problems and needs, and required
licensees to document their ascertainment efforts and place the
documentation in their public files. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(a)(11), (12)
(1977). Noncommercial applicants were also required to abide by the
ascertainment procedures. See Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Noncommercial Applicants, 58 F.C.C.2d 526 (1976).
191. See, e.g., Bamford v. FCC, 535 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 895 (1976).
192. Ascertainment of Community Problems, 27 F.C.C.2d at 686.
193. Renewal Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d at 445.
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f Prior Restraint in the Form of FCC "Policy Statements"
From its earliest days to the present, the FCC has trans-
formed letter rulings in particular cases into general policy
statements that have subsequently been codified. These state-
ments have sometimes informed broadcasters that certain cate-
gories of programming are "off limits." By asserting its power
to make statements of policy in lieu of general rules, the agency
can avoid the rulemaking process, expand its power over pro-
gramming, and attain more dramatic, though sometimes irra-
tional, results. The following are representative examples of
content-regulatory policy statements:
* In response to a letter from Senator Edwin C. John-
son, who inquired about the propriety of alcoholic bever-
age advertising, the FCC issued a program policy
statement in 1949.194 The FCC determined that in states
and localities where the sale or advertising of such bever-
ages was prohibited, it would be contrary to the public
interest for broadcasters to air such advertisements. It
also determined that alcohol advertising was of limited
public appeal and warned broadcasters that in its public
interest assessment of a licensee's overall programming
at renewal time, it would consider such advertising a neg-
ative factor.
* In 1961, the FCC issued a public notice adding to the
general duty of licensees to police their programming for
false or misleading material a particular duty to ascertain
the reliability and reputation of each station adver-
tiser.'95 It explained that the Federal Trade Commission
would regularly send notices to licensees concerning
advertisers against which it had initiated proceedings.
The FCC expected licensees to review the list and "exer-
cise particular care in deciding whether to accept ... for
194. See Broadcast of Programs Advertising Alcoholic Beverages, 43
F.C.C. 446 (1949) (comments of Senator Edwin C. Johnson).
195. Quoted in Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 913 (1985). The Notice read in its pertinent part:
In this regard, particular attention is directed to the fact that
licensee responsibility is not limited merely to a review of the
advertising copy submitted for broadcast, but that the licensee has the
additional obligation to take reasonable steps to satisfy himself as to the
reliability and reputation of every prospective advertiser and as to his ability
to fulfill promises made to the public over the licensed facilities.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
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broadcast advertisements from any advertiser under
investigation by the FTC."1
96
o In 1966, the FCC issued a public notice entitled Con-
tests and Promotions Which Adversely Affect the Public Inter-
est.' 97 In the notice, the agency defined a number of
contests as contrary to the public interest and, so, not fit
for broadcast. These contests included "Treasure
Hunts." The objectionable contests were thought dis-
ruptive of societal order or public safety and, therefore,
contrary to the public interest.'9 8 The FCC cited several
illustrative examples:
A contest which resulted in a vast accumulation of
scrap metal in a certain location, blocking access to
nearby commercial establishments.
A contest which led listeners to choose names at ran-
dom from the telephone directory and to call the
persons listed at all hours of the day and night....
Contests which, by requiring the participants to
travel to a specified place in a very short time, have
caused traffic violations and endangered life.
The broadcast of 'scare' announcements or head-
lines which either are untrue or are worded in such a
way as to mislead and frighten the public; e.g., a
sudden announcement delivered in a tone of excite-
ment to the effect that 'amoebas' were invading a
certain city, implying that amoebas were dangerous
creatures.199
In 1974, the FCC supplemented this statement with
another,200 reiterating the terms of the first notice and identify-
ing a few additional contests and promotions thought to be
fraudulent in nature and, so, contrary to the public interest.2 0
o In 1968, in response to an inquiry from Congressman
John E. Moss, concerning broadcast stations' use of call-
in polls, the agency held that licensees could not broad-
cast poll results without first stating the nature of the
196. Id.
197. 2 F.C.C.2d 464 (1966).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Public Notice, 45 F.C.C.2d 1056 (1974).
201. Id. at 1056-57. In 1976, the FCC adopted a regulation prohibiting
contests that are fraudulent or that fail to disclose material terms. See 47
C.F.R. § 73.1216 (1990); Report and Order in the Matter of Amendment of
Part 73 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Licensee-Conducted Contests,
60 F.C.C.2d 1072 (1976).
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poll, and then stating whether the poll was conducted
upon a scientific basis.20 2
* In 1970, the agency- issued a public notice effectively
banning the use of sirens and "other alarming sound
effects in commercials and other announcements. 20 3 It
did so following receipt of a number of complaints about
such commercials and deducing from these complaints
that such sound effects could confuse listeners into
falsely suspecting the presence of an actual emergency.
* In that same year, the FCC acted on a complaint that a
radio station had broadcast the name and phone number
of an individual who was embroiled in a local contro-
versy, thereby causing that individual to receive certain
harassing and threatening phone calls. The FCC issued a
statement that it was contrary to the public interest for a
station to broadcast programming that it could expect
would result in harassing and threatening phone calls.
20 4
The FCC also addressed a complaint submitted by the
New York Port Authority alleging that a New York City
station encouraged listeners to protest to a Port Author-
ity official for that official's failure to permit the station to
move its transmitter site to the Authority-operated World
Trade Center. The FCC declared it improper for licen-
sees to use their facilities as organs "to promote [their]
own private interests and annoy and harass others.
20 5
* In 1970 and again in 1975, the FCC warned licensees
not to broadcast promotional announcements which
might suggest that the station was a co-promoter of a
concert, when it had no direct involvement or financial
interest in the event or its promotion.20 6
* In 1972, in response to a complaint by the author of a
book on astrology that a station had refused to air infor-
mation on that subject, the FCC issued a declaratory rul-
ing affirming its traditional disapprobation for fortune-
telling and astrology, explaining that these kinds of
broadcasts were contrary to the public interest when
202. See Inquiry Into Use of "Call In" Television and Radio Polls, 13
F.C.C.2d 964 (1968) (comments of Congressman John E. Moss).
203. See In Re Use of Sirens and Other Alarming Sound Effects in
Announcements, 26 F.C.C.2d 275 (1970).
204. See Dewey M. Duckett, Jr., 23 F.C.C.2d 872 (1970).
205. See In Re Complaint by Port of New York Authority, 33 F.C.C.2d
840, 841-42 (1972).
206. See Waterman Broadcasting Corp. of Texas, 28 F.C.C.2d 348
(1970); Doubleday Broadcasting Co., 55 F.C.C.2d 763 (1975).
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"presented by broadcast so as to guarantee or promise
monetary, health or other benefits."
20 7
* In 1973, in response to a request for clarification of its
foreign language programming policies, the FCC dis-
avowed any requirement that licensees hire independent,
paid monitors for such programming. The FCC strongly
encouraged that approach however, thereby effectively
accomplishing the same result as a mandatory
requirement.
208
* In 1973, the FCC issued a policy statement in
response to a complaint that a radio station had repeat-
edly played a single rock and roll record for sixty-nine
consecutive hours. The station had done so as a gimmick
to inform as many people as possible that it had under-
gone a format change. 20 9 The FCC found the redundant
music offensive and therefore contrary to the public
interest. The commissioners wrote:
The selection of records is a matter within the licen-
see's discretion. But the constant repetition of any
record so as to constitute the station's entire
entertainment format for a long period of time raises
a question whether the licensee is making a good
faith programming judgment to fulfill his public
trustee role or whether he is subordinating that role
for his private promotional purposes. The latter
appears to be the case in the circumstances
presented here and your actions appear to have been
inconsistent with the public interest responsibilities
of a licensee.
2 10
g. The FCC's Prohibition on Programming Duplication
In 1964, the FCC adopted a rule that prohibited FM sta-
tions from duplicating more than 50% of their programming
from a co-owned AM station in the same market.
21'
The FCC permitted some program duplication to
encourage the development of the fledgling FM service, but
perceived this as an inefficient use of spectrum that would be
tolerated only on a temporary basis. The prohibition on pro-
207. See Alexandra Mark, 34 F.C.C.2d 434, 437 (1972).
208. See Foreign Language Programs, 39 F.C.C.2d 1037 (1973).
209. See Promotional Activities by GCC Communications of Houston,
Inc., 40 F.C.C.2d 1154 (1973).
210. Id. (emphasis in original).
211. See Report and Order: Amendment of Part 73 of the
Commission's Rules, 45 F.C.C. 1515, 1530-31 (1964).
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gram duplication was designed to force FM to become an
independent service and to encourage the use of the FM radio
set. 21 2 In 1976, the FCC expanded the scope of its prohibition
on program duplication by co-owned same market AM and FM
facilities, limiting such duplication to not more than 25%.213
The agency perceived this new restriction as a continuation of
two of its original objectives: avoiding what it termed "waste-
ful" program redundancy and inefficient use of the spectrum
and promoting the independent development of FM radio.
2,4
h. The Rise of the Fairness Doctrine
Prior to 1959, the FCC made it a practice to merely hold
Fairness Doctrine complaints in abeyance until the licensee's
renewal review. 1 5 Subsequent to 1959, the agency began to
dispose of Fairness Doctrine complaints at the time they were
received by the agency. 6 It did so following Congress's 1959
amendment of Section 315 to the Communications Act.21 7 A
portion of the amendment reiterated the essential Fairness
Doctrine obligation of licensees:
Nothing in the [amendment] shall be construed as reliev-
ing broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of
newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-
the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation
imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the pub-
lic interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the
212. Id. at 1531.
213. See Report and Order: AM-FM Program Duplication, 59 F.C.C.2d
147, 156 (1976).
214. Id. at 148-49, 152.
215. See, e.g., Dominican Republic Info. Ctr., 40 F.C.C. 457 (1957);
Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 464 (1958).
216. See, e.g., Billings Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 518 (1962).
217. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1991), as amended by Pub. L. No. 86-274,
173 Stat. 557. This section of the act generally requires licensees who permit
a candidate for public office to broadcast a message over their facilities to
afford a reasonable opportunity for all other candidates for the same office to
broadcast their messages.
In 1959, third party candidate Lar Daly asked a CBS affiliate in Chicago
to afford him equal time to respond to a series of brief news reports that
featured Republican and Democratic candidates for mayor. The affiliate
refused and Daly asked the FCC to require the station to give him air time.
The FCC decided the case in Daly's favor. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. (Lar Daly), 26 F.C.C. 715 (1959).
Displeased with the FCC's action, Congress amended Section 315 to
exempt from its right of access provision bona fide newscasts, news
interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events.
See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)-(4) (1991).
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discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance.21 8
In 1964, fifteen years after the formal promulgation of the
Fairness Doctrine in the Report on Editorializing, the FCC issued
its first Fairness Doctrine primer, designed to clarify the Doc-
trine's purpose. 21 9 During that fifteen year period, only twice
did the agency take action against licensees for violating the
Doctrine. It did so not by penalizing them, but by admonishing
them to follow the Doctrine's balanced programming prong.
22 0
In Cullman Broadcasting Co., a licensee that aired one side of a
controversial issue of public importance was required to air a
contrasting view either on its own or at another's behest free of
charge if no paid sponsor could be found.22' If the licensee
was unable to find a group or individual to present a contrast-
ing view, it would have to present that view itself, regardless of
its own editorial preferences.
In the Fairness Primer, the FCC emphasized the need for
compliance with the "personal attack" rule corollary to the
Fairness Doctrine. It did so by reiterating an aspect of the Doc-
trine only touched on briefly in the agency's 1949 Report on Edi-
torializing-that a person whose honesty, character, integrity, or
like personal characteristics were attacked during the discus-
sion of a controversial issue of public importance must be
afforded an opportunity to broadcast a reply.223
In 1967, the FCC applied the Fairness Doctrine proper to
cigarette advertising2 24 and, later, to all advertising concerning
218. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1991). Although the amendment refers to the
obligation imposed "under this Act," the amendment was the first time the
doctrine was mentioned in the act. Prior to 1959, the "obligation" was
merely an agency interpretation of the general "public interest" standard
provided for in the Act.
219. See Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of
Controversial Issues of Pub. Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964) [hereinafter
Fairness Primer].
220. Although in the Report on Editorializing, the agency added to the
balanced presentation prong of the fairness doctrine an affirmative
requirement to air controversial issues of importance, since 1949 the agency
ignored the affirmative duty prong and focused exclusively on the balanced
presentation requirement. See Bill F. Chamberlain, The FCC and the First
Principle of the Fairness Doctrine: A History of Neglect and Distortion, 31 FED. COMM.
L.J. 361, 372 (1979).
221. 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
222. See, e.g., John J. Dempsey, 6 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 615 (1950);
Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 19 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 602 (1960).
223. See Fairness Primer, supra note 219, at 610-14; see also Times-Mirror
Broadcasting Co., 24 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 404 (1962).
224. See Letter to Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967),
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controversial issues of public importance-this at the insistence
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.225 In 1970,
the FCC held the Doctrine to apply to paid political advertise-
ments by a candidate's supporters.2 2 6 However, it was the Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. case that served as the greatest boon to the
growth of the Fairness Doctrine and its corollaries.
The Reverend John M. Norris was the owner of Red Lion
Broadcasting Company, licensee of WGCB-AM, Red Lion,
Pennsylvania. On November 27, 1964, WGCB aired a fifteen
minute program in which the Reverend Bill James Hargis criti-
cized Fred J. Cook, author of Goldwater-Extremist on the Right,
describing Cook as a writer for a "left-wing" publication, The
Nation magazine. 227 Hargis alleged that Cook was fired from
his position at the New York World Telegram for making false
charges against a New York City official. He also accused Cook
of writing articles to absolve Alger Hiss and accused Cook of
maligningJ. Edgar Hoover, the F.B.I., and the C.I.A. Finally,
Hargis stated that Cook wrote his book on Goldwater to
"smear and destroy Barry ....
Cook heard of the broadcast and contacted WGCB to
demand an editorial reply. The station refused him that oppor-
tunity. Following a number of letters to the FCC, the agency
found that the station did engage in a personal attack and
ordered it to send Cook a tape, transcript, or summary of the
broadcast and to afford him an opportunity to reply.2 29 The
D.C. Circuit affirmed the FCC's decision on constitutional and
statutory grounds 23 ° and Red Lion Broadcasting Company
appealed to the Supreme Court.
aft'd, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
Congress banned the broadcast of cigarette advertising on January 2, 1971
(Pub. L. No. 91-222 (1970)).
225. See Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
226. See In re Letter to Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970).
227. Hargis described The Nation as "one of the most scurrilous
publications of the left which has championed many communist causes over
many years," quoted in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 371
n.2 (1969).
228. See Steven P. Frankino, Introduction, The FCC's Role in Television
Programming Regulation: A Symposium, 14 VILL. L. REV. 581, 582-83 (1969);
FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD Guys AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECH VERSUS FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING, Chs. 1, 3, 4
(1976).
229. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 372.
230. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.
1967). During the course of the Red Lion litigation, the FCC codified the
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In a decision that has ever since served as the constitu-
tional basis for FCC content regulation, the Supreme Court
affirmed the D.C. Circuit and reversed the Seventh Circuit,
upholding the FCC's most intrusive form of content-based reg-
ulation. The Court articulated all of the rationales for content
regulation that have ever since been the basis for maintaining
and expanding these regulations.2 3 '
personal attack rule. See 32 Fed. Reg. 10303 (1967); 32 Fed. Reg. 11531
(1967); 33 Fed. Reg. 5362 (1968).
At the time the Supreme Court decided Red Lion, the rules were codified
in 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, and 73.679. The pertinent parts read
as follows:
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue
of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character,
integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group,
the licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in no event later
than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the person or group
attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identification of the
broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or
tape is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable
opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be
applicable (1) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures;
(2) to personal attacks which are made by legally qualified
candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or persons associated with
the candidates in the campaign; and (3) to bona fide newscasts, bona
fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news
event (including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing
programs, but the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall be
applicable to editorials of the licensee) .... (c) Where a licensee, in
an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally qualified candidate
or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the editorial,
transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or
candidates for the same office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the
editorial (1) notification of the date and the time of the editorial; (2)
a script or tape of the editorial; and (3) an offer of a reasonable
opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of the candidate to
respond over the licensee's facilities: Provided, however, That where
such editorials are broadcast within 72 hours prior to the day of the
election, the licensee shall comply with the provisions of this
paragraph sufficiently far in advance of the broadcast to enable the
candidate or candidates to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare
a response and to present it in a timely fashion.
The Radio Television News Directors Association challenged the personal
attack rules on constitutional grounds. The rules were declared unconstitu-
tional by the Seventh Circuit. See Radio Television News Directors v. United
States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1012 (7th Cir. 1968). The RTNDA and Red Lion cases
were consolidated before the Supreme Court in Red Lion.
231. One important justification for content regulation that did not
serve as a basis for the decision is the impact rationale of FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), which upholds the FCC's authority to regulate
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The Court first endorsed the varying standards rationale,
explaining that the broadcast media deserved less First Amend-
ment protection than the print media because "differences in
the characteristics of the new media justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to them."'2 2 Next, the
Court endorsed the spectrum scarcity rationale, finding that
there could be no unabridgeable First Amendment in broad-
casting since, unlike newspaper publishing, broadcasting could
only be conducted intelligibly through government licens-
ing.233 The Court also endorsed the trusteeship model, finding
it permissible for the state to require a licensee "to share his
frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or
fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices
which are representative of his community and which would
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. '"234 The
Court held the right of the viewers and listeners to receive a
broad array of views and information (the diversity rationale)
superior to the right of broadcasters to present their own
views,23 5 finding there to be "no sanctuary in the First Amend-
ment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium
not open to all."
23 6
In surveying its repeated affirmances of FCC content regu-
lations, the Court reiterated unequivocally that the FCC had a
constitutional and statutory right to base its licensing decisions
on programming.23 7
In 1973, the Court again visited the question of the consti-
tutionality of Fairness Doctrine enforcement, this time in the
"indecent" speech. The impact rationale focuses on the pervasive presence
and influential nature of the broadcast medium and suggests that this justifies
regulation as a constitutional matter. For a powerful critique, see MATTHEW
L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND Six OTHER STORIES 67-118 (1986).
232. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
233. Id. at 388-89, 390. As set forth supra this statement is false in light
of the property rights alternative.
234. Id. at 389.
235. Id. at 390.
236. Id. at 392. The Court also wrote: "Congress need not stand idly
by and permit those with licenses to ignore the problems which best the
people or to exclude from the airwaves anything but their own views of
fundamental questions." Id. at 394.
237. Reflecting on NBC, the Court held that it had already recognized
"that the Commission was more than a traffic policeman concerned with the
technical aspects of broadcasting and that it neither exceeded its powers
under the statute nor transgressed the First Amendment in interesting itself
in general program format and the kinds of programs broadcast by
licensees." Id. at 395.
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paid advertising context.238 The Court reversed the D.C. Cir-
cuit and upheld the FCC's decision to permit broadcasters the
freedom to reject paid editorial advertisements concerning
controversial issues of public importance.
In 1974, the FCC concluded a comprehensive three year
study of the Fairness Doctrine, determining the net effect of
Doctrine enforcement to be enhancement of viewpoint diver-
sity in the idea marketplace. 23 9 It emphasized the importance
of the first prong of the Doctrine, concerning the necessity of
broadcasting "controversial issues of public importance," and
gave that term of art greater definitional clarity by linking it to
three elements: (1) the degree of media coverage an issue
engendered, (2) the amount of attention the issue received
from government officials and community leaders, and (3) "a
subjective evaluation of the impact [likely] on the community at
large."'2 40 Bolstered by Red Lion and CBS, the agency now reit-
erated that " 'strict adherence to the fairness doctrine'-includ-
ing the affirmative obligation to provide coverage of issues of
public importance-[was] 'the single most important require-
ment of operation in the public interest-the "sine qua non"
for grant of a renewal of license.' "241
i. The FCC's Focus on Children's Programming
In its 1960 Report and Statement of Policy Regarding Program-
ming,242 the FCC for the first time defined "Programs for Chil-
dren" as one of the fourteen "major elements usually necessary
to meet the public interest, needs and desires of the commu-
nity." a243 Although the agency thereby forced all licensees to
provide some programming designed for children (even if that
was against the licensee's editorial desires), it did not define the
kind or amount of children's programming that would be
adequate.
In 1974, this relatively loose regulatory environment
began to suffer some constriction with the adoption of the Chil-
238. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
239. See In re the Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine
and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1,
7 (1974), aff'd sub nom., 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976), revd in part, 567 F.2d 1095
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied 436 U.S. 926 (1978) [hereinafter 1974 Fairness
Report].
240. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 239, at 11-12.
241. Id. at 10 (quoting Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of
Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283, 292 (1970)).
242. 20 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1901 (1960).
243. Id. at 1913.
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dren's Television Report and Policy Statement.244 The Report and Pol-
icy Statement not only reiterated that it was the duty of licensees
to provide programming designed for children,245 it further
held that licensees would be expected (1) to reduce the level of
commercialization present during the broadcast of children's
programming, (2) to maintain a separation between program-
ming and advertising, and (3) to avoid programming that might
take advantage of the immaturity of children.246
Although these broad directives were left undefined, in
each area the FCC's Chairman had exerted pressure upon the
broadcaster's principal lobbying organizations, the National
Association of Broadcasters and the Association of Independ-
ent Television Stations, to supplement their codes for broad-
casting 247 with specific programming requirements. In effect,
the Chairman forced these organizations to do the agency's
bidding under a threat of future regulation if the process of
self-regulation failed.
The FCC held that licensees had a "special obligation to
serve children" and would be expected, "as trustees of a valua-
ble public resource, to develop and present programs which
will serve the unique needs of the child audience.12 48 In partic-
ular, the FCC favored "educational and cultural," rather than
entertainment programming for children. 249 Although it did
not demand that any particular programs be broadcast, it
244. 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), aft'd, Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
245. "During the course of this inquiry, we have found that a few
stations present no programs at all for children. We trust that this Report will
make it clear that such performance will not be acceptable for commercial
television stations which are expected to provide diversified program service
to their communities." Id. at 6.
246. Id. at 18.
247. In 1939, the NAB enacted its Radio Code. See Unnecessary
Broadcast Regulation ("Underbrush Policies"), 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1043, 1051 (1983). On March 3, 1982, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia found that certain provisions of the NAB Code violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act. See United States v. National Assoc. of Broadcasters,
536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982). The NAB entered into a consent degree
with the Department of Justice in which it agreed to stop enforcing the
offending provisions. See 571 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 70843. The Board of
Directors of the NAB voted to abolish the code in January of 1983. See
Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation, 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1051.
248. 50 F.C.C.2d 5 (1974).
249. Id. at 5 ("It seems to us that the use of television to further the
educational and cultural development of America's children bears a direct
relationship to the licensee's obligation under the Communications Act to
operate in the 'public interest.' "); see also id. at 7.
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clearly stated the subjects it preferred.25 ° It also emphasized
that pre-school and school age children would have to be
served with programming separately designed for each
group.25 ' It expressed concern that children's programming,
although dominant on weekends, was largely missing in the
weekday line-up of shows and counseled licensees that it would
expect an "improvement in scheduling practices in the
future.' '252
The commissioners complained vociferously about com-
mercial advertising practices during children's programming
hours. Warning that "[b]roadcasters have a special responsi-
bility to children," the FCC explained that young children who
lack mature reasoning could be misled into placing unquestion-
ing faith in the claims of advertisers.253
The agency also required licensees to maintain a distinct
separation between commercial and program matter by either
announcing that the children's program was being interrupted
for commercial messages, or by broadcasting some visual sig-
nal before and after a commercial to alert viewers of the
change.254 The FCC condemned the practice of program hosts
endorsing products, particularly when this was done in
character.255
The FCC fell short of imposing specific regulations, pre-
ferring a case by case enforcement approach at license renewal
time. However, the agency revealed that its Chairman had
"extensive discussions" with the NAB and the INTV and that
these organizations had "voluntarily" agreed to reduce the
amount of advertising during children's programming through
the adoption of advertising codes for their association mem-
bers.2 56 The FCC commended the trade associations for agree-
250. Id. at 6-7:
We believe that, in the future, stations' license renewal applications
should reflect a reasonable amount of programming which is
designed to educate and inform-and not simply entertain. This
does not mean that stations must run hours of dull "classroom"
instruction. There are many imaginative and exciting ways in which
the medium can be used to further a child's understanding of a wide
range of areas: history, science, literature, the environment, drama,
music, fine arts, human relations, other cultures and languages, and
basic skills such as reading and mathematics ....
251. Id. at 7.
252. Id. at 8.
253. Id. at 11.
254. Id. at 15-16.
255. Id. at 16-18.
256. Id. at 12. See also id. at 13 n.12 which reads in pertinent part:
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ing to heed the Chairman's warnings, but threatened that "[i]f
it should appear that self-regulation is not effective in reducing
the level of advertising, then per se rules may be required. 
25 7
The "voluntary" regulations were substantively no differ-
ent from regulations passed pursuant to a rule making, for
licensees were on notice that if they failed to abide by them
they would not receive automatic renewals.258
Despite its insistence that the programming and advertis-
ing limitations were self-imposed by the industry at the mere
urging of the agency, the FCC quickly admitted to the Court of
Appeals that it held "concrete expectations for [the] broadcast-
ers' self-regulatory efforts" and intended to monitor licensee
performance "through 'private attorneys general' and through
its data collection process.
' 259
In 1975, the FCC released two orders2 60 that amended the
language and the instructions in the agency's commercial tele-
vision renewal form to permit detection of a licensee's failure
to comply with the "voluntary" industry standards promul-
gated in response to FCC urgings. The revised form asked
licensees to define which of their programs were designed "pri-
The actual proposals of the two industry groups are as follows: (1)
beginning in January, 1975, the NAB Code will permit broadcasters
10 minutes of non-program material per hour on Saturday and
Sunday children's programs and 14 minutes during the week;
beginning in January, 1976, these levels will be further restricted to
9 minutes and thirty seconds on weekends and 12 minutes during
the week; (2) beginning in January, 1975, the Association of
Independent Television Stations will reduce its advertising to 12
minutes per hour on Saturday and Sunday and 14 minutes during
the week; beginning in January, 1976, advertising will be limited to 9
minutes and thirty seconds on the weekend and 12 during the week.
257. Id. at 13.
258. Id. Wrote the FCC:
For the present, compliance with the advertising restrictions
adopted by the industry and endorsed by the Commission will be
sufficient to resolve in favor of the station any questions as to
whether its commercial practices serve the public interest. Licensees
who exceed these levels, however, should be prepared to justify
their advertising policy. We recognize that there may be some
independent VHF and UHF stations which cannot easily afford such
a reduction in advertising practices. However, we anticipate
accepting very few other justifications for overcommercialization in
programs designed for children.
Id. at 14.
259. See Children's Programming & Advertising, 68 F.C.C.2d 1344,
1347 (1978).
260. Action for Children's Television, 53 F.C.C.2d 161 (1975);
Children's Television Programs, 58 F.C.C.2d 1169 (1975).
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marily" for children; to describe those programs, supplying
their source, the time of their broadcast, the day of their broad-
cast, the frequency of their presentation, and the programming
type involved; to identify the frequency of their advertising
during children's programming hours; and to detail how the
licensee would limit advertising during children's program-
ming time in the future. 6 '
In 1978, the FCC reaffirmed its commitment to the guide-
lines it established in the 1974 Children's Television Report and
Policy Statement. It did so following an assessment of data from,
among others, the National Association of Broadcasters, on the
extent of television station compliance with its "voluntary"
guidelines.26
In 1979, the FCC re-evaluated its policies governing
review of children's programming and found no reason to
change them. It reaffirmed the 1974 Children's Television Report
and Policy Statement and maintained the self-regulatory regime
created under it.
2 63
During the 1980's, the Commission continued to refrain
from imposing any content restraints on children's program-
ming emphasizing First Amendment concerns. On January 4,
1984, the FCC released a Report and Order in which it
declined to adopt any mandatory programming obligations for
the broadcast of children's programming.26 Despite protests
about the general lack of "quality" in children's programming,
the agency refrained from substituting its commissioners' views
for those of individual licensees, believing there to exist "seri-
ous First Amendment concerns" with this approach. The
agency reiterated that broadcasters would continue to have "a
... duty, under the public interest standard.., to examine the
261. See Children's Programming & Advertising, 68 F.C.C.2d 1344,
1347 (1978).
262. See Children's Programming & Advertising, 68 F.C.C.2d 1344
(1978).
263. See Children's TV Programming and Advertising, 75 F.C.C.2d 138
(1979).
264. See TV Programming for Children, 96 F.C.C.2d 634 (1984), aff'd
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see
also Children's Advertising Detector Signal, 57 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 935 (1985)
(where the FCC refused to adopt an inaudible signal at the beginning and
end of commercial messages designed for children that would, through the
use of a detector device, permit viewers to delete the ad); Children's
Programming, 100 F.C.C.2d 709 (1985) (where the FCC declined to adopt a
rule prohibiting stations from sharing in profits from the sale of products
bearing the name of a children's program, its characters, or its program
devices in return for the airing of the program).
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program needs of the child.., and to be ready to demonstrate
at renewal time its attention to those needs.
265
Congress forced a change in this non-regulatory environ-
ment in 1990. On October 17, 1990, the Children's Television
Act of 1990 became law. 2 66 The Act imposed on broadcasters a
number of restraints that will now force the agency to scruti-
nize the content of children's television programming. The Act
required the FCC to (1) limit the duration of commercials dur-
ing children's programming to not more than 10.5 minutes per
hour on weekends and not more than 12 minutes on week days,
(2) require licensees to present programming responsive to the
educational and informational needs of children and keep
records of such programming, (3) consider in its renewal
review the extent to which licensees complied with the com-
mercial limitations and the programming requirements, and (4)
define "program length commercials," which would be pro-
scribed under the commercial time limits of the Act. On April
12, 1991, the FCC issued its Report and Order implementing
the Act's provisions through revisions to its rules.2 6 7
j. The FCC's Establishment of Minimum Percentages of "Public
Interest" Programming
On April 18, 1973, the FCC ordered its Broadcast Bureau
to establish minimum percentage guidelines for acceptable
levels of non-entertainment programming. Any applicant,
including any renewal applicant, that failed to present proof of
programming within acceptable levels would have its applica-
tion referred to the Commission for review and possible
designation for hearing.
268
These minimum percentages were codified by the FCC.2 6 9
They required commercial AM stations to devote at least 8% of
265. Id. at 656.
266. Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat.
996-1000, codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 303b, 394 (1990).
267. See Report and Order, 6 FCC Rec. 2111 (1991), aff'd
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rec. 5093 (1991).
268. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 469 (1979); see also
Simon Geller, 65 F.C.C.2d 161 (1977), rev'd90 F.C.C.2d 250 (1982), aff'd 91
F.C.C.2d 1253 (1982), rev'd Committee for Community Access v. FCC, 737
F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Simon Geller, 102 F.C.C.2d 1443 (1983); EMORD,
supra note 9, at 210-14.
269. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.281, 0.283 (1979). In 1976, the FCC altered
the television guidelines as they applied to renewal applications, requiring
staff referral of the application to the full commission if the application
reflected less than 5% local programming and 5% informational
programming (defined as news and public affairs) or 10% total non-
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their air-time to non-entertainment programming, commercial
FM stations to devote at least 6% of their air-time to such pro-
gramming, and commercial television stations to devote at least
10% to such programming. 270 Non-entertainment program-
ming was defined as news and public affairs programs. 271 As
the agency later explained in reflection on its practice under
these rules:
What the guidelines mean is that applicants proposing to
offer less than the guideline amounts of non-entertain-
ment programming cannot have their application rou-
tinely processed by the Bureau under its delegation of
authority from the Commission; rather, the application
must be brought to the attention of the Commission
itself. The guidelines do not mean that. a station propos-
ing to offer less non-entertainment programming is abso-
lutely barred from, for instance, renewal of license. It
does mean, however, that its application cannot be rou-
tinely processed, that it must be brought to the Commis-
sion's attention, and that it may be designated for
hearing.
272
The FCC also established maximum limitations on the
amount of acceptable advertising that would be permitted per
broadcast hour.273 The Chief of the Broadcast Bureau would
have to refer to the Commission commercial AM or FM appli-
cations in which advertising matter was to be broadcast in non-
seasonal markets more than twenty minutes per hour during
10% or more of the station's total weekly hours of operation,
and AM or FM applications in which commercial matter was to
be broadcast in seasonal markets more than twenty minutes per
hour or more than twenty minutes per hour during 10% or
more of the station's total weekly hours of operation. Licen-
sees that failed to abide by these limits were either issued short-
term license renewals 274 or were admonished to comply with
the rules.275 The Chief of the Broadcast Bureau also had to
refer to the Commission any commercial TV application in
entertainment programming. See Amendment to Section 0.281 of the
Commission's Rules: Delegations of Authority to the Chief, Broadcast
Bureau, 59 F.C.C.2d 491, 493 (1976).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 492.
272. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 975 (1981).
273. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.281(a)(7), 0.283(a)(7) (1977).
274. See, e.g., Enid Radiotelephone Co., 67 F.C.C.2d 19 (1977).
275. See, e.g., CBS, Inc., 41 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1350 (1977);
Chattahoochie Broadcasting Company, 69 F.C.C.2d 1460 (1978).
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which advertising matter was to be broadcast more than sixteen
minutes per hour during 10% or more of the station's total
weekly hours of operation.276
The guidelines remained the law from 1973 until 1981 (for
commercial radio) and 1984 (for commercial television), when
they were abolished.
k. The FCC's Content Focus in Comparative Hearings
Early in Commission history, the Supreme Court ordered
the agency to hold a comparative hearing whenever two or
more applicants sought the same channel.277 Because of the
zero price associated with filing for a license, multiple appli-
cants, mutually exclusive of one another, became common-
place at the FCC.2 78
Before 1965, broadcast applicants were examined compar-
atively in ten areas developed in an ad hoc case by case man-
ner: local ownership, participation in civic activity, integration
of ownership and management, diversification of background
of stockholders, broadcast experience, record of past broad-
casting performance, proposed program policies, proposed
programming, proposed staff and technical facilities, and diver-
sification of media ownership.279 In addition to these standard
areas of comparison, the agency inspected the character of each
applicant's principals to determine their propensity for truth-
276. See Amendment of Part 0 of the Commission's Rules -
Commission Organization - With Respect to Delegation of Authority to the
Chief, Broadcast Bureau, 43 F.C.C.2d 638 (1973); Amendment to Section
0.281 of the Commission's Rules: Delegations of Authority to the Chief,
Broadcast Bureau, 59 F.C.C.2d 491 (1976).
Nicholas Johnson and Kenneth A. Cox in recurrent dissents in renewal
cases from May 1968 forward argued for minimum nonentertainment
programming standards. Commissioner Cox explained:
Our position is that further study should be made of any station
which proposes to devote less than 5% of its time to news, less than
1% to public affairs, and/or less than 5% to public affairs and
"other" programming.
Kenneth A. Cox, The FCC's Role in Television Programming Regulation, 14 VILL.
L. REV. 590, 591 (1969).
277. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
278. See generally DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF
BROADCASTING: LAW AND POLICY TOWARDS RADIO, TELEVISION AND CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS 76 (1979).
279. See H. Gifford Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing Applicants,
43 MINN. L. REV. 479, 481 (1959) [hereinafter Irion]; see also Rosel H. Hyde,
FCC Policy and Procedures Relating to Hearings on Broadcast Applications in Which a
New Applicant Seeks to Displace a License Seeking Renewal, 1975 DUKE L.J. 253,
257.
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fulness and reliability.2"' These highly subjective criteria gave
administrative law judges great discretion in selecting who
would be permitted to broadcast from the pool of prospective
broadcasters.
Through adduction of evidence in comparative hearings,
the FCC's judges obtained information actually or presump-
tively indicative of the kinds of people who would be licensees
and of the kinds of programming they proposed to broad-
cast. 28 ' By selecting an applicant who best fulfilled the
agency's policy preferences, the FCC could thus influence the
composite message communicated to the public, or so the the-
ory went.
The FCC thought local ownership important because "a
broadcaster who resides in the community" to be served "will
be more familiar with the needs and interests of the commu-
nity" and therefore more apt to present localized program-
ming, responsive to community problems, needs, and
interests.282 Likewise, involvement in civic activities within the
area to be served was thought to suggest a heightened aware-
ness of and sensitivity to community needs and, for this reason,
was a beneficial characteristic.
283
The FCC preferred that licensee ownership and manage-
ment be united because this would ensure that the licensee
could be held directly "responsible for what [the] station puts
on the air.'"284 "The significance of the integration factor,"
wrote the FCC, "is based on our belief that there is more assur-
ance that a proposal will be effectuated if the day-to-day opera-
tion is in the hands of an owner of the station than if the station
is run by employees ...." 28 The integration factor was "given
great respect.
286
The diversification of background factor proceeds from
the premise that an applicant whose principals come from
varied employment backgrounds will be more aware of diverse
aspects within the community of license than one whose princi-
pals do not possess such a varied background. This factor
rarely influenced decision making.
287
280. Irion, supra note 279, at 481.
281. Id. at 483.
282. See Aladdin Radio & Television, 9 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1, 38 (1953).
283. Irion, supra note 279, at 484.
284. Id.
285. Hi-Line Broadcasting Co., 13 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1017, 1042
(1957).
286. Irion, supra note 279, at 485.
287. Id.
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Broadcast experience was thought to indicate technical
proficiency and was, therefore, deserving of credit.288 An
applicant's broadcast record was examined to determine to
what extent the applicant had fulfilled the agency's program-
ming policy objectives. A past broadcast record was thought to
be indicative of future performance. Hearing examiners dwelt
upon such subjective matters as the quality of the program-
ming presented in the past. 289 H. Gifford Irion, a former FCC
Hearing Examiner, wrote that:
In this area the Commission is mainly concerned with
local live programming. It is to the applicant's advantage
to show as many high quality shows as possible and to
demonstrate his public service responsibility by showing
an appreciable number of announcements on behalf of
worthy causes. Naturally his opponents at the hearing
will try to uncover a neglect of the public interest
through excessive commercialization or some similar
sin.
290
An applicant's proposed program policies would also be
explored. This tended to be a comparison of boasts by appli-
cants trying to outdo one another in their pledges of program-
ming desired by the agency. As Irion explains:
If there is one aspect of a comparative case where evi-
dence of a purely subjective and self-serving character is
permitted, it is here. In framing a policy statement for
future operations the applicant is of course free to make
promises of the most idealistic kind. It is noteworthy,
however, that a danger exists in making them too extrav-
agant, because they will seem unrealistic and will be likely
to suffer when matched against evidence of actual
293operations.
In the proposed programming category, applicants were
compared based on their presentations of a sample week's pro-
gramming schedule. The schedule would contain sufficient
detail to permit comparative evaluation of the quality and
nature of the proposals.292 When technical factors were equal,
288. Id. at 485-86.
289. See, e.g., California Inland Broadcasting Co., 11 Rad. Reg. (P & F)
257 (1956); Evansville Television Co., 11 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 411 (1955);
Radio Station KFH Co., 11 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1955).
290. Irion, supra note 279, at 486.
291. Id. at 487.
292. Id.; Tampa Times Co., 10 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 17 (1954);
Sacramento Broadcasters, Inc., 10 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 615 (1955). In Radio
Station KFH Co., 11 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1955), the Commission explained:
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judgments about the quality of proposed programming proved
dispositive. 93
Parties would be permitted to explain their plans for a
superior physical plant and to present evidence of the talents of
their proposed staff, but this information did not "hold much
weight in the Commission's final decisions."' 9"
The diversification of media ownership factor carried great
weight. Irion explained that "the Commission . . . adhered
with a rather high degree of consistency to [this factor]" on the
theory that diversification of ownership "tends to keep the
channels of communication open to as large a number of own-
ers as possible and this prevent[s] restriction of news and
information. "295
In 1965, the FCC assembled its disparate policy prefer-
ences into a more orderly hierarchy in its Policy Statement on
Comparative Broadcast Hearings.29 The agency defined two over
arching policy objectives: "best practicable service to the pub-
lic" (also referred to as "integration") and "maximum diffusion
of control of media of mass communications" (also referred to
We must look to the content of the over-all programming proposed.
If an applicant's numerical superiority in the category in question is
found to consist of programming of a worthwhile nature, a
preference may then be accorded on the basis noted - that such an
applicant can appropriately claim that it is more completely fulfilling
its vital role as an outlet for local expression.
Id. See also id. at 97, 100:
In summary, we have found that the percentage differences as to
local live programming ... have been translated by Wichita TV into
worthwhile, meritorious programs, and into superiority in several
categories. Wichita TV's margin of superiority over KFH in this
area is a slight one, stemming from the fact that its proposal has
been found more completely to meet [sic] the educational needs of
the area. Its superiority over KANS is clearer and more marked, and
is found not only in the educational but in the discussion and agri-
cultural categories. While Wichita TV is thus seen to be better pro-
posing to fulfill its important role as an outlet for local expression, it
should be kept in mind that its preference here--even over KANS-
is not a major one, since all three programming schedules have been
found to be essentially well-rounded, meritorious ones.
See also WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 9 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 227, 260 (1954).
293. See, e.g., WBNX Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 837 (1947);
Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 5 F.C.C. 501 (1938); Southwest
Broadcasting Co., 3 F.C.C. 630 (1937).
294. Irion, supra note 279, at 487.
295. Id. at 487-88. See also Louisville Times Co., 5 F.C.C. 554, 559
(1938); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474-5 (1940); FCC
v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
296. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
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as "diversification"), with the latter factor being most
important.
297
Under the diversification criterion, the agency would
assign a demerit to applicants possessing ownership interests in
other media of mass communication. This demerit would
increase in severity in proportion to the size of the interest, the
proximity of the communications outlet to the area proposed
to be served, and the size of the audience reached by the
medium. 98
Under the integration criterion, the FCC found it "desira-
ble that legal responsibility and day-to-day performance be
closely associated," reasoning that "there is a likelihood of
greater sensitivity to an area's changing needs, and of program-
ming designed to serve these needs, to the extent that the sta-
tion's proprietors actively participate in the day-to-day
operation of the station. "299 The agency would only give credit
to integration proposals that were to be "adhered to on a per-
manent basis."' s ° Maximum credit would go to proposals for
full-time participation of owners in management. 3 0 ' The pro-
posed management positions would be credited only if they
constituted "important roles" involving "policy functions"
such as "general manager, station manager, program director,
business manager, director of news, sports, or public service
broadcasting, and sales manager.' '302 "[M]erely consultative
positions" were to be given "no weight.
' 30 3
Integration of ownership into management could be
enhanced by certain other factors should owners of a station
have these traits. Local residence, broadcast experience, and
past participation in local civic activities would improve an
applicant's chances of winning the permit.3 0 4
The Commission considered local residence beneficial
because local residence "indicates a likelihood of continuing
knowledge of changing local interests and needs. °3 0 5 The like-
297. Id. at 394.
298. Id. at 394-95.





304. Id. at 395-96.
305. Id. at 396:
[RIesidence in the principal community to be served will be of
primary importance, closely followed by residence outside the
community, but within the proposed service area. Proposed future
local residence (which is expected to accompany meaningful
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lihood that a station would air programming responsive to
local interests was thought to be enhanced by local resi-
dence.3 °6 Past participation in civic activities was considered "a
part of a[n] .. .owner's local residence background," further
suggesting "a knowledge of and interest in the welfare of the
Community. "307
The FCC rejected diversity of business backgrounds as a
factor and determined that the broadcast experience factor
would be "of minor significance" at best because "emphasis
upon this element could discourage qualified newcomers to
broadcasting" and because "experience generally confers only
an initial advantage.
' 308
The agency reiterated the "importance of program ser-
vice" and emphasized that an applicant had to conduct ascer-
tainment of area needs and interests and "show that the
program proposals are designed to meet the needs and inter-
ests of the public in that area. ' °9 Failure to perform ascertain-
ment properly was to be considered "a serious deficiency. "310
The agency eliminated consideration of staffing proposals as a
comparative factor "except where an inability to carry out [a
proposal was] indicated." 31'1 An "unusually good or unusually
poor" record of past broadcasting experience would be consid-
ered and weighed for its comparative significance.
31 2
Engineering proposals would be considered to determine
whether one proposed a more efficient use of the spectrum
than another. This has come to mean greater service to popu-
lations and areas than a competitor's proposal.3 1 3
Upon the designation of an appropriate issue, the charac-
ter of an applicant's principals would be examined in detail.
participation) will also be accorded less weight than present




309. Id. at 397.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 398. The FCC held that it would:
consider past records to determine whether the record shows (i)
unusual attention to the public's needs and interests, such as special
sensitivity to an area's changing needs through flexibility of local
programs designed to meet those needs, or (ii) either a failure to
meet the public's needs and interests or a significant failure to carry
out representations made to the Commission....
313. Id. at 398-99.
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Demerits would be assigned for character defects. Serious
defects would result in an applicant's disqualification."1 4
In the years since 1965, the comparative factors have been
refined. Diversification remains the criterion of greatest signifi-
cance followed by integration. Integration has been distinctly
divided into "quantitative" and "qualitative" parts, the former
.producing a numerical percentage equal to the percent of sta-
tion ownership that can be counted upon to work in station
management, the latter resulting in "very slight," "slight,"
"moderate," and "substantial" enhancement credits for the
quantitative integration awarded." 5
In 1973, the FCC added minority race to its qualitative
enhancement criteria at the insistence of the D.C. Circuit.
3 ,
6
The court demanded that the agency presume that minority
race would beget a programming difference and that this differ-
ence would add to programming diversity. In 1978, the FCC
added female gender as an enhancing factor on the assumption
that gender too would beget programming differences.
In the comparative renewal context (where an existing
licensee is challenged at renewal time by a new applicant pro-
posing mutually exclusive operating parameters), the FCC has
tended to favor incumbents over newcomers. The same com-
parative criteria used to evaluate new applicants are applied to
compare existing licensees with their challengers.31 7 However,
in this later context, renewal applicants have always been
afforded a weighted presumption in favor of renewal if they
have abided by agency rules.
Several reasons were given for favoring incumbents: (1)
"as a practical matter, an applicant's past broadcast record was
deemed a more reliable indicator of future service in the public
interest than a new applicant's untested proposal;" (2) "it was
deemed desirable to reward incumbents for good public ser-
vice with certainty of renewal;" 318 (3) it would "encourage
314. Id. at 399.
315. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 205-06.
316. See TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see
also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
317. Although the 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings states
that it does not apply to renewal proceedings (see 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 398 n.12),
the FCC subsequently held that it would govern the introduction of evidence
in renewal hearing. See Seven (7) League Prod., Inc., 1 F.C.C.2d 1597, 1598
(1965).
318. See Rosel H. Hyde, FCC Policy and Procedures Relating to Hearings in
Broadcast Applications in Which a New Applicant Seeks to Displace a Licensee Seeking
Renewal, 1975 DUKE L.J. 253, 258 (quoting Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15
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licensees to invest and reinvest in their stations;" ''9 and (4) it
would "prevent possible disruption of service to the public."32
The agency has had difficulty creating a consistent stan-
dard to judge renewal applicants against newcomers. 32' The
courts have not helped matters. 2 2 Nevertheless, the FCC has
maintained a consistent focus on a licensee's past performance
and, if in accordance with FCC programming preferences and
rules generally, has awarded the licensee an almost irrebuttable
presumption in favor of renewal. This presumption is called a
"renewal expectancy. 9323
4. Summary of the Era of Aggressive Content Regulation
The history of broadcast regulation from 1927 to 1979 is
an unseemly one. It provides proof of persistent government
efforts to manipulate broadcast content. It amounts to censor-
ship carefully couched in popular, but often transparent, "pub-
lic interest" language. Through the urgings of Congress, the
exertions of commissioners, and the complicity of the courts,
the federal agency charged with regulating the airwaves has
F.C.C. 1149, 1175-76 (1951); WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 F.2d 623, 629-30
(D.C. Cir. 1946).
319. See Second Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 3 F.C.C.R. 5179, 5.180 (1988).
320. Id.
321. See, e.g., Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings
Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970), rev'd in part
in Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see
also Notice of Inquiry, 27 F.C.C.2d 580 (1971); Further Notice of Inquiry, 31
F.C.C.2d 443 (1971); Second Further Notice, 43 F.C.C.2d 367 (1973); Third
Further Notice, 43 F.C.C.2d 1043 (1973); Formulation of Policies Relating to
the Broadcast Renewal Applicant Stemming from the Comparative Hearing
Process, 40 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 763 (1977), aff'd, National Black Media
Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
322. Compare FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775, 805-06 (1978) and Central Fla. Enter. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 506
(D.C. Cir. 1982) ("meritorious" service) and Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)
("sound or 'favorable' record") with Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC,
447 F.2d 1201, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("superior performance").
323. See Timothy B. Dyk, Full First Amendment Freedom for Broadcasters:
The Industry as Eliza on the Ice and Congress as the Friendly Overseer, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 299, 305 (1988). Compare Central Fla. Enter. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 56-58
(D.C. Cir. 1978) ("superior" programming record needed for weighted
presumption in favor of renewal) with Central Fla. Enter. v. FCC, 683 F.2d
503, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("substantial" or "meritorious" programming
record would warrant a renewal expectancy); Formulation of Policies
Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the
Comparative Hearing Process, 88 F.C.C.2d 120, 121 (1981).
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erected a complex array of restraints designed to serve the gov-
ernment's policy objectives. This content regulatory labyrinth
has had a pervasive chilling effect on broadcasters' exercise of
editorial discretion. Never capable of owning a property right
to use their facilities, broadcasters have remained beholden to
the state for their right to be in the opinion and information
marketplace. Perpetually cautious so as not to offend their fed-
eral overseer, and required to hold an allegiance to the federal
regulators by force of law, broadcasters have kowtowed to the
Commission, substituting for their own editorial preferences
those mandated in Washington. Moreover, leading broadcast
interests have helped foster the unseemly alliance between gov-
ernment and the entity that was supposed to serve as the gov-
ernment's watch dog, the press.
Long protected from competition by the system of licens-
ing, broadcasters were quite willing to part with a degree of
editorial autonomy to attain above market rates of return.
In 1979, this indelicate system of state paternalism began
to fall apart. Popular pressure for deregulation began to
mount. A movement commenced to loosen the structural and
content strictures that had for over fifty years stifled broadcast
expression. The proliferation of broadcast technology and the
dramatic rise in the number of licensed stations had reduced
the above market rates of return made possible by licensing.
Over a decade since the deregulatory movement began,
although some significant deregulation has taken place, the
broadcast industry is still far from being as free as the print
industry. The Oak Leaves property rights model remains a
largely unexplored alternative, politically unattractive to those
who have benefitted from years of content controls.
B. The Decline of Broadcast Content Regulation
In 1972, the FCC hinted for the first time that it would
move in a deregulatory direction. In that year, the agency's
chairman assembled a broadcast "reregulation" staff. This
group examined all of the technical rules in an effort to cull
from them those rendered obsolete by market changes.32 4
Between 1972 and 1981, the FCC enacted over 1,000 technical
rule revisions and deletions.3 25 This fledgling movement to
324. See Broadcast Reregulation Study, FCC Mimeo No. 83444, April
16, 1972.
325. See Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation ("Underbrush Policies"),
54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1043, 1046 (1983).
1992]
172 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
deregulate gained momentum in 1979 and reached its zenith
by 1988.
1. The FCC's Elimination of Ascertainment, Programming
Logs, Quantitative Commercialization and
Programming Guidelines, and Renewal
Audits
On September 27, 1979, the FCC commenced a rulemak-
ing proceeding, soliciting comments concerning and proposing
elimination of its ascertainment, commercialization, and
nonentertainment programming requirements.3 26 This action
signaled the start of a series of dramatic deregulatory initia-
tives. The FCC announced that "in the future the emphasis of
[its] regulatory effort [would] be shifted away ... from content
. . . and towards . . . structural [regulation]. ' 2 7 The FCC
began to view the "public interest" and the "workings of mar-
ketplace forces" as complimentary, rather than antagonistic.3 28
The agency pointed to an extraordinary profusion of new
media outlets-from 583 AM stations and no FM stations in
1934 to 4,547 AM and 4,107 FM stations in 1979.329 In addi-
tion, the number of stations competing with one another in
small, medium, and large markets had substantially
increased.330 The agency began to question the central prem-
ise for broadcast regulation, the spectrum scarcity rationale,
finding that "[d]evelopments since the 1920s render the scar-
city theory overly simplified."1
3 3'
On February 24, 1981, the FCC released its decision the
Deregulation of Radio proceeding.3 3 2  It eliminated its
nonentertainment programming guidelines, retaining in their
stead a "generalized obligation for commercial radio stations
to offer programming responsive to public issues. 333 It elimi-
326. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979).
327. Id. at 482.
328. Id. at 483.
329. Id. at 484.
330. Id. at 484-85.
331. Id. at 498.
332. 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), recons. granted in part, 87 F.C.C.2d 797
(1981), remanded in part, Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (as to program log
elimination), modified in part, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 93 (1984) (where the
FCC revised its issues/programs list requirement, eliminating its limitation
that no more than 10 issues be listed and mandating that they be prepared on
a quarterly, rather than an annual, basis), recons. denied, 96 F.C.C.2d 930
(1984).
333. 84 F.C.C.2d at 971.
INVALIDITY OF FCC CONTENT REGULATIONS
nated its 1971 Ascertainment Primer and its Renewal Primer, simply
requiring new applicants to file programming proposals and
renewal applicants to address, using "any means" reasonable,
issues facing their communities.33 4 It eliminated the commer-
cial guidelines "leaving it to marketplace forces to determine
the appropriate level of commercialization. '3 3 5 It eliminated
its program logging requirement, substituting a requirement
that an annual listing of five to ten issues be maintained
"together with examples of programming offered in response
thereto. 33 6 The FCC ordered that this listing be placed in the
station's public file.337
In eliminating its nonentertainment guidelines for com-
mercial radio, the FCC'did not repudiate its essential rationale.
It did not conclude that it had erred and that the First Amend-
ment forbad its review of licensee programming. Rather, it
considered increased competition in local markets to justify a
lessening of FCC scrutiny. It retained its requirement that
licensees present programming responsive to community
tastes, needs, and interests and left untouched the Fairness
Doctrine and all of its corollaries.33 8
In eliminating its ascertainment requirement, the FCC
confirmed that it did not question the purpose of ascertainment
("to assure discovery of [local] problems, needs and issues and
to generate some relevant programming responsive thereto"),
only the prescribed method for implementing that objective. 3 9
In eliminating its commercial limitation guidelines, the
FCC did not relinquish its power to set commercial limits.
Instead, as in each previous case, it merely found market forces





338. Id. at 978-79.
339. Id. at 998.
We see no reason to require the broadcaster to engage in the
current sort of renewal ascertainment if community issues can be
determined in a less burdensome manner. Again, it is the
programming and not the process that is the most important
component of the broadcaster's efforts, the public's attention, and
the Commission's concern.
Id.
340. Id. at 1000-05. Ironically, the traditional market failure thesis had
been turned on its head. Instead of looking to the government for solutions
to perceived failures in the free market, regulators looked to the free market
for solutions to perceived failures in regulation.
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In reducing its program logging requirement to an annual
listing of five to ten issues of public concern and of program-
ming responsive to those issues, the FCC in no way questioned
its own authority to compel the keeping of program logs, it just
found the burden of doing so unnecessary in light of market
forces that naturally focused licensee attention on
responsiveness.34 '
In May of 1981, the FCC eliminated its random long form
audit procedure for radio license renewals.342
On August 17, 1983, the FCC commenced a rulemaking to
deregulate commercial television. 4 3 On August 21, 1984, the
FCC rolled back some of its television regulations. Once again,
although the agency eliminated its television programming
guidelines, its promise versus performance standard in the
uncontested renewal context, its ascertainment requirement,
its commercial guidelines, its program log requirement, and its
long form atidit procedure, it left in place many of the essential
bases for these regulations. However, with the arrival of Rea-
gan appointees at the Commission, for the first time print
model constitutional concerns made their way into the deregu-
latory framework. The new commissioners voiced concerns
that the "current regulatory scheme . . . [may] unnecessarily
[infringe] on the editorial discretion of broadcasters ....
Without directly admitting that the old programming
guidelines violated the First Amendment, the FCC stated that
its new, deregulatory approach was "more consistent with
underlying First Amendment values."' 345 As in the case of its
radio deregulation, although the FCC deleted its programming
guidelines, it retained the requirement that licensees provide
programming responsive to local issues of public importance.
341. Id. at 1008-10.
342. See Radio Broadcast Services: Revision of Applications for
Renewal of License of Commercial and Noncommercial AM, FM, and
Television Licensees, 46 Fed. Reg. 26236 (1981) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73
(1990)).
343. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 94 F.C.C.2d 678 (1983).
344. Commercial Television Deregulation, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1080
(1984). The Commission wrote:
For example, a licensee that is currently presenting levels of
programming at the limits of the guidelines may desire to alter its
mix of non-entertainment programming. In this particular situation,
our guideline may infringe upon its editorial discretion by requiring
it to present specified levels of non-entertainment programming that
it would not otherwise air.
Id. at 1089 n.45.
345. Id. at 1090.
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In short, it just removed the quantitative guidelines that aided
it in policing licensee performance, but it did not reject the
concept of localism from whence quantitative guidelines
came.
3 46
As in the case of radio deregulation, television deregula-
tion in each of these areas was based on the notion that contin-
ued constraints would be onerous because market incentives
already existed that would produce the desired behavior.
The FCC found that its ascertainment procedures could be
deleted in light of market forces that caused licensees "to be
aware of the needs of their communities," but continued to
require community responsiveness, leaving it to the licensees
to perform ascertainment "by whatever means they consider
appropriate.' '141
Concerning its commercial guidelines, the FCC's rationale
for television differed slightly from the one it adopted for
radio. In the radio context, the Commission had found that
acceptable limits on advertising were occurring not as a result
of regulation but as a consequence of competition. In the tele-
vision context, the Commission seems to have equated natural
market levels of advertising with "appropriate commercial
levels," indicating that the focus on commercialization itself
was the problem . 48 The FCC went one step further, eliminat-
ing its policy banning program length commercials.3 49 The
agency also voiced First Amendment concerns, explaining that
it believed a chilling effect was generated by the commercializa-
tion policies on commercial speech. 50
The Commission elected to replace its program logging
requirement with the same quarterly issues/programs lists that
it required of radio licensees, finding this documentation "suit-
able and adequate," relieving an unnecessary burden on licen-
sees. 5' As it had in the radio context, the FCC also abolished
its random-long-form renewal audit procedure in the television
context.3 52
346. Id. at 1091-93.
347. Id. at 1098-99.
348. Id. at 1102 ("The record in this proceeding provides convincing
evidence that marketplace forces can better determine appropriate
commercial levels than our rules.").
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1104.
351. Id. at 1106-10.
352. Id. at 1111. In Television Deregulation, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986),
the FCC affirmed its decision in Commercial Television Deregulation, 98
F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984), but clarified it by indicating that the regime of self-
regulation of children's television was intended to be eliminated. On appeal,
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2. The FCC's Elimination of Several Programming Policy
Statements
On August 2, 1983, the FCC released the first in a series of
policy statements and orders designed to roll back certain con-
tent and structural regulations. 353 Most of these statements
and orders did not repudiate the rationales for regulation.
Instead, consistent with the "marketplace approach" theme,
354
they found extant "sufficient private remedies or market
forces" that would deter the perceived harms without further
need of government intervention.355
In the first statement, the agency deleted its rule prohibit-
ing ratings distortions and false representations about station
coverage. 56 This time it did so not only on the basis of a
changed market and administrative efficiency, but also on the
basis of First Amendment concerns.3 5 7 The agency found that
its policies interfered with the editorial discretion of broadcast
licensees yet failed to serve any compelling governmental inter-
est. 358 On October 21, 1983, the FCC deleted: 359 (1) its prohi-
bition on the broadcast of alcoholic beverage advertising in
the D.C. Circuit remanded this aspect of the decision, stating that the FCC
had "failed to explain adequately the elimination of its long-standing
children's television guidelines .... ." Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 821 F.2d 741, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
353. Elimination of Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation, 94 F.C.C.2d
619 (1983).
354. See generally Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982).
355. Id.
356. See Horse Racing Information, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 976
(1984); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.4125, 73.4126, 73.4130 (1982).
357. Horse Racing Information, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 977.
358. The Commission held:
[These rules] directly regulate program content by effectively
prohibiting the broadcast of such material as live broadcasts of a full
program of races, preface information of jockeys or post positions,
off-times, race results before the next race, or information furnished
publishers of scratch sheets, etc. Our authority to interfere with
editorial judgments of licensees is, of course, carefully
circumscribed by both the anti-censorship provisions of Section 326
of the Communications Act [47 U.S.C. § 326; footnote omitted] and
the First Amendment unless justified by a clear and compelling
showing that the public interest requires governmental intervention.
Applying this standard to the subject policies, we must conclude that
they unnecessarily restrict licensees' editorial discretion without the
essential counterbalancing factors.
Id. at 983.
359. See Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation ("Underbrush Policies"),
54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1043 (1983).
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states or localities in which such advertising was prohibited,36 °
(2) its policy discouraging the broadcast of astrological infor-
mation,361 (3) its policy encouraging the hiring of independent
monitors to review the contents of foreign language program-
ming,312 (4) its policies against broadcasts that could induce
harassing phone calls or annoy or harass individuals for private
gain,363 (5) its policy (never implemented in light of an FCC
stay of its effective date) that would have restricted the scope of
music format agreements, 36 (6) its policy prohibiting repeti-
tious musical broadcasts, 3 65 (7) its policy requiring broadcast
stations that air poll results to specify the nature of the poll and
whether it was performed on a scientific basis, 66 and (8) its
policy discouraging the use of sound effects in promotional
announcements.367
The FCC deleted these policies because of its fear that
they unnecessarily trenched on the editorial freedom of broad-
cast licensees.3 68 It also found the regulations unnecessary due
to the availability of civil remedies and other federal and state
enforcement mechanisms. The FCC did reserve the power to
consider any adverse determinations by other judicial and reg-
ulatory bodies in its assessment of a licensee's character. 369
3. The FCC's Repudiation of the Fairness Doctrine
No single act did more to shake the foundations of broad-
cast regulatory law than the FCC's elimination of the Fairness
Doctrine. In one fell swoop the agency abandoned the spec-
trum scarcity rationale, the constitutional predicate that had
justified almost all of its content regulations. To this day, the
agency and Congress, averse to replacing the licensing system
with a property rights alternative, have clung to the spectrum
scarcity rationale despite the fact that the FCC, during the mid-
1980s, held it to be anachronistic in light of the extraordinary
growth in media markets and the proliferation of broadcast
media substitutes.
360. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.4015 (1982).
361. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.4030 (1982).
362. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.4105 (1982).
363. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.4120, 73.4205 (1982).
364. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.4145 (1982).
365. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.4150 (1982).
366. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.4200 (1982).
367. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.4240 (1982).
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On May 14, 1984, the FCC sought public comment on the
statutory, constitutional, and policy implications of the Fairness
Doctrine.17 ' Based on the submissions it received, the FCC
determined that the Doctrine no longer served the public inter-
est, that extraordinary viewpoint diversity existed in the mar-
ketplace of ideas because of the multiplicity of media outlets,
that enforcement of the Doctrine restricted "the journalistic
freedom of broadcasters" and stymied presentation of contro-
versial issues of public importance, and that the Doctrine vio-
lated the First Amendment.
37'
Because it was uncertain whether the Fairness Doctrine
was merely a creature of agency policy or mandated by statute,
the FCC fell short of eliminating it, preferring to afford Con-
gress an opportunity to reevaluate the Doctrine's efficacy in
light of the FCC's findings.372 Congress took no action, but
individual members demanded that the FCC continue enforc-
ing the Doctrine.373
Having said that the Doctrine contravened the First
Amendment, the FCC nonetheless enforced it to satisfy these
political demands. The agency held that Meredith Corpora-
tion, a Commission licensee, violated the Doctrine by airing
three advertisements lauding the Nine Mile II nuclear power
plant in New York, but declining to air opposing views.374
While the Syracuse Peace Council decision was pending
before the agency on reconsideration, Judge Robert Bork
decided Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC,3 75 in
which he filled the political and legal vacuum the FCC created
by issuing its 1985 Fairness Report. In short, although in the
report the agency demurred to Congress on grounds that it did
not know for certain whether it had authority to unilaterally
eliminate the doctrine, in TRAC, Judge Bork held that the Fair-
ness Doctrine was not codified by Section 315(a) of the Com-
munications Act, but was a creature of the agency's own
making.376 Hence, he sent a clear message to the FCC that it
could proceed with the Doctrine's elimination and be protected
370. See Notice of Inquiry, 102 F.C.C.2d 145 (1985).
371. Id. at 147, 225-26.
372. Id. at 225, 227.
373. See Communications Daily, Feb. 25, 1987.
374. Syracuse Peace Council, 99 F.C.C.2d 1389 (1984).
375. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter TRACI.
376. Id. at 509. Compare Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (wherein the D.C. Circuit upheld the equal
time provisions of Section 315(a) of the Communications Act against a First
Amendment challenge).
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in that move by the D.C. Circuit. Moreover, Judge Bork
strongly hinted that he did not regard spectrum scarcity as a
legitimate rationale. In dicta, Bork indicated that the concept
of spectrum scarcity was a bankrupt one, expressing the view
that broadcast frequencies were no different from any other
economic good (such as the paper, ink, and delivery trucks
relied on by the print media). Thus, he did not think spectrum
scarcity a legitimate distinguishing principle. 7
On reconsideration, the FCC affirmed its decision that
Meredith Corporation violated the Fairness Doctrine,3 78 paving
the way for a crucial contest in the D.C. Circuit. Viewing the
1985 Fairness Report in tandem with Judge Bork's TRAC deci-
sion, the court determined that the agency had acted arbitrarily
by deeming. the Doctrine unconstitutional, but enforcing it
nonetheless. Therefore, the court remanded the case, implor-
ing the agency to address the constitutional question.
3 79
Finally, the FCC did so, with sensational results.38 0
In July of 1984, the Supreme Court indicated a willingness
to reconsider its spectrum scarcity rationale if Congress or the
FCC found technological change to warrant revisiting Red Lion.
377. See TRAC, supra note 376, at 508.
378. Syracuse Peace Council, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 179 (1985).
379. Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
380. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987). Congress
was quick to react. Many members' immediate reactions revealed the extent
to which they felt betrayed by the agency which they had long relied upon to
do their bidding with the mass media. At once, the spectrum scarcity
rationale that they relied upon to ensure mandatory access for political
programming, among other programming controls, seemed to have been
obliterated with a constitutional mallet.
The reaction of Massachusetts Congressman Edward J. Markey,
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance,
which oversees the FCC, is a typical one. On the day the agency ended
enforcement of the Doctrine, he wrote:
Over the past several months there have been consistent promises
and commitments that the "Patrick Commission" would be less
confrontational and more willing to work with the Congress than
was the Fowler Commission. Well, the proof of the pudding is in
the eating, and the rancid dish served up today is the same stale stuff
that's been ladled out for the last six years.
With its decision today, the Commission attempted to flout the will
of Congress. The Commission's action was unconscionable, but it
will be short-lived. I am certain that the Congress will reaffirm its
overwhelming support for the Fairness Doctrine by recodifying the
Doctrine again [sic] at the earliest possible opportunity ....
The honeymoon between the Congress and the Patrick Commission
is over.
Quoted in EMORD, supra note 9, at 242.
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In footnote 11 to FCC v. League of Women Voters,3 1 ' the Court
stated:
The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based
on spectrum scarcity has come under increasing criticism
in recent years. Critics, including incumbent Chairman
of the FCC [Mark Fowler], charge that with the advent of
cable and satellite television technology, communities
now have access to such a wide variety of stations that the
scarcity doctrine is obsolete .... We are not prepared,
however, to reconsider our long-standing approach with-
out some signal from Congress or the FCC that techno-
logical developments have advanced so far that some
revision of broadcast regulation may be required.
In its 1987 decision on remand, the FCC explicitly gave
the Court the sign it requested. In Syracuse Peace Council, the
FCC wrote:
We further believe, as the Supreme Court indicated in
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, that the dra-
matic transformation in the telecommunications market-
place provides a basis for the Court to reconsider its
application of diminished First Amendment protection to
the electronic media. Despite the physical differences
between the electronic and print media, their roles in our
society are identical, and we believe that the same First
Amendment principles should be equally applicable to
both.
38 2
By repudiating spectrum scarcity and embracing the
notion that the broadcast press was entitled to full First
Amendment protection, the FCC had, at least theoretically,
called into question its very existence. 8 3 However, on recon-
381. 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n.II (1984).
382. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5058 (1987), aff'd, 867
F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 717 (1990).
383. Bush administration appointees to the Commission have largely
ignored the mandate of Syracuse Peace Council, choosing to avoid significant
deregulatory measures to maintain harmony with Congress. But see
Memorandum Opinion & Order, F.C.C. 91-434 (Jan. 6, 1992)(in which the
FCC expanded the reach of Syracuse Peace Council by invalidating the ballot
proposition corrolary to the Fairness Doctrine). The Supreme Court has also
ignored the message sent to it in Syracuse Peace Council. In Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990), the Court stepped beyond
the bounds of merely addressing the Fifth Amendment question there in
issue to reiterate its support for the spectrum scarcity rationale, ignoring the
import of footnote 11 to its League of Women Voters v. California decision and of
the agency's response to it in Syracuse Peace Council. Id. at 3010. Indeed, the
Court endorsed the trusteeship model of broadcasting, reiterating that
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sideration, the FCC was quick to narrow the effect of its hold-
ing, making it clear that it did not alter those "regulations
designed to promote diversity" that stemmed from the Associ-
ated Press case.38 4 In response to congressional pressure, FCC
Chairman Patrick in a letter to John D. Dingell, Chairman of
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, emphasized
that the agency's actions did not encompass the corollaries to
the Fairness Doctrine, warning, however, that issues arising
under these rules could "come within [the Fairness Doctrine
repeal order's] precedential scope." He also stressed that the
decision did not "affect any obligations codified by the Con-
gress, such as the equal opportuntiy provisions under § 315 or
the reasonable access provisions of § 312(a)(7)." '35
4. The FCC's Abortive Attempt to End the Comparative
Hearing Process
On November 5, 1981, the FCC released a Notice of
Inquiry38 6 in which it questioned the efficacy of its 1965 Policy
Statement on Comparative Hearings in the advent of congressional
legislation authorizing the agency to use lotteries in lieu of
comparative hearings in initial licensing matters.38 7 The
agency also questioned whether the development of more spe-
cific standards to judge a licensee's past programming per-
formance would be consistent with the First Amendment. In
addition, the agency sought to accommodate the D.C. Circuit
Court's concerns that FCC renewal review lacked a standard
"susceptible of judicial review. '388 Eight months after the
agency released its Notice, the D.C. Circuit again urged the
broadcasters were not to be viewed like other business men and women but
were "fiduciaries for the public." Id.
384. See Syracuse Peace Council, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035, 2041 n.56 (1988).
385. See id. at 2065 n.75 ("We need not-and do not-decide here what
effect today's ruling will have on every conceivable application of the fairness
doctrine"). The political programming rules are contained in 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1920 (1988) ("personal attack" rule) and 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1988)
("political editorial" rule). These latter rules are still in effect. See also Letter
from Dennis R. Patrick, Chairman, FCC, to John D. Dingell, Chairman,
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 27,
1987).
386. See Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal
Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 88 F.C.C.2d
120, 122, 126 (1981).
387. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
35, 95 Stat. 357.
388. 88 F.C.C.2d at 126. See Central Fla. Enter., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d
37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 957 (1979).
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agency to define its renewal review standards with greater
specificity. 89
On March 10, 1989, the FCC acted on the lottery concept
it raised in its 1981 notice by commencing a rulemaking in
which it recommended that its comparative hearing process for
new facilities be replaced with random selection by lot. 390 The
agency condemned the comparative hearing process, finding
that it "frequently operate[s] to delay service ... without pro-
viding substantial off-setting benefits in terms of selecting a
'better' applicant." 3 9' It found its comparative hearing criteria
bereft of value,3 92 and its decisions often based on such "fine
gradations" as to produce distinctions without meaningful dif-
ferences, leading to a circus environment of topsy-turvy
litigation.313 _
With the arrival of the Bush appointees to the Commis-
sion, the agency reversed course on the lottery proposal, elect-
ing to retain the comparative hearing process and to revitalize
concepts such as localism and trusteeship that were held in dis-
repute by the Reagan appointees. On July 2, 1990, the new
commission terminated the lottery proceeding and commenced
a rule making designed to reform the comparative hearing
process.
394
389. See Central Fla. Enter., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983).
390. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 4 F.C.C.R. 2256 (1989).
391. Id.
392. "Based on our years of experience in this area, we tentatively have
concluded that, generally, the criteria do not lend themselves to consistent
and easily predictable results and that the process often functions to produce
only marginal benefits to the public." Id. at 2258.
393. Wrote the Commission:
The overall process is so complex because of the myriad of factors
involved and the fine gradations of weight accorded to each of these
factors that one level may reach one result, a second level a different
result, and the third the same result as one of the other levels, but
for substantially different reasons. The analyses may be based on
minor distinctions having little, if any, impact on the quality of
service to be provided. As a result, the process is viewed as lacking
in overall consistency and predictability and as producing results
that appear arbitrary in nature.
Id. at 2259.
394. See Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 4002 (1990). The views of Commissioner
Ervin S. Duggan epitomize the revival of the regulatory spirit. Wrote Duggan
in a separate statement appended to the Order:
I will support every reasonable proposal to make the licensing
process more efficient. But I cannot support proposals whose
unspoken assumption is that a broadcast license is simply an
income-producing asset like any other-like a widget factory or a
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5. Fraud and Extortion in the Comparative Hearing Process
By the early 1980s, it became apparent to many of those
practicing communications law that the licensing process had
become rife with fraud and abuse. A number of agency actions
coalesced to create an environment conducive to corruption.
In 1984, as a part of its relaxation of its ownership regula-
tions, the FCC held that properly insulated limited partnership
interests and non-voting stock interests would be non-cogniza-
ble under its ownership rules.395 The agency applied its own-
ership non-attribution policy in the comparative hearing
context, exempting non-voting stockholders and limited part-
ners from comparative consideration except in those instances
where the presumption against non-attributability was rebutted
by evidence that the putatively passive principals had in fact
exercised control.396 Because the agency awarded enhance-
ment credits for minority race, female gender, local residence,
civic involvement, and broadcast experience, because of 'the
relatively low expense associated with filing a broadcast appli-
cation, and because applicants often settled cases (with the dis-
missing applicants receiving monetary awards in excess, and
sometimes substantially in excess, of their expenses), the
unscrupulous filed hundreds of fraudulent applications. Some
filed fraudulent applications en masse, seeking not a station,
but a chance to profit from settlement awards.3 97 Others filed
single fraudulent applications that were structured for the sole
purpose of looking formidable from a comparative standpoint
in order to induce competitors to pay them profitable settle-
ment awards.398 Still others structured their applications in a
peanut farm. A broadcast license, to my mind, is a sacred trust and
should be granted with exquisite care. So to the idea of lotteries, I
say good riddance.
Id. at 4003.
395. See Multiple Ownership Rules, 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1465,
1483-1485 (1984), modified, Ownership Attribution, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
604 (1985), clarified, Multiple Ownership Rules (Ownership Attribution
Reconsideration), 1 F.C.C.R. 802 (1986); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1989).
The agency's policy, in the comparative hearing context, even before its
1984 attribution order, had been to ignore putatively passive, non-integrated
limited partners when general partners appeared empowered to manage and
control applicants. See Anax Broadcasting, Inc., 87 F.C.C.2d 483 (1981).
396. See, e.g., Payne Communications, Inc., 1 F.C.C.R. 1052 (Rev. Bd.
1986); Coast TV, 2 F.C.C.R. 2982 (Rev. Bd. 1987), aff'd 4 F.C.C.R. 1786
(1989), modified, 5 F.C.C.R. 2509 (1990).
397. See, e.g., Abuses of the Commission's Processes by Broadcast
Applicants (Section 403 Inquiry re Dr. Bernard Boozer), 3 F.C.C.R. 4740
(1988).
398. See, e.g., Poughkeepsie Broadcasting Limited, 5 F.C.C.R. 3374
1992]
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similarly fraudulent manner to increase the probability that
they would win the permit, only to thereafter sell the facility as
soon as it was licensed or force its transfer from the putative
controlling principal or principals to the real controllers, the
limited partners or non-voting stockholders. 99
Typically, white businessmen, anxious to own a new or an
additional broadcast media property, would convince minority
individuals, often females also possessing one or more of the
FCC's other desired qualitative enhancements, to serve as
nominal general partners or sole voting stockholders in appli-
cants. These putative controllers were in fact nothing more
than mere figureheads, lacking any genuine authority over and
possessing no financial stake in the applicant. They often were
poor people led to believe that by following the instructions
given to them they would come to hold positions of importance
at radio stations or would receive a part of settlement proceeds.
An unseemly cottage industry came into existence, and it still
exists. Many individuals have been induced to perjure them-
selves at trial by representing themselves to be in control when
the evidence plainly indicates that they are not.
40 0
The problem of fraud on the Commission's processes
caused the agency's law judges to react. For example, FCC
Review Board member Norman Blumenthal remarked:
Because of this recent outbreak of sham broadcast appli-
cations, bona fide applicants and the Commission's
[Administrative Law Judges] have been compelled to
(Rev. Bd. 1990); Metroplex Communications, Inc., 4 F.C.C.R. 8149 (Rev. Bd.
1989).
399. Parties also filed petitions to deny pending applications in an
effort to extort money from applicants in return for the withdrawal of such
petitions. These petitions, particularly ones that raised bogus equal
employment opportunity complaints, could cause an applicant to be exposed
to reputational damage, to have its application languish at the FCC for a year
or more, and to suffer significant legal expense in fending off the false
charges. The agency commenced a rule making to explore these abuses
(Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 2 F.C.C.R. 5563 (1987)), and adopted a
Report and Order barring settlement payments to petitioners for any amount
in excess of the legitimate and prudent expenses of the petitioner in filing its
petition. See Report and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 3911 (1990).
400. SeeJarad Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.R. 181 (Rev. Bd. 1986); Pacific
Television Ltd., 2 F.C.C.R. 1101 (Rev. Bd. 1987); Tulsa Broadcasting Group,
2 F.C.C.R. 5513 (Rev. Bd. 1987); Magdalene Gunden Partnership, 2 F.C.C.R.
5513 (Rev. Bd. 1987). The author can verify the existence of these
circumstances, having litigated in this field before the FCC during the period
from 1986 to 1991 and having cross-examined numerous individuals who,
although putatively in control, seemed to be entirely beholden to their
supposedly "passive" investors.
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examine much more closely the alleged ownership struc-
tures and, more specifically, the purported "integration"
designs of numerous competing applicants to determine
whether their proposals reflect the [actual] composition
of the particular applicant or whether that applicant is, in
reality, an utterly artificial construct devised exclusively
for the purpose of deceitfully exploiting the Commis-
sion's comparative system . . . . Unless sham applicants
are stoutly rebuffed, the very fabric of the Commission's
licensing process will be irreparably rent, and our broad-
cast license rolls reduced to a shabby sodality of frauds,
mountebanks, and sundry speculators of the lowest
echelon.401
It was not the policy against attribution that created an
environment hospitable to acts of fraud, it was the comparative
system itself with its favoritism for characteristics having no
necessary correlation with talent or ability to broadcast, such as
race, gender, local residence, and civic participation, that
invited abuse.
Indeed, fraudulent applicants did not always come in the
form of limited partnerships or two-tiered corporations. Indi-
viduals also filed at the behest of undisclosed "real parties-in-
interest" who would pay for their applications and induce them
to claim sole proprietors status, cognizant of the fact that the
individuals in question lacked the financial wherewithal to
operate a station and would be beholden to them for finances.
As in the context of the bogus limited partnerships and two-
tiered corporations, the nominal sole proprietors often had
those "winning" qualitative attributes desired by the agency,
but lacked any inherent ability or financial wherewithal to effec-
tuate their promises.40 2
Fraudulent applications also appeared in the comparative
renewal context where non bona fide entities were suspected of
filing mutually exclusive applications against existing licensees
in an effort to extort from these licensees payments in
exchange for withdrawal of their competing applications. 413
401. Religious Broadcasting Network, 3 F.C.C.R. 4085, 4088 (Rev. Bd.
1988). See also EMORD, supra note 9, at 207-08.
402. Consider, for example, the interesting case of Linda L. Crook, 3
F.C.C.R. 1867 (Rev. Bd. 1988), where a local black female resident,
previously awarded a construction permit, was suspected of engaging in acts
of misrepresentation and of serving as a "front" for a previously undisclosed
non-minority owner before the FCC's Review Board. See also Perry
Television, Inc., 5 F.C.C.R. 1667 (Rev. Bd. 1990).
403. See Second Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule
1992]
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6. The FCC Attempts to Curb Hearing Process Abuses
On August 16, 1988, the FCC commenced a rule making
that expanded the scope of its 1981 Notice that questioned the
efficacy of its 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings. As in
the 1981 Notice, in the 1988 rulemaking, the FCC contem-
plated reforming its comparative renewal process.4 °4 More-
over, the agency sought to curb abuses created by the filing of
fraudulent renewal challenge applications and to prevent the
filing of bogus petitions to deny.40 5 It also revealed a sensitiv-
ity to First Amendment concerns in the comparative process,
asking commenters to "examine any alternative means that
might be capable . . .of simplifying and clarifying the process
and of minimizing, consistent with first amendment aims, the
degree of governmental intrusiveness over broadcasters' pro-
grammingjudgments. '4 6 The agency admitted that its evalua-
tion of licensee programming performance under the existing
system was "subjective" and erratic due to vacillating perform-
ance standards.40 7
On May 16, 1989, the FCC released its decision 4 8 on the
abuse of process subject. The agency prohibited the payment
of any consideration made to renewal applicants in competition
with existing licensees prior to the Initial Decision stage of a
comparative hearing 40 9 and permitted the payment of only
legitimate and prudent expenses to a withdrawing applicant at
any time after the Initial Decision.
41 °
On July 2, 1990, the FCC commenced a rulemaking solicit-
ing comments on a proposal to limit the amount of payments
that could be given to settling parties in proceedings involving
competing applications for new or modified facilities. 41 '
Making, 3 F.C.C.R. 5179 (1988) ("[Alssertions and criticisms have been
voiced that unscrupulous parties may be using the renewal process for private
gains unrelated to any public interest aims thereunder."). See also Metroplex
Communications, Inc., 4 F.C.C.R. 8149 (1989).
404. 3 F.C.C.R. 5179 (1988).
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 5180.
408. 4 F.C.C.R. 4780 (1989), aff'd Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5
F.C.C.R. 3902 (1990).
409. - ld
410. 4 F.C.C.R. 4780 (1989).
411. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 5 F.C.C.R. 3921 (1990). The
FCC also commenced a rulemaking that set forth a broad number of
recommended changes designed to reduce the amount of time it takes to
prosecute an application through the agency. See Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 5 F.C.C.R. 4050 (1990).
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On December 21, 1990, the FCC released a decision limit-
ing settlement awards in comparative hearings for new facilities
to legitimate and prudent expenses from the time of applica-
tion filing until the first day of the hearing. From the first day
.of the hearing forward, the FCC prohibited settlement awards
entirely.4 t2 On reconsideration, the FCC eliminated the pay-
ment ban and made the legitimate and prudent expenses cap
applicable from the time of application filing forward.413
7. Summary of the Era of Partial Deregulation
The deregulatory initiatives of the FCC have not called
into question the agency's essential power to second guess
broadcasters' editorial judgments; its measures have more
times than not merely invalidated particular extensions of
power. The FCC has usually focused on changed market con-
ditions to justify removal of content restraints.
Deregulation has not altered the agency's expansive
authority to define and then regulate in "the public interest,"
nor could it, for that is a statutory requirement. With the
exception of the Fairness Doctrine abolition order, deregula-
tion has also not gone beyond merely removing regulations
when it could have extensively addressed how the core values
of the First Amendment bar the agency from regulating in a
particular manner. Instead of taking this extra step, the FCC
has often simply redefined the "public interest" to embrace,
rather than encumber, free market processes. As a conse-
quence, the regulatory machinery remains in place, although
some of it is no longer in use.
At the behest of a new Commission or Congress, currently
disfavored content regulation could be brought to bear upon
licensees again without need to consult the Constitution or the
agency's prior policy pronouncements in favor of a market
approach. No more striking example of this point exists than
the ease with which the agency's existing renewal apparatus
could accommodate the content strictures imposed on licen-
sees by the Children's Television Act of 1990. Consequently,
from the deregulators' standpoint, the last decade has been
only a partial success, in many respects a Pyrrhic victory.
412. See Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 85 (1990). On this same day,
the FCC also adopted the numerous procedural changes that it proposed to
hasten completion of its hearing process. See Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R.
157 (1990), modified, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 3515
(1991).
413. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 3513 (1991).
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With the exception of the repudiation of the Fairness Doc-
trine on First Amendment grounds, the FCC has never deter-
mined that any of its other most basic content regulatory
policies violate the freedom of speech and press. For example,
although the Fairness Doctrine has been eliminated, all of the
Doctrine's corollaries, including the personal attack and polit-
ical editorial rule remain. Although the quantitative program-
ming and commercialization guidelines have been removed
(with the exception of the new commercial limits for children's
programming), licensees must still be prepared to account for
their "stewardship" of the airwaves at renewal time by being
able to prove that they have broadcast locally responsive pro-
gramming. Indeed, licensees must now do more than they ever
have in the past to provide cultural and educational program-
ming for children and that programming will be scrutinized by
the agency, replete with a renewal form category addressing
that subject.
Although the agency has attempted to modify the compar-
ative hearing process, it still employs a selection system that
discriminates against one class of prospective speakers and
favors another class, namely those whose characteristics fulfill
the government's content-oriented policy objectives. The gov-
ernment presumes that blacks' views inherently differ from
whites', that women's views inherently differ from men's, and
that civically active, local residents will sponsor locally respon-
sive programming. Relying on this counterintuitive series of
racist, sexist, and parochial assumptions, the FCC prefers
blacks over whites, women over men, and civically active local
residents over non-local residents when licensing new facilities.
It does so in an effort to influence, through its selection, the
composite message communicated to the public.414
414. Some have argued that this system must be retained because it
affords low-income individuals a chance to get into the business of broadcast
ownership. They argue that an auction system would prevent low income
earners from getting into the business. This argument proceeds from a false
premise, namely that those who own and operate broadcast properties can do
so without substantial financial resources.
In these proceedings, only one thing is achieved: a market dislocation.
For several years, different applicants (some financially capable, others not)
compete for the facility. If the case in question does not settle, the victor will
embody the FCC's favored characteristics. Once awarded a construction
permit, however, the permittee must construct and operate its facility at its
own expense or with financing from a third-party source. To pay for
construction and operation requires substantial financial resources, ranging
from the low $200,000 range (for Class A FM stations) to the $1 million plus
range for television facilities in certain markets. Permittees that lack these
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Although in Syracuse Peace Council, the FCC announced that
broadcasters were to be treated on a par with their print media
counterparts and that the spectrum scarcity rationale had
become obsolete, broadcasters still suffer from content restric-
tions that would be constitutionally impermissible were they
imposed on the print media. Moreover, dicta in the Supreme
Court's Metro Broadcasting, Inc. decision may give new life to the
scarcity rationale.
Although the agency has been willing to lessen some geo-
graphic restraints on, for example, the location of a licensee's
main studio, and to eliminate the local program origination
requirement, 41 5 it has not abandoned the concept of localism.
In fact, the Bush appointed commissioners have assiduously
adhered to the concept, demanding that licensees present at
least some locally responsive programming.41 6
resources usually sell their permits and obtain reimbursement of their
expenses. Those who do construct, but do not have the financial wherewithal
to operate the station beyond the first several months, usually sell (rather
than go bankrupt) to the highest bidder.
Consequently, the FCC's licensing process, when it works as designed
and when it additionally assists a person who lacks substantial financial
resources, merely delays permitting those who can put the broadcast facilities
to their best and highest use from doing so. The current system is not
successful as a vehicle to redistribute speech power. In the past, it has
sometimes been successful as a vehicle to redistribute wealth, for it has
permitted those with fraudulent intentions to speculate and obtain large
amounts of money that would not come to them were it not for the licensing
system.
415. In 1950, the FCC made it a primary obligation of radio licensees
to locate their main studios within their licensed communities and to "serve
as a medium for local self expression" by providing "a reasonably accessible
studio for the origination of local programs." See Promulgation of Rules and
Regulations Concerning the Origination Point of Programs, 43 F.C.C. 570,
571 (1950). These same rules were applied to television. See Television Main
Studio Location, 43 F.C.C. 888 (1952). The main studio and program
origination rules, along with the FCC's rule requiring the maintenance of a
local public inspection file, were most representative of the agency's
commitment to community responsiveness. In 1987, the agency relaxed its
main studio rule, permitting licensees to locate their studios outside their
communities of license, provided the studio was within the station's primary
service contour area and was accessible by a toll free call from community
residents. The agency also eliminated its program origination requirement.
See Main Studio and Program Origination Rules, 2 F.C.C.R. 3215 (1987),
aff'd, 3 F.C.C.R. 5024 (1988).
416. See, e.g., Statement of Alfred C. Sikes, Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission, before the- Subcommittee on
Communications, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate on the "Public Interest" Standard under the 1934
Communications Act, Thursday, June 20, 1991, where he emphasizes the
importance of localism to the current FCC.
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In sum, the essential theories that have justified govern-
ment intrusion into the editorial judgments of broadcasters
remain largely intact despite the deregulatory efforts of the last
decade. Only the regulatory manifestations of these theories
have changed. As a consequence, content re-regulation may
continue to proceed apace without need for extensive develop-
ment of new rationales to justify new actions.
IV. A REFUTATION OF THE REGULATORY RATIONALES
At root, the FCC's regulations of broadcast media content
depend for their constitutionality on four central rationales:
the scarcity rationale, the impact rationale, the varying stan-
dards rationale, and the diversity rationale.4" 7 These rationales
are derived from false factual premises and posit indefensible
double-standards.418
The Scarcity Rationale. The electronic media is said to suffer
from unique physical limitations (the fact that no more than
one broadcast station can operate on a single frequency from a
single location at a single time) and economic limitations (the
fact that there are more people who would like to broadcast
than there are frequencies available for use) that justify afford-
ing broadcasters less First Amendment protection than print
media journalists.
Although it is currently true that no more than one broad-
cast station can operate on a single frequency from a single
location at a single time,4 19 it is not true that the useable spec-
trum is finite.42 ° The technological history of broadcasting
proves this. Technology has consistently expanded the amount
of useable spectrum. For example, although in 1934 the usea-
ble spectrum was thought to be largely filled for commercial
broadcasting with only 583 AM stations,42 1 today, through
417. See supra notes 4-8.
418. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 277-95.
419. Even this once incontrovertible point is giving way as a result of
digital compression technology which creates the possibility that existing
radio spectrum occupied by one channel could be altered to split the single
channel into as many as three new channels. This same compression
technology can be applied to television to expand the number of channels.
See generally Matt Stump, Compression Lights a Fire Under Cable Networks,
BROADCASTING July 29, 1991, at 26-29; Peter D. Lambert, Video Compression:
Multiplying Satellite Capacity from the Ground in '90's, BROADCASTING, July 29,
1991, at 34-41; Bill Carter, Brave New TV World. 300 Channels, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 1991, at DI.
420. See MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER
STORIES 13-14 (1986).
421. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 283.
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technological advancements that permit the available spectrum
to be used more efficiently, there are 4,987 AM stations, 4,502
FM stations, 1,475 FM educational stations, 570 UHF commer-
cial TV stations, 557 VHF commercial TV stations, 232 UHF
educational TV stations, and 124 VHF educational TV stations
licensed in America.4 22 In addition, there are 711 UHF Low
Power TV stations and 214 VHF Low Power TV stations.423
Moreover, there are numerous multi-channel electronic
media substitutes for traditional radio and television including
digital audio broadcasting,424 cable,42 5 multichannel multipoint
distribution services, 4 26 low power television,4 2 7 satellite
422. See FCC, News Release, "Broadcast Station Totals as of August 31,
1991," (Sept. 11, 1991).
423. Id.
424. AM and FM radio broadcasting relies on analog transmission
schemes, that is, "the information they carry (such. as the fluctuating tones of
music or voice) causes a continuous range of variation in the frequency (FM)
or amplitude (AM) of the carrier wave." See Bringing Radio Up to Date, WASH.
POST, June 3, 1990, at D3. However, digital audio broadcasting transmission
systems encode sound "as a series of binary (0/1, on/off) digits, with the
sequence corresponding to a certain pitch, volume, etc." Id. DAB is largely
immune to multi-path interference that plagues traditional radio and can
improve the sound of radio to equal compact disc quality. See EMORD, supra
note 9, at 309-10.
DAB . . . [uses] far less power than conventional broadcasting
stations to reach the same sized audience. AM and FM stations use
high power to overcome problems of multipath interference. DAB
uses digital technology to neutralize multi-path. Consequently, a
DAB station operating on 2,500 watts of power can reach an
audience equal to a typical FM station operating with 50,000 watts.
Id. at 310.
Moreover, from one location, it is possible for three separate audio pro-
grams to be transmitted simultaneously using the same spectrum that is now
relied on by an FM station to transmit just one program. Id.
425. In 1990, 91.2% of all television households were passed by cable,
and 61.4% subscribed to basic cable service. See FCC OFFICE OF PLANS AND
POLICY, BROADCAST TELEVISION IN A MULTICHANNEL MARKETPLACE 70
(Working Paper No. 26, 1991) [hereinafter OPP Study]. 98.2% of all
households in America have television sets. Id. at 12. There are 95.7 million
households.
426. MMDS is also known as "wireless cable." It relies on the use of
microwave frequencies to transmit up to 32 programming channels that can
be received by standard television receivers using a converter mechanism.
With roughly 180,000 subscribers, MMDS reaches about .2% of television
households. See OPP Study, supra note 425, at 109-10; EMORD, supra note 9,
at 309.
427. Low power television relies on the use of regular UHF and VHF
television channels but uses substantially reduced power levels. See EMORD,
supra note 9, at 309. There are 925 UHF and VHF low power TV stations
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master antenna television systems,4 28 home satellite dish sys-
tems,4 29 direct broadcast satellites,43  video cassette record-
ers,43 1 and compact disc players432 that can compete directly
with the traditional broadcast media.
In addition, the fact that the broadcast media is less than a
universally available good does not distinguish it from the print
media, for access to the latter media is also encumbered by rel-
ative scarcity. Indeed, all economic goods are less than univer-
sally available, and, so, are plagued by degrees of scarcity.
Consequently, scarcity can not serve as a distinguishing
principle.433
Furthermore, the holding in NBC had no precedential
antecedents. Although the print media has always been less
licensed in the U.S. See FCC, News Release, "Broadcast Station Totals as of
August 31, 1991," (Sept. 11, 1991).
428. SMATV systems operate like a cable system, but do not tranverse
public rights of way and usually provide service to a single multi-dwelling
building, such as an apartment complex. See generally Omega Satellite Prod. v.
City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
429. In 1990, approximately 3% of all television households (or
approximately 2.7 million homes) made use of home satellite dishes to obtain
video programming. OPP Study, supra note 425, at 93.
430. Beginning in mid-1994, it is believed that a number of American
Direct Broadcast Satellites will be launched into orbit. See USSB, Hughes
Revive DBS in $100 Million + Deal, BROADCASTING, June 10, 1991, at 35.
Eight DBS permits have been issued by the FCC. OPP Study, supra note 425,
at 97. DBS uses a very high powered Ku-band satellite to transmit television
programming across the continental United States from a geostationary
satellite to homes located within the geographic "footprint" reached by the
satellite. It is capable of offering 200 or more new television channels. Home
reception is possible through the use of relatively inexpensive flat-plate
antennas that may be placed on a window inside the home or office. EMORD,
supra note 9, at 308.
431. Video cassette recorders are now in use in 76.6% of television
households. See Mark Berman, VCR Penetration Climbs to 76. 60, VARIETY, May
13, 1991, at 45.
432. According to the Electronics Industry Association, an estimated
28% of the 95.7 million households in America have CD players.
433. According to Professor Coase:
[I]t is a commonplace of economics that almost all resources used in
the economic system (and not simply radio and television
frequencies) are limited in amount and scarce, in that people would
like to use more than exists. Land, labor, and capital are all scarce,
but this, of itself, does not call for government regulation. It is true
that some mechanism has to be employed to decide who, out of the
many claimants, should be allowed to use the scarce resource. But
the way this is usually done in the American economic system is to
employ the price mechanism, and this allocates resources to users
without the need for government regulation.
Coase, supra note 26, at 14.
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than universally available, this condition of scarcity never led
the courts to conclude that newspapers should be provided less
than full First Amendment protection.
Moreover, in today's media environment, the print media
is far more scarce than the electronic media. There are far
fewer newspapers in America than broadcast media outlets.
The costs of entry into the newspaper business far exceed
those of entering the broadcast business, and the costs of
reaching an audience with a newspaper are far greater than
those of reaching the same audience with a radio broadcast.
43 4
Consequently, as the FCC found in Syracuse Peace Council,
spectrum scarcity is an anachronistic rationale. In an age of
media abundance, where spectrum substitutes are bountiful, it
is grossly counterintuitive to continue viewing broadcast spec-
trum as a uniquely scarce resource that must be allocated by
the state rather than the market. The scarcity rationale should
be abandoned.
The Impact Rationale. Justice John Paul Stevens articulated
this rationale in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, where he stated that
The broadcast media have established a uniquely perva-
sive presence in the lives of all Americans .... Because
the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out,
prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or
viewer from unexpected program content. To say that
one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio
when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow.43 5
This argument proceeds from a false premise: that the viewer
of television or the listener of radio, unlike the reader of a
newspaper, magazine, or book, is a captive audience and can-
not help but receive unwanted media offerings. It also is pre-
mised on the assumption that government can and must
perform the role of a parent, ensuring that majoritarian values
protective of social norms are maintained even at the expense
of individuals who seek to present dissenting views and of
those who wish to receive them. The underlying assumption is
434. See Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC
Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 440-441 (1989); see also
MICHAEL 0. WIRTH, ECONOMIC BARRIERS TO ENTRY: DAILY NEWSPAPERS VS.
TELEVISION STATIONS VS. RADIO STATIONS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (1984)
(prepared for the National Association of Broadcasters), reprinted in
Comments of National Association of Broadcasters, FCC Gen. Docket No.
84-282, app. C (Sept. 6, 1988).
435. 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
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that less knowledge of certain matters is beneficial and that it is
appropriate for government to define what those matters are.
The danger of the exercise of official discretion over speech is
not considered a barrier to state intervention.
This state paternalism is both unnecessary and in violation
of core speech and press values.43 6 Viewers and listeners can
tune out just as surely as they can tune in; without the aid of
government, they already possess the wherewithal to block
unwanted media offerings from reaching them or their family
members. Justice Stevens's assault metaphor is misplaced.
The receipt of unwanted media offerings is not a physical
offense, coming as it does from an inanimate box. It is harm-
less except for the indignation that it may inspire in some recip-
ients. It is merely a challenge to their sensibilities, a challenge
that is characteristic of life in a democracy. The unwanted
speech could just as easily reach the listener when he or she
strolls through a park or along the sidewalk and confronts a
soapbox orator.
In our open society, the fear of being confronted with
views unlike our own is not a justification for silencing them.
The disenchanted or disgruntled can resort to counterspeech.
Alternatively, in the case of the electronic media, they may
avoid watching television or listening to the radio, or they may
selectively partake of the media by subscribing to any one of a
number of print media services that offer listings of available
programs. Through the use of these listings, commonly found
in newspapers and magazines like TV Guide, they may protect
themselves and their family members from the unorthodox.
However, those who desire access to unorthodox presentations
should not be deprived of that opportunity in order to placate
the wishes of others among us, even if (or perhaps especially if)
those others represent a majority.
Furthermore, Justice Stevens writes as if the interaction
between a broadcaster and a listener is a purely random occur-
rence. It is not. Success in the business of broadcasting
depends upon the broadcaster's ability to carve out a program-
ming niche that can ensure viewer and listener loyalty.4" 7 By
and large, viewers and listeners know what kinds of program-
ming they can expect by tuning in to any particular channel.
This fact also undermines the captive audience thesis.
436. See generally EMORD, supra note 9, at 120-26.
437. See generally NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, RADIO IN
SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE (1985).
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Justice Stevens errs by assuming that the broadcast media
are fundamentally more intrusive than the print media. Just as
an unsuspecting viewer may confront a viewpoint he finds
offensive while watching the television or listening to the radio,
so too can he upon reading the newspaper, a magazine, or a
book. It is a risk one takes by reading, listening to, or viewing
any medium. The adage, "you can't judge a book by its cover"
is a reflection of the fact that sometimes one may discover that
a publication that apparently presents a particular perspective
in fact presents another, and that other may not be pleasing.
Screening is often not possible, because one must first read the
passage or passages in question before one comes to the reali-
zation that the view offends. However, here too, for the partic-
ularly squeamish among us, there are book and magazine
reviews that could be consulted to determine whether the con-
tents of a book or magazine are of a nature that could offend.
In short, the broadcast media are not "uniquely pervasive"
when compared to the print media.
Moreover, Justices Stevens's focus on the need for state
protection against offensive speech creates a new, larger prob-
lem. This focus invites government to replace the private sys-
tem of editorial selection and market demand with a state
speech orthodoxy that reflects majoritarian values-precisely
the condition that James Madison feared would happen unless
basic rights, such as those to speech and press, were protected
from the state.438 It is precisely offensive speech that holds out
the greatest promise of encouraging debate that may lead to
the discovery of new truths about the human condition. Sup-
pression of speech not only stifles the right of speakers to pres-
ent their messages, it also suppresses knowledge itself, for it is
only by being subjected to speech, even speech we find offen-
sive, that we are best able to understand precisely what it is that
we do not like and why it is that we do not like it.
4 3 9
The Varying Standards Rationale. In assessing the First
Amendment ramifications of communication by sound truck,
438. In 1788, James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger
of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the
majority of the Comrmunity, and the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to
the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government
is the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents.
Reprinted in 3 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 616 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1980).
439. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 278-79.
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Justice Robert H. Jackson originated the concept that different
modes of communication should be treated differently for First
Amendment purposes. He wrote: "The moving picture
screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck
and the street corner orator have differing natures, values,
abuses and dangers. Each in my view is a law unto itself, and all
we are dealing with now is the sound truck."44 The Court
relied upon this concept again in assessing the broadcast
media, holding that "differences in the characteristics of news
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to them."44 '
The Court has never explained in a developed fashion why
it is that a difference in the mode of communication should jus-
tify a difference in the treatment of the content disseminated by
that mode. On close inspection, the rationale breaks down, for
the substantive commonalities of the media defy efforts to dis-
tinguish them. Written works can evoke the same emotions as
visual works. Radio can have as profound an effect on a lis-
tener as television can have on a viewer. Some would argue,
with good reason, that because written works create imagery
with words and depend, to a degree, upon embellishment in
the mind of the reader, these works can produce more
profound and lasting impressions than aural or visual works.
Whether by written word, verbal message, or video image, it is
equally possible to engage the mind of the reader, listener, or
viewer.4 4 2 These profound substantive commonalities render
efforts to distinguish the freedom of speech and press afforded
the various media, based upon technological differences, an
exercise in the elevation of form over substance.
In addition, the technology of the various media are merg-
ing. Newspapers rely upon satellite, telecommunications, and
computer technologies to receive and disseminate the news.
Within the first decade of the twenty-first century, cable tech-
nology, particularly fiber optic cable, will likely enable consum-
ers to retrieve written information, printed from a teletext unit
connected to a video receiver, as a supplement to video pro-
gramming. In time, interactive cable technology will permit a
vast array of information to be presented in brief in video form
and then supplemented with hard copy print-outs that provide
greater detail.443 Ultimately, the computer-generated artificial
440. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949).
441. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
442. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 278-79.
443. See id. at 280-81.
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worlds of virtual reality will meld print, video, computer, and
telephonic communication into one multifaceted speech envi-
ronment accessible through an audio-video headset. 444 These
changes will make it increasingly difficult for the courts to char-
acterize a medium as either "broadcast" or "cable" or "tele-
phonic," for that matter.
The Diversity Rationale. In December of 1791, when the
First Amendment became a part of the Constitution, there were
only eight daily newspapers in America, seventy weeklies, ten
semi-weeklies, and three tri-weeklies.44 5 Despite the relative
scarcity of the print media and the fact that not everyone who
desired to be in the business of printing could afford that lux-
ury, the Framers of the First Amendment did not feel com-
pelled to grant government an affirmative right to ensure
access to the press in order to foster a politically preferred
degree of diversity in media markets. Rather, it was irrelevant
to the Framers whether there existed any speech in the idea
marketplace. The end in view was simply to ensure that "no
power whatever over the press" was lodged in government.4 4 6
The goal was not to redistribute speech property or speech
rights, for these rights were viewed as personal and inalienable.
It was merely to deny a power to interfere with private speech
and editorial judgments.
The freedom of speech and press was a freedomfrom gov-
ernment, it was not an affirmative right to any particular means
of communication.447 As a consequence of this historical leg-
acy, although the print media are in far less abundance than the
broadcast media, they are protected by the First Amendment
from government intervention designed to foster diversity.
In Associated Press v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that the Sherman Act could be applied to the electronic media
without violating the First Amendment, reasoning that "it
would be strange indeed . . .if the grave concern for freedom
of speech which prompted adoption of the First Amendment
should be read as a command that the government was without
power to protect the freedom. ' 448 The Court did not simply
hold that the Sherman Act applied to the electronic press, it
went further, determining that the government had an affirma-
444. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, VIRTUAL REALITY (1991).
445. See id. at 222.
446. See James Madison, "Report on the Virginia Resolutions," in 1799-
1800, in IV THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 572 (J. Elliot ed., 1836).
447. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 127-28.
448. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944).
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tive role to play in ensuring a preferred level of diversity in the
idea and information marketplace.4 4 9 The Court held that the
First Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest pos-
sible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonis-
tic sources is essential to the welfare of the public. '4 50 It also
held that "[fireedom of the press from governmental interfer-
ence under the first amendment does not sanction repression
of that freedom by private interests."'4 5 1 Ever since Associated
Press, the courts and the FCC have used the diversity rationale
as a justification for all manner of government intervention into
the private communications sphere. Affirmative rights of
access, whether based on the Fairness Doctrine, the Personal
Attack Rule, the Political Editorial Rule, or the Equal Time
provision in Section 315 of the Communications Act, are justi-
fied by the argument that they merely create more speech.
More speech is said to be beneficial, regardless of the extant
competitiveness of media markets, for it enhances media diver-
sity. It is the government's right, under this scheme, to deter-
mine what kind and what level of diversity is appropriate at any
given time.452 This power lodges in the state the authority to
second guess editorial judgments and to supplant them with
enforced rights of access ad nauseum until the marketplace of
ideas, diverse though it may be, is anything butfree.
This extension of Associated Press to justify a constant state
presence in the idea and information marketplace turns the
First Amendment on its head. Without any evidence of anti-
449. Even if the Court had merely held that the antitrust laws applied
to the press and had expressly forbad the use of such laws as a pretext for
content regulation, it would still not be possible to ensure that these laws
would be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Although in theory
objective enforcement is possible, in practice these laws have been enforced
in a subjective and prejudicial way. Government antitrust enforcement has
been characterized by arbitrary suits predicated on patently political
determinations. See, e.g., LUCAS A. ScoTr POWE, JR., AMERICAN
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 121-41 (1978); EMORD, supra note
9, at 225-28. The danger of such prejudicial enforcement against the press
for the purpose of silencing criticism raises insurmountable First Amendment
concerns. Consequently, even if Associated Press were narrowly used, it could
not help but invite those press abuses historically associated with the exercise
of official discretion. To my mind, these dangers make prohibiting
applicaiton of the antitrust laws to the press a constitutional imperative.
450. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
451. Id.
452. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1990)
("Safeguarding the public's right to receive a diversity of views and
information over the airwaves is . . . an integral component of the FCC's
mission.").
INVALIDITY OF FCC CONTENT REGULATIONS
trust violations, indeed in the presence of a highly competitive
media environment, the government continues to relentlessly
pursue diversity. It does so by restricting the speech of elec-
tronic media owners in order to enhance the speech of others,
those preferred by the state. This is censorship. The govern-
ment's actions may create viewpoint diversity in some abstract
sense, but that diversity comes at the expense of freedom,
through a taking of part of a broadcast media owner's speech
property and through the suppression of that media owner's
speech freedom. The current regulatory scheme pits the rights
to property against the freedom of speech, when the two were
designedly compatible. Most importantly, this system permits
the state to create a speech orthodoxy by confiscating the
speech property and rights of some, to enhance the opportuni-
ties for expression of others preferred by the state.
This role of the state as super-editor violates the core val-
ues of the First Amendment, for it creates a pervasive chilling
effect on speech. This degree of state power is too great to
bear in a country that depends on a free and critical media to
protect it from government abuses.453
V. A RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
Carefully scrutinized, none of the four rationales that the
Congress, the courts, and the FCC have relied upon to justify
lessened First Amendment protection for the broadcast media
establish any meaningful basis for distinguishing that media
form from the print media. The broadcast media are now the
media of abundance, the print media are, by comparison,
scarce. The broadcast media possess no greater ability to
intrude into the home or offend the sensibilities of individuals
than the print media. The broadcast media are substantively
indistinguishable from the print media and remaining techno-
logical differences are vanishing. The broadcast media are
exceedingly diverse and operate in highly competitive markets;
by comparison the print media are not as diverse and often
operate in one newspaper towns. The First Amendment does
not bar the government from continuing to regulate entry into
453. In addition to the four extant rationales for regulation, there are
others not yet applied to broadcasting based on the nonpublic forum law of
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), and the public
function theory first expressed by the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946). I have addressed these rationales in EMORD, supra note
9, at 289-95. Because this article concerns the First Amendment invalidity of
existing content regulations, I need not reiterate here my arguments
concerning these rationales.
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and the content of the broadcast media in a never ending quest
for more diversity, yet it bars the government from regulating
the print media in this manner.
Because each of the broadcast regulatory rationales
depend for their validity on false factual premises and unjustifi-
able double-standards, continued reliance upon them is disin-
genuous and indefensible. Simply put, the government now
lacks a legitimate reason for denying the broadcast media full
First Amendment protection. Moreover, the existing rationales
are protecting an unseemly system of censorial controls
whereby an administrative agency coaxes and cajoles members
of the press into serving the policy objectives of the govern-
ment. This system has always been antithetical to the core val-
ues of the First Amendment.
Sound epistemological arguments exist for affording the
broadcast media print model protection. Because the elec-
tronic media are now the media that the public looks to as its
principal source of news and information, the functional bene-
fits of the First Amendment will not exist for the vast majority
of Americans unless the same First Amendment that has pro-
tected print media freedom is permitted to transcend the new
electronic modes of communication.
It is not enough to appreciate the simple logic of this argu-
ment. To understand the reason why the print model must be
embraced in the broadcast media context, one must come to
appreciate the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment
and the benefits that accrue as a result of its proper application.
A. The Natural Law Origins of Free Speech and Press
There is a very close nexus between freedom of speech
and freedom generally.454 Throughout history, freedom has
been associated with a freedom from governmental restraint,
and it may well be that there is no greater freedom from gov-
ernment than the freedom to criticize those who govern.
In our constitutional tradition,455 the freedom to castigate
those in power who abuse their authority has Lockean origins,
454. As Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard put it in the early
Eighteenth Century, "in those wretched Countries where a Man cannot call
his Tongue his own, he can scarce call any Thing else his own." See 1 JOHN
TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO's LETrERS 96 (Leonard Levy gen.
ed., 1971) (Letter No. 15, Of Freedom of Speech; That the Same is Inseparable from
Publick Liberty, 1720).
455. For the sake of brevity, I will not reiterate why a historically based
focus ensures principled First Amendment jurisprudence. See EMORD, supra
note 9, at 11-23.
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reflected in the Declaration of Independence. We are said to
possess as birthrights certain pre-political rights that are ina-
lienable, and we are, by virtue of these rights, said to be sover-
eign with the inherent authority to establish new governments
if existing ones prove incapable of protecting our rights.
Rights in the American constitutional tradition are not
bestowed by the state. Under the law, our freedoms may be
deprived by or protected from government, but they start with
us. Our freedoms originally stem from Locke's hypothetical
pre-political state of nature: "a State of perfect Freedom to
order [one's] Actions, and dispose of [one's] Possessions, and
Persons as [one thinks] fit, within the bounds of the Law of
Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of
any other Man."'4 56 However, even this individual conception
of freedom has its natural limits, defined by reason: a respect
for the equal right of others to dispose of their possessions and
persons, "[for who could be free, when every other Man's
Humour might domineer over him?
'45 7
In nature, it is an arduous task to defend one's life, liberty,
and property against the wrongful acts of others. We create
civil government in order to relieve us of this burden and to
secure our liberties. However, because governments can be
just as arbitrary as individuals when it comes to violating rights,
the only legitimate governments are those that arise from uni-
versal consent, where all individual rights can be secured
equally.458
Within the natural rights paradigm, man would have total
freedom to communicate except that he would act contrary to
right reason were he to use his speech as a means to deprive
another of life, liberty, or property. By entering into society
man does not abandon his natural rights to free speech, rather
government is obliged to protect those rights to their natural
limits.
The Anti-Federalists in American constitutional history
were the principal proponents of this natural rights conception
of speech and press from 1787 to 1791. It was in no small part
due to their struggle that the Bill of Rights included an express
protection against state involvement with speech and press.459
The amendment was designed to erect a static barrier that,
456. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, BOOKS I AND II
269 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988).
457. Id. at 306.
458. Id. at 278, 284.
459. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 73-96.
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through proper judicial interpretation, would bar government
from encroaching upon a private communications sphere coex-
istent with the natural right to free speech and press.4 6 °
In the field of communication, this barrier has been
breached in a manner akin to that method employed by Henry
VIII over the print press-through a system of licensure.
Licensing is by its very nature incompatible with the natural
rights to speech and press for it makes the speaker beholden to
the state for his right to speak. It presumes that the right to
speak flows from the state, when it rightfully flows directly from
the individual. Accordingly, to fully apply the First Amend-
ment to the field of communication will require dismantling the
licensing regime. It is only by uniting the private right to fee
simple property ownership of a speech forum with the freedom
to speak that the electronic media will be equal to the print
media as a full participant in the private sphere of
communication.
B. The Benefits of a Private Communication Sphere
The benefits of maintaining the private sphere of commu-
nication have long been appreciated by advocates of liberty.46'
460. See id. at 83. Madison defined the essential purpose of a
declaration of rights:
[W]hatever may be the form which the several States have adopted
in making declarations in favor of particular rights, the great object
in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by
excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the
Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode.
They point these exceptions sometimes against the abuse of the
executive power, sometimes against the legislative, and, in some
cases, against the community itself; or, in other words, against the
majority in favor of the minority.
Quoted in 5 THE RooTs OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1029 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1980).
461. The conception that held sway with the American founding
generation was that of "Cato" and the radical Whigs, the party in opposition
to the Hanoverian Kings. Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard, two radical
Whigs, wrote 138 letters on liberty published in The London Journal from 1720
to 1723 under the pseudonym "Cato." EMORD, supra note 9, at 30. In
addressing the speech and press freedom, Gordon and Trenchard relied
upon the essential Self-Government/Checking Value, Marketplace of Ideas/
Search for Truth, and Personal Autonomy/Self-Fulfillment Models in
support of an expansive conception of the freedom. See id at 29-45.
For two good summaries of the various free speech and press models,
see Susan Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REV 615, 676-696 (1991) and Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative
Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 54, 68
(1989).
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Detailed below, these benefits have been construed to be cen-
tral values embodied within the First Amendment.
Freedom from governmental restraint on speech permits
speakers to engage in ideological contest without fear of official
punishment for ideas expressed. This free idea exchange tends
to expose falsehoods and confirm truths, thereby causing polit-
ical, economic, social, and scientific evolution to take place.
Throughout western history great minds have lauded the bene-
fits of this aspect of the protected private sphere of communi-
cation."' The Supreme Court has embraced the concept,
holding the benefits of free idea exchange indispensable means
to discover and spread political truth.4 6
Freedom from governmental restraint on speech also per-
mits people to remain sovereign by enabling them to exercise a
critical check on their governors' actions without fear of state
retaliation. They can thereby expose the corrupt and condemn
them, identify maladministration, and demand political change
to rectify it. A central theme in Cato's Letters is the vital function
of free speech and press as a means to check misguided gover-
nors and governments. 46  In modern times, Alexander
Meikeljohn and numerous other scholars have adhered to this
theory as a foundation of free speech and press.46 5
Finally, freedom from governmental restraint on speech
enables individuals to develop their faculties. Cultivation of
the intellect through expression is a basic free speech and press
right, tied more closely to the individual than any other.
Trenchard and Gordon understood freedom of speech to be
462. See, e.g., 2JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO's LETTERS
296-300 (Leonard Levy, gen. ed., 1971) (Letter No. 100, Discourse upon Libels
(1722)); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (J. Suffolk ed., 1968) (1644); THOMAS
JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address, reprinted in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 493
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984);JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (D. Spitz ed.,
1975).
463. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272
n.13 (1964); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705 (1990).
464. 1 CATO's LETTERS, supra note 454, at 96-97. (Letter No. 15, Of
Freedom of Speech: That the Same is Inseparable from Publick Liberty (1720)).
465. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
(1960); GEORGE A. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1971); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299
(1978); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.
BAR FOUND. RES. J. 523; William J. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
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crucial for the enhancement of wisdom.466 In our time C.
Edwin Baker and Martin Redish have variously argued that
"self-realization" and "self-fulfillment" are core free speech
and press values.467
C. Why the First Amendment's Anti-State Focus Is Essential to the
Preservation of First Principles
Reasoning from Associated Press, arguments have been made
that government has a duty to ensure that the beneficial by-
products of free speech and press are attained in the idea mar-
ketplace by mandating rights of access to particular individuals
or groups whose views are "counter to the capitalistic goals of
privately owned, for-profit media. '4 6 8 According to this view,
the exercise of editorial discretion is "private censorship" and
is said to be as onerous as government censorship.4 69 "When a
select few individuals have the ability to restrict access, free-
dom of expression is endangered just as surely as if the restric-
tion had been imposed by the government," writes Dominic
Caristi.47° The mass media are viewed as censorial power cen-
ters that deprive those with dissenting views from having access
to the press in order to promote their own ideological agendas.
Government is the source of countervailing power that can
provide limited rights of access in order to eliminate the effects
of private censorship and enhance viewpoint diversity. Accord-
ing to Barron, "[t]he mass media's development of an antipa-
thy to ideas requires legal intervention if novel and unpopular
466. 1 CATo's LETrERS, supra note 454, at 96, 99.
467. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political
Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982);
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); see
also T.M. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 216
(1972). But see T.M. Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression,
40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 519 (1979).
468. Dominic Caristi, The Concept of a Right of Access to the Media: A
Workable Alternative, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 103, 108 (1988); see also Jerome A.
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641
(1967); Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405
(1986); Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975).
469. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944) (the
Court reasoned that the "freedom of the press from governmental
interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests."); see also LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE
PRESS 110 (1991) [hereinafter BOLLINGER] ("[u]nrestrained private interests
can, at times, hamper the free exchange of ideas as seriously as governmental
censorship ... ").
470. Caristi, supra note 468, at 110.
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ideas are to be assured a forum - unorthodox points of view
which have no claim on broadcast time and newspaper space as
a matter of right are in a poor position to compete with those
aired as a matter of grace."'4 7 ' Owen Fiss recognizes that
access regulations will sacrifice the "autonomy" of media own-
ers, but thinks that a tolerable result in order to enrich public
debate.472 In short, the access advocates do not fear sup-
planting the judgments of competing media with those of the
monopoly of the state.
These arguments reverse the First Amendment's historical
premise. From the founding forward (and continuing today in
the print media context), the Amendment has served as a force
against state control, a check on state censorship. The realm of
private editorial discretion has been viewed as symptomatic of
a properly functioning free press and so properly protected.473
Indeed, as the following discussion reveals, it is impossible to
protect a fully functioning private realm of communication if
the First Amendment does not serve as a virtually impenetrable
barrier against state intervention into the idea and information
marketplace.
Mandatory access arguments proceed from false factual
assumptions. They presume that people with unorthodox
views do not gain access to the media. No empirical evidence
exists to support this charge. Of course, the exercise of edito-
rial discretion does cause some viewpoints to be preferred over
others; this is an economic reality given the fact that any one
media entity cannot present every conceivable view expressed
at any single time. It remains, however, in the economic inter-
est of competing media to cover those subjects of interest to
listeners and viewers that other media fail to cover, including
the views of dissenters.
Moreover, and more importantly, access arguments mis-
conceive the relationship between the First Amendment and
speech and press freedom. The access advocates would sup-
plant private editorial discretion with state selection without
even offering checks on the exercise of official discretion,
naively assuming that the mere provision of a substantial power
to sift through and periodically suppress private journalistic
judgments will not be manipulated to serve biased political
ends. The history of broadcast regulation, however, demon-
strates that discretionary powers such as these are an open invi-
471. Barron, supra note 468, at 1641.
472. Fiss, supra note 468, at 1415.
473. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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tation to partisan abuse and corruption and have periodically
been used to promote the political or private economic agen-
das of those in power.
474
Moreover, each step in implementing rights of access
entails the rendering of political judgments that cannot be
made without severe censorial effects, including the suppres-
sion of disfavored speech and the chilling effect that is pro-
duced from each act of suppression. To implement mandatory
rights of access, the government must (1) select particular
views worthy of access, (2) select the particular media on which
to impose mandatory rights of access, and (3) enforce a decree
for a media owner to give up his speech forum for use by
another in presenting a viewpoint.475 The access implementa-
tion system permits officials to impose an orthodoxy on the
press. Officials will ineluctably do so by awarding access rights
to groups that adhere to a political agenda they perceive to be
underrepresented and by restricting the speech rights of those
media owners whose views they oppose. Because there is no
objective way of determining what constitutes an "under-
represented" viewpoint, officials can require the broadcast of
almost any content they desire.
Thus, although removing the anti-state focus of the First
Amendment and investing the state with power to determine
speech outcomes could lead to greater viewpoint diversity in
the short run, it can only accomplish that goal at the expense of
individual freedom. It narrows the protective scope of the First
Amendment, rendering it an amendment maximally protective
of those whose views are politically preferred and minimally
protective of those whose views are not. In this way, our First
Amendment becomes an unequal freedom, fully protecting the
exercise of speech by certain favored individuals who do not
own media outlets at the expense of those who do. This grand
scheme to redistribute rights protection is alien to the tradi-
tional First Amendment. Moreover, it will ineluctably lead to a
general chilling effect, as the acts of state suppression form a
pattern that reveals the state's content biases.
In Images of a Free Press, Lee C. Bollinger presents a most
peculiar argument in favor of "partial access regulation" that
he believes adequately responds to many of the concerns raised
against such regulation. Bollinger's argument is unique among
474. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 121-41 (1987); ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON
JOHNSON: MEANS OF ASCENT 82-106 (1990); EMORD, supra note 9, at 225-27.
475. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 294.
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academic theories. Bollinger not only lauds the societal bene-
fits that Barron and Fiss have said flow from access regula-
tion,476 he also admits that such regulations deprive the media
of editorial discretion and threaten to create a speech ortho-
doxy.47 Nevertheless, he thinks that individual liberty may be
sacrificed to some extent in order to achieve the social objec-
tives of Barron and Fiss. He thinks that this is possible without
much harm through selective enforcement of access regula-
tions.478 In short, although unique among academic theories,
Bollinger's viewpoint is nothing new; he favors the print/
broadcast dichotomy that now exists. He just assumes that
such regulation can be imposed without a general chilling
effect on the unregulated media. 471 Writes Bollinger:
In light of the double-edged character of access regula-
tion, and the special circumstances of the mass media, it
may make sense to affirm congressional authority to
implement a regulatory scheme, but only partially within
the media. With this approach, with a major branch of
the press remaining free of regulation, the costs and risks
of regulation may be held at an acceptable level.
Expressed another way, only under such a system can we
afford to allow the degree of governmental regulation
that is necessary to realize the objectives of public
access.
480
Bollinger's partial access theory is flawed in at least five
respects.
476. Bollinger thinks society benefits from access regulations, because
such regulations "neutralize the disparities that impede the proper
functioning of the 'marketplace of ideas' " and "equalize opportunities within
our society to command an audience and thereby to mobilize public
opinion." BOLLINGER, supra note 469, at 110. These leveling effects help us
"realize democratic ideals," according to Bollinger. Id.
477. Bollinger believes access regulations produce "three adverse
consequences:" (1) deprivation of editorial discretion, .(2) the creation of an
official speech orthodoxy, and (3) the establishment of precedent conducive
to the expansion of different forms of access regulation on media. Id. at Ill-
13.
478. Bollinger believes that access regulations promote certain
"constitutional traditions" while disparaging others. Id. at 110. He describes
such regulations as "both desirable and dangerous." Id. at 113. He advocates
maintaining restrictions on the electronic press and all new modes of mass
communication while retaining maximum press freedom in the print context.
He thinks this the ideal way to accommodate both the democratic ideals of
the access advocates and the personal autonomy concerns of the traditional
First Amendment advocates. Id. at 113-15.
479. Id. at 114.
480. Id. at 113-14.
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(1) Bollinger's theory violates the minority-protecting
premise of the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights gener-
ally, yet provides no reasoned explanation why this violation
should be countenanced. The First Amendment and the Bill of
Rights have historically been understood to protect the rights
of the minority against the freedom violative acts of the major-
ity.48 1 In advocating partial access regulation Bollinger dis-
penses with this minority-protecting premise without remark.
He writes: "The prospect that some regulated editors will
forgo coverage of some political discussion because of reply
requirements need not necessitate rejection of access regula-
tion, for the benefits may still outweigh the costs."482 This
statement is much too facile to effectively challenge a cardinal
First Amendment principle.
State speech orthodoxies are verboten under the First
Amendment.48 3 This is why the unorthodox speech of one,
even a major media company's editor-in-chief, cannot be sup-
pressed by the many consistent with the First Amendment,
whether or not that editor's speech offends certain favored
political or religious nostrums. Likewise, the amendment can-
not be permitted to serve as an instrument to communicate the
viewpoints Bollinger, Barron, and Fiss believe deserving of
media access at the expense of the right to free speech and
press of even one editor, regardless of that editor's political or
social views. If the minority-protecting premise of the First
Amendment is to have true meaning (and it must if each of us is
to be protected should we ever choose to dissent from the
accepted wisdom), it cannot be construed in a biased manner
but must be construed in light of equal justice for all-the rich
and the poor, the Republican and the Democrat, the media ora-
481. See supra note 440. This principle is perhaps most eloquently
stated by Justice Holmes in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-
55 (1929), "if there is any principle of the Constitution that more
imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free
thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the
thought we hate." Repeatedly, the First Amendment has served as a shield
against the imposition of majority will on a dissenting minority spokesperson.
See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 2533 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404
(1990).
482. BOLLINGER, supra note 469, at 112.
483. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion ... ").
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tor and the soap box orator alike. Access regulations, even par-
tial ones, violate the minority-protecting premise by
supplanting the free press editorial judgments of a single
media editor with those preferred by government.
(2) Bollinger replaces the First Amendment's most power-
ful weapon against state suppression of the press, its onus
against state deprivation of private speech, with what is in fact a
mere rational basis balancing formula. In Images of a Free Press,
Bollinger never analyzes which standard should be applied to
assess state action against private editorial judgments. Rather,
he simply presumes that "competing social interests" should
be balanced against "[t]he idea of journalistic autonomy" with
the latter being circumscribed to accommodate the former-
what appears to be a rational basis treatment.4 84 However, the
First Amendment has historically stood as a very high barrier
against state action that would violate individual rights of free
speech and press to attain the "social good." Bollinger has not
succeeded in making a convincing case for lowering that bar-
rier. He has not explained in any detail why state suppression
of private editorial judgments through partial access regula-
tions should not be strictly scrutinized to protect private edito-
rial discretion against governmental action.
(3) Bollinger erroneously assumes that access regulations
on the electronic media will not create a pervasive chilling
effect destructive of the core values of the First Amendment.
48 5
Bollinger seems to appreciate that if the electronic media (the
ones chosen for his access regulatory regime) are the preferred
and most populous media (which they are) his system of partial
access regulation might have to be re-examined.48 6 Indeed, it
should be. If implemented, Bollinger's partial access regime
would clearly have a pervasive chilling effect because the vast
majority of Americans look to the electronic media as their pri-
mary source of news and opinion. Consequently, government
violation of editorial autonomy and promotion' of state
orthodoxies in this media would seriously diminish 'the ability
484. BOLLINGER, supra note 469, at 24.
485. He writes "One advantage of a partial regulatory system is that the
unregulated sector provides an effective check against each of the costs of
regulation. A partial scheme offers some assurance that information not
disseminated by the regulated sector will nevertheless be published by' the
unregulated press." Id. at 114.
486. He digresses: "[T]o the extent that the value of a partial
regulation scheme depends upon it affecting the marketplace of ideas as a
whole, we must determine how many people read or view only unregulated
media or are otherwise untouched by the regulations." Id. at 120.
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of the press, as a whole, to exercise a critical check on malad-
ministration, to explore to the widest limits the parameters of
public debate, and to introduce those new, potentially chal-
lenging political ideas that might offend policy makers.
It is not enough that some, those in the print media not
regulated under Bollinger's theory, could theoretically make
up for the electronic media's deficiencies. Through Bollinger's
partial access regime, the effective power of the most populous
media is reduced, greatly increasing the likelihood that malad-
ministration will go unchecked, that public debate will be less
than robust, and that new, potentially challenging political
ideas will be suppressed. Under Bollinger's preferred regime,
only the least populous and least financially able media, the
print media, could be counted on to perform the watchdog
function of the press-an inadequate substitute for a truly free
press.
(4) Bollinger thinks it best to limit his partial access regu-
latory regime to new media.487 He makes this statement with-
out discussing its logical consequences. He ignores the fact
that imposition of access regulations on the new electronic
media economically burdens them and so inhibits their devel-
opment, to the advantage of incumbents. When market driven
in a competitive media environment, unencumbered by state
restraints on the content of their broadcasts or cablecasts, new
electronic media are best able to enter markets and satisfy the
demands of viewers and listeners. When impediments, such as
access regulations, exist, they must substitute for programming
they have selected programming desired by the state, but not
necessarily by their viewers and listeners. This substitution
causes them to lose opportunities to retain precious viewers
and listeners as well as advertisers. These viewers and listeners
can easily change channels to other media that are not forced
to present unwelcome press offerings. Moreover, complying
with access regulations requires the payment of costly fees to
lawyers who must be hired to help the regulated entity compre-
hend their rights and responsibilities under the regulatory
regime and respond to legal inquiries made by the regulators.
Hence each access regulation becomes a greater and greater
economic burden for the regulated station, a burden that rises
in proportion to the zeal with which the state enforces the
regulations.
487. Bollinger professes that there are "special advantages to limiting
regulation to new technologies," but never explains what he means by this.
Id. at 120.
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(5) Finally, Bollinger presents no reasoned explanation
why the electronic media should be treated differently than the
print media. He appears to assume that the two should be
treated differently but given their profound commonalities, this
presumption is entirely unjustified. Consequently, his argu-
ment lacks a proper foundation in reason.
Like Barron, Fiss, and Caristi, Bollinger entirely ignores
the insurmountable First Amendment problems posed by
implementing access regulations, by placing the government in
the role of determining what constitutes an idea or group
deserving of press access and which media should have its
property expropriated to permit access. Neither Barron, Fiss,
nor Caristi has explained how it is possible for the state to
avoid censorship in selecting views worthy of access, in select-
ing media to impose rights of access, and in enforcing access
decrees. Bollinger also fails to present this most basic and
essential explanation.
None of the complete or partial access regulatory systems
advocated by scholars escapes the grave dangers of censorship
associated with elimination of the anti-state focus of the First
Amendment.
D. The Preservationist Perspective
The benefits of the private communications sphere cannot
co-exist with the re-orientation of First Amendment law away
from an anti-state focus in favor of state intervention. How-
ever, this re-orientation has already occurred in modern broad-
cast law. Increasingly, under the mantle of diversity, the
government enforces rights of access to the press for those
whose views the government defines as underrepresented in
the media. To avoid the dangers of censorship attendant to
this approach and to ensure that the principal source of news
and information in our society is cloaked with a maximum
degree of free speech and press protection requires application
of the print model standard to the broadcast press. To ensure
that editors may freely engage in strident editorialization with-
out fear of suffering from regulatory restraints imposed after
the fact, the broadcast media must be set free.
A new constitutional doctrine is necessary: one that will
ensure the unencumbered operation of speech and press in a
protected private sphere. In Freedom, Technology, and the First
Amendment, I offer the "Preservationist Perspective" as that new
doctrine. The Preservationist Perspective has two components:
(1) Static Barriers against government intervention and (2) Adap-
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tive Definitions for the terms "speech" and "press." Under the
first component, any effort by government to invade the private
speech and press sphere and to reorder existing relationships
there would directly implicate the First Amendment and would
be presumptively invalid (subjected to strict judicial scrutiny).
Under the second, the intended scope of the First Amendment
would be preserved by causing print model protection to tran-
scend all new modes of mass communication. Under this stan-
dard, government would be removed from the business of
determining who may speak or what may be said in
broadcasting.
488
As explained earlier, a system of licensing, by its very
nature, is antithetical to the print model. It makes the press
beholden to the government for its right to speak. Conse-
quently, it always chills speech, for it is the natural reaction of a
licensee who has invested significant amounts of money in the
licensed business to avoid taking actions that may offend the
preferences of the licensor and so risk a loss of license or, at a
minimum, an increase in the cost of doing business with the
licensor. Accordingly, the print media property rights environ-
ment must be replicated in the broadcast media context if
broadcasters are to be free.
VI. THE DIRE NEED FOR A PROPERTY RIGHTS ALTERNATIVE
Over thirty years ago, Ronald Coase persuasively argued
that a property rights system should replace the system of
broadcast licensing.489 Since then, numerous other scholars
have also argued in favor of a property rights alternative49 ° or
have recognized that such an alternative is workable.49' As
Coase understood, once property rights in broadcasting are
defined and protected by government, there is no need for fur-
ther regulation. The FCC becomes superfluous. Parties can
freely trade spectrum rights without engendering intolerable
interference.49 2 Reliance on market processes would be effi-
cient, permitting those who would put the resource to its best
and highest use to do so free of encumbrance from the state.
488. EMORD, supra note 9, at 128-29.
489. See Coase, supra note 26.
490. See, e.g., Arthur S. DeVany et al., A Property System for Market
Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1499-561 (1969); Douglas W. Webbink, Frequency Spectrum
Deregulation Alternatives, FCC Office of Plans and Policy (Oct. 1980);
Spitzer, supra note 12, at 1068-69.
491. See, e.g., BOLLINGER, supra note 473, at 89.
492. See Coase, supra note 26, at 27.
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A property based system could be phased into existence
through a federal statute that would replace existing content
and structural restrictions contained in Title III of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934.493 In brief, this new system would grant
existing licensees a fee simple property right to their currently
licensed operating parameters. That right would be defined
not merely by the frequency or channel used, but also by refer-
ence to all data that define a current licensee's broadcasting
parameters, including its tower height, its effective radiated
power, and its coverage contour configuration. These parame-
ters would be registered on a national database title registry
that would serve as an up-to-date computer storehouse, listing
information concerning all essential characteristics of each
broadcaster's technical facility. Under the new statute, a broad-
cast market entrant (or an existing operator who proposed to
alter its registered parameters) could commence new broadcast
operations (1) only after supplying registered broadcasters
with a detailed notice of the proposed new operation, affording
them a reasonable time for analysis and comment, and (2) only
after filing with the national title registry an appropriate form
detailing the precise nature of the proposed operation. These
steps would enable broadcast property rights holders to pro-
tect their rights against trespassers and would ensure the integ-
rity of the national title registry.
The new federal statute would define and prohibit objec-
tionable levels of interference into an existing broadcaster's
service area, and it would specify heavy fines for such a tres-
pass. Disputes would be decided in the federal courts, not by a
federal agency. Procedures would be established for obtaining
preliminary and permanent injunctions against broadcast tres-
passers. Such suits would lie immediately following com-
mencement of the offending broadcast operation. The statute
would set a receiver standard to judge interference in the vari-
ous broadcast services. Common law "first in time, first in
right" principles would govern the disputes. Proof of loss of
audience reception within an existing broadcaster's service area
would be prima facie grounds for seeking an injunction against
an offending use. Such injunctions would have to be narrowly
tailored to merely stop the offending use without shutting
down the new facility, if that is possible.
In most instances, notice of a potentially offending use
would cause incumbent broadcasters to negotiate with those
seeking new facilities before commencing a costly court battle.
493. See EMORD, supra note 9, at 302-04.
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Existing broadcasters would often enter into agreements
whereby a newcomer would either buy the incumbent's opera-
tion or pay the incumbent rents for accepting a limited amount
of interference or for modifying its technical parameters to
avoid objectionable interference. Coase has explained how
accommodations could be made between newcomers and
incumbents:
The operator whose signals were interfered with, if he
had the right to stop such interference, would be willing
to forego this right if he were paid more than the amount
by which the value of his service was decreased by this
interference or the costs which he would have to incur to
offset it. The other operator would-be willing to pay, in
order to be allowed to interfere, an amount up to the
costs of suppressing the interference or the decrease in
the value of the service he could provide if unable to use
his transmitter in a way which resulted in interference.
Or, alternatively, if this operator had the right to cause
interference, he would be willing to desist if he were paid
more than the costs of suppressing the interference or
the decrease in the value of the service he could provide
if interference were barred. And the operator whose sig-
nals were interfered with would be willing to pay to stop
this interference an amount up to the decrease in the
value of his service which it causes or the costs he has to
incur to offset the interference.
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The contemplated system would be entirely free of content
restraints and would enable new technologies to be introduced
by anyone with the financial wherewithal to implement them.
The contemplated system would not differ in any other mate-
rial technical respects from the existing system, which protects
rights to use the spectrum in its licenses and has protected
those rights with little difficulty in light of near universal
respect for them among broadcasters.49 5
For over sixty-four years, broadcast journalists have been
second class citizens, subjected to content restrictions that
legally cannot be imposed on their print media counterparts.
Broadcasters have often kowtowed to the dictates of the FCC,
and the FCC has often kowtowed to the dictates of Congress.
Time and again political pressures have reinforced the essential
494. Coase, supra note 26, at 28.
495. The federal government's new role would be limited to affording
legal recognition and protection to broadcast property rights and to ensuring
that broadcasters honored U.S. treaties concerning spectrum use.
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monopoly rent/content control quid pro quo that has histori-
cally defined the relationship between broadcasters and the
government.
With the continuing proliferation of electronic modes of
communication and the public's on-going movement away
from print to these modes, we confront the spectre of a vanish-
ing First Amendment. The First Amendment will only retain
its full protective compass if it is permitted to transcend time
and technology. The adoption of full First Amendment protec-
tion for broadcasting, the complete elimination of FCC content
and structural regulations, and the implementation of a prop-
erty rights alternative are essential first steps on the road back
to a free press.

